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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION.  
Often in comparative philosophy Western ideas are superimposed on other cultures. 
Western languages play a crucial role in this, as most often comparative philosophy uses 
Western languages. The thinking of Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism, and especially their 
ideas on language, can aid comparative philosophy in trying to overcome the 
metaphysical way of thinking that has dominated Western philosophy. In comparing 
Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism I argue for a change of perspective towards a non-
metaphysical reading of Daoism, which I think better suits the Daoist sensibilities.   
Through a reading of Heidegger’s thinking about the ancient Greeks and some 
poets, chapter one argues for the importance of Heidegger’s different view of language 
for understanding his place in comparative thinking. Heidegger’s later thinking is fruitful 
as it advocates openness towards what is other, and argues for the idea of 
Auseinandersetzung as keeping, or gathering of difference. 
Chapter two introduces Derrida as a complicated descendant of Heidegger. A 
different perspective on language is vital to locate Derrida intelligibly in comparative 
philosophy. Through an analysis of some Derridean terms I argue that context or 
difference becomes constitutive of any identity, and as context it is structurally and 
inherently open-ended. Applying this idea to language and translation, any closure is 
prohibited, and thus texts remain constantly open to different interpretations. The 
importance for comparative philosophy is that Derrida shows how Western metaphysical 
language is inadequate for comparative enterprises, how identities are never pure, but 
always based on relationality. The outside of philosophy is invited in, not to 
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accommodate itself within the existing sphere, but to upset it.  
Chapter three shows the shortcomings and metaphysical inclinations of various 
interpretations of Daoism, and then offers a different reading. Through an interpretation 
of classical Chinese language that challenges the universal orthodoxy that writing has to 
be a transcription of speech, I argue that a non-metaphysical reading of Daoism is 
possible and reflects better the Daoist sensibilities. In Daoism context and relationality 
are vital for any meaning to arise, meaning is thus always provisional. However, 
language is not denied value, but this value is based on provisionality. An analysis of 
translations of certain key characters of Daoism, especially the gateway (men) character, 
shows that the metaphysical language of Western philosophy distorts important ideas of 
Daoism.  
Chapter four argues that none of the protagonists deny the value of language; 
instead they are acutely aware of the importance of language in shaping thought. Yet they 
point to the limitations of ‘everyday’ language and its reference structure, and point to the 
possibilities that arise from thinking through, and thereby seeing and using differently, 
language. Notions as Auseinandersetzung, Ereignis, context, trace and relationality show 
important similarities between Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism, and further point to a 
non-metaphysical thinking of the in-between that comparative philosophy could be. I 
then establish that the negative approach of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism must be 
understood as a stage, yet that going beyond the inversion of opposites does not have to 
lead to positing some kind of metaphysical principle. 
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“Monotonisation of the world. Strong spiritual impression of all travels of the last years, 
despite the individual happiness: a pale drab of monotonisation of the world. Everything 
is becoming similar in its outward appearances, levelling out in a uniform cultural 
scheme. The individual customs of peoples are wearing off, the way of dress is becoming 
uniform, ethics international. Ever more nations seem fused together, people living and 
working in the same way, cities looking alike. Ever more the fine aroma of the 
specificness of cultures evaporates, ever more vengeful the colours peel off, and beneath 
the cracked layers of varnish the steel-coloured pistons of the mechanical bustle, the 
modern world-machine, become visible.” 1    
 “Being at one is godlike and good; whence, then, this craze 
 among men that there exists only One, why should all be one?”2 
                                                
1 Zweig 1990, 30, my translation. 
2 Hölderlin 1966, 70/71 (translation modified) and 1970, 241: 
“Einig zu sein, ist göttlich und gut; woher ist die Sucht denn  
Unter den Menschen, daß nur Einer und Eines nur sei?”  
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INTRODUCTION.  
Comparative philosophy is a relatively young discipline in philosophy. The realisation of 
the fundamental limitations of Western style (mainstream) philosophy, with its demands 
for strict logic and rationalism, as well as the increasing awareness that every single form 
of philosophy, and even scientific research, carries with it (the burden of) a cultural 
component and foresight, have resulted in more and more Western philosophers taking an 
interest in the ways of thinking of other (than Western) cultures, that were looked down 
upon earlier in Orientalist ways. On the other hand, non-Western cultures have felt the 
growing need to assess and integrate their respective forms of thinking in the greater 
philosophical discourse. Non-Western cultures are not only realising the importance of 
coming to terms with the West in a more profound way by advocating their own 
traditions in the philosophical discourse, but they are also aware that their own 
philosophies and cultures per se are very much worth further exploring and comparing 
with other non-Western ways of thinking. 
Let me start with an explanation of my views on what comparative philosophy 
should and should not be, at least if it is sincere in trying to be truly inter-cultural. 
Comparative philosophy can not stop at the finding and explanation of similarities and 
differences between thinking from different cultures, however valuable these findings 
are. As a discipline, it should locate itself between these differences, while aware of the 
impossibility of a purely neutral viewpoint, and in that sense I use the term inter-cultural. 
Being between different cultures suggests not the Western metaphysical ideal of 
objectivity, but does suggest the openness towards what is other. 
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In the last decades, comparative philosophy has seen great development. I think 
recent scholarship in comparative philosophy and other areas exhibits very little anymore 
of Edward Said’s Orientalism3 in the sense of a feeling of Western superiority or 
imperialism, but that does not mean it is now completely neutral. Rather, my argument 
will be that the language of many intercultural encounters still displays and favours a 
prejudiced and one-sided way of thinking, even if often not consciously, and that this 
one-sidedness is presented as neutrality or objectivity. Said showed convincingly that 
there is a certain mindset at work in a lot of scholarly work which involves the encounter 
between different cultures. This mindset to him is the result of colonial imperialism, 
which gave rise to the idea of the supremacy of certain (mainly Western) civilisations or 
cultures over others. According to Said, even in this present era much of what he 
considers to be Orientalism still dominates scholarship on other than Western cultures. 
Said’s notion of Orientalism made problematic certain questions of how to (re-)present 
other cultures, or of what constitutes another culture. His main idea is that most 
representations are biased in that they tend to see the other culture as inferior, and 
promote and justify the dominance of the representator’s culture over that of the other.  
Heidegger has argued in similar vein that disciplines like ethnology already 
“operate with definite preliminary conceptions and interpretations of human Dasein in 
general,”4 and while Heidegger does not have the political implications in mind that Said 
has uncovered, we can read in this the idea that the West imposes its structures and 
                                                
3
 See Said 1978. 
4 Heidegger 1993, 51; 1962, 76. In this dissertation I work with both original German language works by 
Heidegger and English translations, and refer to these in the following way: If the reference is to an original 
German language work, the year of publication and page number will appear in normal type, and where 
possible and available the reference to the work in translation will follow in bold type. In general I will 
follow available translations of Heidegger, unless there is either none available or I do not agree with the 
translation, in which cases translations will be mine, as will be indicated, and in such cases and others 
where I find it clarifying, the German original passage will appear in footnotes. 
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conceptions on other cultures. 
A similar thing has often happened in comparative philosophy, whereby Western 
ideas, concepts and thought structures were superimposed on other cultures with the idea 
that these were a more truthful approach to what ‘they’ were really thinking. It is here 
that Western languages play a crucial role, as most intercultural exchanges in philosophy 
are ‘done’ in Western languages. It will thus be argued that the language of current 
comparative philosophy shows a proclivity or tendency towards a form of Orientalism, 
very subtle but still present indeed in the ways of communication and the focus of 
scholarly research, and which, thought through, has certain philosophical and even 
political implications which arise from misunderstanding or misrepresenting other 
cultures.  
Contrary to such misrepresentations, to accommodate different ways of thinking 
into one discourse without that discourse favouring one of these ways above the other, 
and thus to make productive meetings possible, should be one of the main tasks of 
comparative philosophy. This task is by no means an easy one, and it remains to be seen 
whether this is at all possible without getting caught in some political, linguistic, 
metaphysical or other prejudice. This will be one of the main questions of this 
dissertation. I will explore the possibility of a different reading of the protagonists that 
seeks to avoid the standard metaphysical implications. The comparative way of thinking 
wishes to acknowledge and promote the equivalence of different cultures, whereby 
otherness and diversity are valued above equality and unity. Equivalence does not mean 
equality, for to ‘make equal’ carries with it the connotation of getting rid of differences. 
In this sense the language of Western philosophy has been notorious for its equalising 
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effects because of its thinking in terms of generalisations, ideas of identity and unity 
valued over difference and change. It is also a fact that most if not all Western languages 
have been so influenced by the metaphysical way of thinking that it is hard to even bring 
up the idea of some different way of thinking. Therefore a new way of seeing language is 
vital for the project of comparative philosophy. It is clear that comparative thinking 
should not be a proponent of some obscure world syncretism or of a ‘melting of horizons’ 
that would annihilate all differences and thus the richness of diversity in favour of unity 
or identity, a world culture. We should avoid trying to make things identical (what 
Heidegger calls das Gleiche), but we should treat them as being similar in a different 
way, which translates Heidegger’s notion “the same” (das Selbe). As he says: “But the 
same is not the merely identical. In the merely identical, the difference disappears. In the 
same the difference appears...”5 It is problematic to think of a ‘common’ ground in this 
respect. Although Heidegger has referred to such a thing on occasions, he simultaneously 
hinted that this common ground could be nothing but a hidden one.6 One focus of this 
research will be to look for the way this ‘common’ ground is to be thought of, and what it 
would entail. If anything, it should admit of differences as equally originary. Similarities 
at some level should not function as above, or more important than, differences. 
The idea of comparative philosophy which will guide me in this dissertation thus 
has the following characteristics. Comparative philosophy should focus on two things, 
similarities and differences between ways of thinking. It should however not content 
itself with merely pointing to these similarities and differences, but instead seek to make 
them productive in the sense that through these similarities and differences we come to 
                                                
5 Heidegger 1999, 35; 1974, 45: “Allein das Selbe ist nicht das Gleiche. Im Gleichen verschwindet die 
Verschiedenheit. Im Selben erscheint die Verschiedenheit.” See also: Heidegger 1994b, 187. 
6 Heidegger 1997b, 94; 1971a, 8. 
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understand better first of all what we are comparing, and second the way in which we 
compare these philosophies and that means also our contemporary philosophies and 
presuppositions of how we perceive our world. I do not believe in one overarching theory 
or methodology of comparative philosophy. In that sense my approach is hermeneutic, in 
that it recognises the necessity of perspectives. There are however a couple of ideas 
which comparative philosophy should adhere to. It should seek a dialogue, between two 
different cultural perspectives (and it must be noticed that the Western philosophical 
tradition, although often one of the interlocutors, is not necessarily always involved), that 
is based on equivalence. This dialogic approach means that comparative philosophy 
should try as much as possible to position itself in-between the different cultures. How 
this in-between is to be perceived will be addressed in this dissertation. But at least it is 
not meant to overcome differences, but to acknowledge and appreciate them in a 
realisation of the complementarity of perspectives. Raimundo Panikkar argues for 
example that comparative philosophy should be understood as “diatopical 
hermeneutics,”7 by which he means a search for understanding in a dialogue between 
different spaces.  
My understanding of comparative philosophy also entails that theory and practice 
of comparative philosophy can not be separated. This is meant in a double sense. First of 
all, it means that it is impossible to abstract a purely theoretical methodology, which 
would somehow stand above, and be applicable in, all instances of comparative 
philosophy. Second, it means that as such, any comparison is of necessity related to the 
theory of comparative philosophy in that it is only in the comparisons that we can locate 
                                                
7
 See Panikkar’s contribution to Interpreting Across Boundaries (Larson & Deutsch (eds.) 1988), especially 
130-136. 
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any theory or method. In other words, the interlocutors of the comparative dialogue to a 
large extent dictate the guiding theory behind that particular dialogue. So this dissertation 
is as much an exercise in comparative philosophy as it is about comparative philosophy. 
In other words, we can only learn about comparative philosophy by doing it, by actively 
crossing over to different ways of thinking. Since I believe and hope to prove that a non-
metaphysical understanding of Daoism is feasible, in effect this means that comparing 
Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism will entail a non-metaphysical and non-dialectic 
approach or what Heidegger has called Auseinandersetzung. This approach is the only 
possible way to take serious the fact that there is no neutral overall birds-eye view from 
which we could objectively look down at the compared ways of thinking.8 
Last, but maybe most important, understanding comparative philosophy as a 
constantly renewing dialogue entails that language is a crucial factor. Any comparative 
philosophical enterprise has to be cautious of the language it uses. Certain conceptual 
schemes are so embedded in Western languages that it is hard to avoid or circumvent 
them within these languages, but this is exactly what we need to do in order for different 
conceptual schemes to be brought forward in comparative philosophy. With this in mind I 
wish to research the philosophies of Heidegger, Derrida, and classical Daoism, and hope 
to show that the ideas of language propagated in these ways of thinking can aid the 
project of comparative philosophy specifically, and philosophy generally, in trying to 
overcome its suffocating ties to the metaphysical way of thinking that has dominated 
Western philosophy for the last twenty-five hundred years and is still dominating and 
                                                
8 I do not hereby deny that some comparisons of certain ways of thinking can be comparisons of the 
metaphysics involved in these ways of thinking, yet I do wish to argue that even such a comparison in itself 
should not aim at or be led by a supposedly neutral metaphysical principle or a dialectical sublimation of 
the differences. 
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frustrating our efforts in intercultural encounters. This dominance of metaphysics in 
philosophy will be evident if we look closer at Heidegger’s and Derrida’s writings on 
these subjects, which will also show how Western languages in general have been 
influenced by philosophical ideas and language, and have thereby become biased through 
this metaphysical dominance. In the same way, I will show how many interpretations of 
the Daoist classics have inserted this same bias in an effort to appropriate Daoism into the 
wider philosophical discourse. In arguing against what I would call these metaphysical 
interpretations I am not suggesting that there is some other, true meaning of what these 
Daoist classics mean.9 On the contrary, I am suggesting that the search for such a strict 
unified meaning is futile considering the inherent vagueness of the compositions and the 
language used. This does not mean however, that Daoism is open to an “anything goes” 
attitude, a relativism or scepticism. Obviously, some interpretations make much more 
sense than others. The importance of my approach lies more in the idea that comparative 
philosophy should also further our understanding of the problems we face today, and that 
means that a purely historical approach or one-sidedly metaphysical approach is 
unsuitable. We need to look at the possible contributions of the thought of Heidegger, 
Derrida and Daoism to a better understanding of this world, and that means an attitude 
that is more open to different interpretations of the texts of these three protagonists.  
MAIN QUESTIONS. 
There are then a number of questions which this research will try to address, and the main 
                                                
9 The metaphysical interpretation of Daoism is not a specifically Western invention or imposition. 
Metaphysical interpretations have been found in the Chinese tradition as well, for example in the Wang Bi 
commentary on the Daodejing. Yet my main concern is the domination of the comparative discourse by 
these metaphysical approaches, and that is why I focus more on the Western interpretations of Daoism, and 
those by Chinese scholars who seem influenced by these Western interpretations. 
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one will be: 
To what extent are differences in language and the backgrounds of 
particular languages used by Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism affected by 
and do they affect not only philosophy in general and culturally different 
ways of thinking in particular, but especially the ongoing efforts in 
comparative philosophy, and thus in what way do these differences in 
languages have an effect on intercultural understanding?  
To further explain this main question a number of related questions are asked: 
1 What exactly is the influence of language and its use in the thinking of Heidegger, 
Derrida and Daoism? Are there similarities in their ideas or use of language, and if so, 
what do these amount to if we apply them to intercultural encounters, dialogues etc? And 
are there serious differences in their linguistic views, which would warrant caution in 
trying to apply similarities? 
2 In relation to this, how should we see the ongoing practice of intercultural 
understanding in mostly Western languages? We could see this in two ways, as an 
obstruction and hindrance to intercultural understanding, or as a necessary medium of 
comparative philosophy. Another question here would be if a change to other than 
Western languages for comparative philosophy would not run the same risks. 
3 Does the recognition of important differences in language and in ways of thinking 
lead to a position of relativism or not? What are the communication possibilities? Is it 
possible to take an objective stand and maintain that serious and unprejudiced 
communication is possible, or do we have to admit to the hermeneutic fact brought to our 
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attention by Gadamer that no dialogue or discourse is ever so neutral, that prejudice or 
perspective is inevitable, but that we can turn this into a positive aspect of understanding? 
Yet what are the consequences of such a view? 
4 What can be said of the existence of ideas about intercultural encounters in 
Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism? Aside (or maybe not) from the language, are there ideas 
to be found which expressly relate to other cultures, or from which we can construct ideas 
on how these three would look at universalism or cultural differences and the way to deal 
with them? 
5 The idea of ‘Nothingness’10 is prominent in Heidegger and Daoism, and to a 
lesser extent in Derrida as well. What is the status of this Nothingness, as it seems often 
to be seen as something beyond language? How does language relate to this Nothingness, 
and how is it seen to function within and without language? 
6 How exactly is language seen here? Does it consist solely of the spoken and 
written word, or should we extend the meaning of language by including different sign 
structures, like art, music and poetry? As we shall see, poetry has a special function for 
Heidegger, and we will have to rethink in what way we extend the meaning of language. 
Do we just widen the scope of language, or do we have to radically rethink the whole 
idea of language and its functions? If we do, what are the consequences for philosophy? 
7 Given the findings, what in the end should comparative philosophy stand for and 
what should it practically consist of? What are its possibilities?  
                                                
10 This dissertation will feature a number of odd or even nonexistent English words or neologisms, as well 
as untranslated German and French words and neologisms, and further untranslated classical Chinese 
characters in Romanisation. The reader is asked to be patient in this respect and to acknowledge the 
necessity of my stretching of the English language or resorting to non-English in making my arguments.  
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These questions are not easy ones. This dissertation attempts to shed some light on the 
questions of the problem of how language and interpretation go together in comparative 
philosophy. Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism might be able to change our ways of 
thinking about these problems, in anticipation of a different way of thinking. Guiding this 
attempt will be the notion of a dialogue between them, thought through from different 
perspectives such as logos, polemos, physis, differance, trace, supplement and dao, tian, 
men, ziran, wuwei.11 Starting with Heidegger’s approach to comparative philosophy I will 
then bring in Derrida as both a proponent of this approach and as its critic, and proceed to 
see whether his philosophy allows a comparative variant and whether his critiques 
directed at language offer a viable alternative to the traditional thinking of identity and 
opposition that still dominates philosophy today. From ‘the other side,’ Daoism will be 
put in intercultural perspective as well, and its interpretations by Western language 
translators and philosophers scrutinised. Heidegger and Derrida show that the 
metaphysical idea of language as naming can be seen as an attempt at identification and 
stabilisation, fixing reference, to which my interpretation of Daoism would offer an 
alternative view, resulting from the horizons expanded by Heidegger and Derrida, but 
most of all in accordance with the ‘original’ openness of Daoism.  
The whole process of this dissertation will have to keep in mind that it is a work 
about three different philosophies, in three (or more) different languages. To 
accommodate these into English is not something to be seen as a side effect. It is rather 
one of the main problems. To give but one example beforehand, the dynamic or process 
character of Heidegger’s work, especially his ‘verbal’ thinking, is hardly translatable into 
                                                
11 Romanisation of Chinese characters will be according to the now standard Pinyin conversion, except in 
quotations where the Wade-Giles Romanisation is used, so as not to disrupt the original translations. 
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English, as any translation becomes static very easily. Think of Wesen, usually rendered 
as ‘essence,’ or sometimes as ‘root unfolding.’ It is easy to misread ‘essence’ in a 
metaphysical way as substantial and thereby neglect the ‘esse’ in it. And as a rather bad 
starting point I could quote Heinrich Petzet, Heidegger’s long term friend, who on the 
occasion of being presented with the English translation of Sein und Zeit complained that 
“almost every sentence either missed an essential point or failed to consider a perhaps-
significant nuance of meaning. This was confirmed when we [Heidegger and Petzet, 
SVB] went through the translation sample together.”12 I will try to alert the reader to 
these problems throughout the dissertation, but will nevertheless venture forth. The main 
focus will thus be on language and on the logos of dialogue, and on the supposed 
‘nothingness’ as the guiding principle, but this will be rethought from three different 
sides in a way which runs counter to usual interpretations.  
To conclude this introduction, we need to be aware that while the dialogue is the 
most important means for comparative thinking, language is also the foremost danger in 
this area. The development of ideas about translation and its importance in philosophy of 
language seems to warrant a closer look at translation(s). W.v.O Quine’s theory of the 
indeterminacy of translation13 is that there are always different possible translations, and 
that it is only a matter of elegance or usefulness which translation is chosen. There are no 
objectively true translations. Quine uses this theory to argue that meaning itself is relative 
or indeterminate, because there is no objective language which will capture the meaning 
of things. Donald Davidson14 seems to avoid this at first, but he can only do so by 
                                                
12 Petzet 1983, 176-177; 1993, 168. Words or sentences in quotations followed by SVB, in square brackets, 
are mine but in line with the text. 
13 See Quine 1960, especially 22-35, and Quine 1998. 
14 See Davidson 1998. 
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assuming some basic truth on which he grounds his theory of meaning. Certain 
constraints are introduced to get an idea of this truth. But Davidson can only defend these 
constraints by introducing the ‘principle of charity,’ which basically assumes that we 
assign our own beliefs and ideas of truth onto speakers of other languages and cultures, 
holding our Western notions as universal truth conditions. And even if we do not 
extrapolate our own beliefs, others are at least supposed to be intelligible to us, which can 
only mean we assume that they think like us, in similar categories, and from there we 
arrive at meaning. But even with this theory Davidson can not deny some degree of 
indeterminacy of interpretation, translation and thereby meaning. 
There is thus a translation problem in philosophy of language, and the research 
will take this indeterminacy of language up using Heidegger and Derrida, who have both, 
although in different ways, done very much for a different appreciation of the role of 
language in philosophy. There are different sorts of language used in different areas of 
philosophy. There is for example a certain use of language in analytic philosophy, and a 
different one in continental philosophy, and yet a different one in Daoism. So there are 
not only translation problems between languages, but also between different ways of 
thinking within one language. English can be used in a specific way for analytic 
philosophy, but also for continental philosophy, where it is used in a different way. 
Philosophical languages can then not be simply equated or sided with natural languages; 
different philosophies imply a specific use of languages. Different use, different meaning. 
What my research will focus on is mainly continental philosophy in relation to classical 
Chinese philosophy in translation, where different ways of thinking try to find a way of 
expression in one language. The question is whether such a one language, in this case 
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English, will be able to provide enough ‘space’ for such differences to emerge.  
The point of all this is that I realise that in the ideal circumstances I would have to 
have proficiency in the classical Chinese language. But nevertheless I think that even 
without this proficiency and with just some acquaintance with classical Chinese, I can 
still make a valuable contribution. I am not doing a language study; my main concern is 
how language is used, how it functions in (intercultural) dialogue, what the metaphysical 
assumptions behind it are, if there are any, and how language is seen to relate to the 
world and reality. In my view this can be done by studying works on Chinese language, 
and by studying the way translators, commentators, philosophers and interpreters have 
dealt with the problems they encountered. This will bring out the profound differences of 
the Chinese language from Western languages, and thereby the difference in ways of 
thinking in Daoism in an equally thorough fashion. The point is that I think it is possible, 
without fluency in classical Chinese, to nevertheless raise interesting questions about the 
Daoist way of thinking by looking at the differences in translations and interpretations 
and the reasons that translators and philosophers have given for defending these 
differences, questions which might then be addressed by those with sufficient knowledge 
of classical Chinese. It is also the case that as this is a work in the English language, it 
appeals more directly to English speaking readers, and one of its main points is to show 
the difficulties that arise especially in the space between cultures. By taking into account 
as many differing translations and interpretations as possible, I hope to make up for the 
lack of proficiency in classical Chinese.  
Another reason why I believe I can make a valuable contribution is that one of the 
things I hope to show is exactly how being able to read Chinese does not necessarily 
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entail getting closer to the meaning of the Daoist classics. Ability in a foreign language is 
always influenced by certain ways of thinking, and scholars with proficiency in classical 
Chinese are known to widely differ on many aspects of the language. But even without 
such proficiency, the main aim of this dissertation is to promote intercultural 
understanding. This understanding is much needed today, and it is unrealistic to assume 
or expect proficiency in multiple languages to be a necessary requirement for the 
expansion of such understanding. I hope to show in conclusion that comparative thinking 
is possible despite the inherent dangers of interpretation, translation and language. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HEIDEGGER AND THE OTHER COMMENCEMENT.  
1.1  HEIDEGGER’S GREEK CONNECTION.  
“…that every reflection upon that which now is can take its rise and thrive only 
if, through a dialogue with the Greek thinkers and their language, it strikes root 
into the ground of our historical existence. That dialogue still awaits its 
beginning. It is scarcely prepared for at all, and yet it itself remains for us the 
precondition of the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world.”1  
Heidegger himself started or at least prepared both of the abovementioned dialogues. The 
first one, the dialogue with Greek thinking, was already long on his agenda as a means to 
help the overcoming of Western metaphysics. The fundamental characteristic of this 
metaphysics is the distinction between the sensuous and the non-sensuous since the time 
of Plato. The outcome of this distinction can be seen throughout the history of Western 
philosophy, as the abstracting and theorising influences of the later Greeks, the 
theologising influences of medieval times and scientification in more modern times of the 
originary thinking of Being. In general this distinction has led to further distinctions such 
as between form and matter, essence and attributes, mind and body, truth and appearance 
etc. Related to these general distinctions there arose the hierarchical view that one side of 
the distinction was worthy, good and true, while the other was at best a hindrance with 
which one had to live, or at worst something evil that was to be eradicated.  
                                                
1 Heidegger 1994b, 43; 1977, 157-158. 
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The transformation that thus took place throughout the history of thinking brought 
about and was brought about by a change of the functioning of language, in a reciprocal 
way, and the dominant theory has since become our standard way of seeing and 
experiencing the world, with little or no tolerance towards views which differ profoundly. 
The ancient Greeks were precisely different from this dominant metaphysical tradition in 
that they were before metaphysics, so what Heidegger saw in them was an opportunity 
for finding a different way of thinking which could challenge the dominating philosophy 
of his own time. 
It would be hard to overestimate the influence of early Greek thinking on 
Heidegger’s work. In nearly all his writings there are usually at least a mention or 
reference to an ancient Greek word or saying. As Heidegger obviously felt that the 
language of certain Presocratics was worth thinking over against the usual interpretations 
that are normally given, it is only logical that I too should venture into this. Because 
Heidegger thought that by looking more closely at the way in which the Greeks actually 
thought, or rather in how Heidegger reinterpreted them, we could find what is really 
worthy of thought. This Wiederholung of Greek thinking is very important for the project 
of comparative philosophy in two ways. First of all, Heidegger thought the 
Auseinandersetzung2 with the Greeks a necessary precondition for the possibility of an 
encounter with the East Asian world. His argument for this was that he thought that 
modern philosophy had become corrupted by the narrowness of the metaphysical and 
                                                
2 As we have briefly seen before, Auseinandersetzung is one of the key words in Heidegger’s thinking and 
also of this dissertation. A possible translation of Auseinandersetzung could be con-frontation, as it 
captures most of the meaning of coming together in difference through the hyphen. In most cases I will 
leave it untranslated because it is a word so important that a false translation or one that does not capture its 
full and ambivalent meaning, would seem inappropriate. There will however be discussion and explanation 
of the word throughout the dissertation. Wiederholung is another important word. Usually translated as 
‘repetition,’ We will see that Heidegger means it to be anything but a mere repeating of what others, in this 
case the ancient Greeks, have said and thought. 
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purely rational way of thinking, making it unsuitable for an encounter with very different 
thinking, this different thinking being exactly what Heidegger expected to find in East 
Asian thought. This narrow metaphysical outlook and the insistence on its rightness in 
certain places would prevent any encounter that would not try to explain things according 
to Western ideas and values. Heidegger also thought that in East Asian thinking he would 
find, along with a way of thinking that was not influenced by metaphysics as we know it 
in the Western world, languages or at least views on language that were equally unspoilt. 
The second reason why the dialogue or Auseinandersetzung or con-frontation 
with the Greeks is important, is that Heidegger’s translations and readings of the (ancient) 
Greeks is exemplary of the way he wishes us to approach that which is ‘foreign’ or 
‘other,’ in a thoughtful con-frontation that leaves what is con-fronted as it reveals itself, 
from itself, and to give this ‘other’ the space to do so. In other, slightly less Heideggerian 
words, the way to approach what is other is to let it speak for itself. The real difficulty is 
how to achieve this. Of course, ancient Greek civilisation has long vanished, and the 
same goes for the world of the Daoist classics, so even if given the chance, how could 
they be speaking for themselves? In spite of this obvious discrepancy, Heidegger thinks 
there are opportunities to think these ways of thinking in a more originary way, to make 
them speak again or rather to make them speak to us. In what follows, I will focus largely 
on Heidegger’s rethinking of the Presocratics, whom he saw as the representatives of 
thinking before it was overtaken by metaphysics. Insofar as philosophy has become 
metaphysical, he considered the Presocratics not philosophers, but “greater thinkers,”3 
who thought before Seinsvergessenheit, the forgetfulness of Being, made its entry into 
thinking, turning it into philosophy as metaphysics. 
                                                
3 Heidegger 1963, 24, my translation. 
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It should however be made clear that Heidegger was not some sort of nostalgic 
thinker who longed for the good old days of philosophical astonishment. Superficial 
reading of his work could lead one to take this position. After all, did he not on many 
occasions lash out at modern technology, the modern subject and its rational approach to 
all objects? He did indeed, but not because he was principally opposed to these things, 
but because he saw their increasing dominance and exclusive claim to truthfulness, and 
wanted to counterbalance this by putting them in their proper place. To this extent he 
argued for example for a reinterpretation of t (techne) and  (logos), the Greek 
etymological grounds for the notion of technology.  
Basically a lot of Heidegger’s work is based on reinterpretations of the ancient 
Greeks and their language in order to come to a new understanding of what is going on 
today. It is in this light that we must see his ongoing efforts at reading “what the Greeks 
have thought in an even more Greek manner”4 than the Greeks did themselves. This 
Wiederholung does not mean reading in the sense of a nostalgic return to what was, but it 
is rather a task that lies ahead of us, for the better understanding of what now is through 
what has been, by thinking it through ursprünglicher or more originary5 than the Greeks 
could themselves, which means thinking through what remained unthought by them. This 
means that the ancient Greeks inhabited this originary world, but they did not think it as 
such. This thinking through would then be Heidegger’s contribution to thinking as it lies 
before us. In a way we should read the sentence “thinking through” in a double sense, in 
                                                
4 Heidegger 1997b, 134; 1971a, 39. 
5 Although ‘originary’ is not a proper English word, it has philosophical use as being different from 
‘original(-ly)’, which has too many connotations with regard to a possible origin. ‘Originary’ also goes to 
explain the idea of thinking something through as it engages us, rather than ‘originally’, which would then 
mean thinking something exactly the way the Greeks, for example, thought it. Heidegger considers this last 
option to be either impossible or uninteresting, as it has nothing to say to us now. 
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that we are returning to the Greeks and what they thought and left unthought in this way 
of thinking, and in the sense that we get to think because of something else, which 
somehow shows itself to us and calls for our thinking. The German von in much of 
Heidegger’s work has the same connotations, in that it can mean both ‘from’ and ‘of,’ 
and even ‘on,’ so that we get to think ‘from’ the Greeks, by our renewed thinking ‘of’ 
them.6 
Heidegger uses the very same strategy in his con-frontation with Asia, so it is 
crucial to understand his Wiederholung of Greek thinking first. Heidegger’s efforts at 
rethinking and rereading the Presocratics were often in direct opposition to those of 
classical philology. It should be noted however that Heidegger was himself very well 
versed in ancient Greek and that the point of his enterprise was precisely to upset and 
uproot the tradition both of philosophy and philology by offering different ways of 
reading these Presocratic works. Heidegger was aware that traditional philology “is 
always already situated within a linguistic and conceptual structure which it does not 
question.”7 This linguistic and conceptual structure Heidegger thought of as onto-
theological philosophy or metaphysics, which has been mentioned already. In order to 
fight this single-minded domination of metaphysics, Heidegger therefore needed to 
challenge the philosophical foundations of philology, as it remained closed to different 
interpretations because of its liaisons with philosophy as metaphysics. This will be of 
considerable importance for the encounter with East Asia, as traditional philological 
translations and interpretations have dominated the efforts of Western philosophers 
                                                
6 In many of the titles of essays and books by Heidegger the hint to this double notion of von is obvious. 
Also see Heidegger 1996, 313-364: Brief über den Humanismus for a similar reading of the French ‘de,’ 
and Heidegger 1997a: Was Heisst Denken?, in which the double meaning of heissen and durch are 
expounded in similar fashion. 
7 Maly & Emad 1986, 6. 
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seeking to understand Asian ways of thinking for ages. 
There are three of these challenges to normal philological and philosophical 
interpretation which come readily to mind to anyone familiar with Heidegger’s work. 
These are his interpretations of Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. I will look into 
all three of them to see where their importance for comparative philosophy lies, starting 
with the earliest one, Anaximander. All three interpretations or readings by Heidegger 
involve similar thinking and ultimately make roughly the same point, but it is still useful 
to treat them separately in order to understand the full impact Heidegger’s interpretations 
of the Greeks had on his encounters8 with East Asia, and mainly with Daoism.  
1.1.1 ANAXIMANDER. 
In Der Spruch des Anaximander9 Heidegger inquires into what is being said in one of the 
oldest known pieces of Western philosophy:   
es s t  s ,   t a es a 
e . d a  d t s   d a   
t .10 
Looking at a number of different translations Heidegger comes to the conclusion that 
they are all influenced by later thinking, and that they thus do injustice to the Spruch or 
fragment itself, in that they impose concepts and ideas of a later time on an earlier 
thinking. This happens seemingly automatically when we translate, because we use terms 
which are familiar to us, but which need not at all have the same familiarity or usage for 
                                                
8 Note that Heidegger was already familiar with and thinking about Daoism and other East Asian thinking 
at the same time as he was working on the ancient Greeks. Yet Greece received more attention overall. 
9 Heidegger 1994a, 321-373; 1975, 13-59. 
10 Anaximander, taken from Heidegger’s Der Spruch des Anaximander. See also Kirk & Raven 1957, 
106/107. 
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the Greeks. Even in calling the above mentioned thinkers Pre-socratics later philosophers 
have made this mistake: “The unexpressed standard for considering and judging the early 
thinkers is the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. These are taken as the Greek 
philosophers who set the standard both before and after themselves.”11 The idea is that it 
was right to measure the Presocratics by standards of Plato because these earlier thinkers 
were supposedly thinking the same as the later ones, but not yet correct, or still 
fragmented.12 This sort of reading from one’s own point of view13 has happened 
throughout the history of metaphysics as Heidegger argues, from the early medieval 
Christian interpretations of what we should rather now call the early Greeks, to Hegel and 
even Nietzsche. 
Against these sorts of interpretations Heidegger exhorts his readers to look more 
closely at the text itself and what it could be saying from itself. However, this does not 
mean that Heidegger is arguing for a more literal translation, since we must not 
understand ‘literal’ in the normal sense. As he says: “But when a translation is only literal 
it is not necessarily faithful. It is faithful only when its terms are words which speak from 
the language of the matter itself.”14 Translating the original German sentence of this 
quote alone could lead us into trouble. The difference between Wörter and Worte is 
subtle, and goes together with the difference between wörtlich and wortgetreu. Both these 
latter are usually translated by ‘literal,’ although Krell and Capuzzi translate wortgetreu 
                                                
11 Heidegger 1994a, 322; 1975, 14. 
12 Compare for example Heidegger’s “Hegel und die Griechen” in Heidegger 1996, 427-444, or “Moira” in 
Heidegger 1994b, 223-248; 1975, 79-102, or Heidegger’s Nietzsche, 1979-1987, vol IV, 17. 
13 Of course Heidegger will not deny that bringing your own view into interpretations in inevitable. He is 
hermeneutic enough to recognise and appreciate this, but is looking for a way that will leave what is 
interpreted stand by itself more. 
14
 Heidegger 1994a, 322; 1975, 14: “Aber solange eine Übersetzung nur wörtlich ist, braucht sie noch nicht 
wortgetreu zu sein. Wortgetreu is sie erst, wenn ihre Wörter Worte sind, sprechend aus der Sprache der 
Sache.” 
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with faithful. I do not agree with this translation as it is first of all closely associated with 
religion, which is something Heidegger would not approve of, and then a more ‘literal’ 
translation would rather be ‘word-loyal.’ Faithful also does not hint at the difference 
between Wörter and Worte, which makes for the subtle wordplay of the quotation in 
question. But even from the translation of the above fragment it is clear that Heidegger 
makes a distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘true to the word.’ ‘True to the word’ would be 
a translation that would speak “aus der Sprache der Sache,” that is pertaining to the true 
‘matter’ of thinking. Heeding this ‘matter of thinking’ would first of all require readers to 
relinquish the practice of looking at older thinking through the lenses of more recent 
ideas and concepts. The “Wirrnis”15 (confusion) that has arisen through this practice, 
which has dominated Western philosophy, has first of all to be addressed. This is not 
done by just giving better or truer translations of the original Greek, but by rethinking our 
relation to the Greeks in a more originary way, which means by coming to a real dialogue 
with them. 
What has to be done then is to think through Anaximander from a different 
perspective, or maybe even to give up the idea of perspective if that is at all possible, 
looking for what is yet unthought in these words. To do this, it is necessary to jump over 
(or maybe, as we shall see later, into) a trench or abyss16 to another way of thinking. In 
doing this Heidegger offers his own version of the Spruch, but before I give that, it is 
better to first give the usual translation: 
“And from what source things arise, to that they return of necessity when they 
are destroyed; for they suffer punishment and make reparation to one another for 
                                                
15 Heidegger 1994a, 335; 1975, 25. 
16 Heidegger sometimes uses Abgrund, Graben, Kluft etc., but the point is always leaving behind (to a 
certain extent) the hindrances of metaphysics. 
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their injustice according to the order of time.”17 
Heidegger’s translation runs very different, having reinterpreted most of the words and 
even questioned the validity of attributing part of the Spruch to Anaximander, so that 
only the part … e . d a  d t s   d a 
remains certain. Although the rest of the fragment might not be from Anaximander 
himself, Heidegger still considers the whole fragment as Anaximandrian, considering the 
other parts as “secondary testimony”18 to Anaximander’s thinking. He comes to the 
following German translation:  
“Von woheraus aber der Hervorgang ist dem jeweilig Anwesenden auch die 
Entgängnis in dieses (als in das Selbe) geht hervor entlang dem Brauch; gehören 
nämlich lassen sie Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem anderen (im Verwinden) des 
Un-Fugs entsprechend der Zuweisung des Zeitigen durch die Zeit.”19 
The differences between this and the usual translation are obvious and very significant. In 
English the translation of Heidegger’s version would be: 
“The place from out of which emergence comes is, for everything that emerges, 
also the place of disappearance into this (as into the same)—in accordance with 
exigence (brook); for they let enjoining and thereby also reck belong to each 
other (in the getting over) of disjoining, responding to the directive of time’s 
coming into its own.”20 
Another translation in English, only of the part which was thought to be originally from 
                                                
17 Translation taken from: Nahm 1964, 39/40. Other translations offer little variation and stick to this 
interpretation, so this one can serve as representative of the normal, traditional version. 
18 Heidegger 1994a, 341; 1975, 30. Heidegger did not make this up himself (see Heidegger 1994a, 340; 
1975, 28, where he refers to John Burnet). Heidegger was ambivalent though, saying he was “inclined” to 
think only the middle part was from Anaximander, and in Holzwege this is the part he focuses on. In the 
slightly earlier lecture course though, he focused on the whole fragment. 
19
 Heidegger 1991, 101. 
20 Translation by Kenneth Maly in: Sallis 1993, 231. 
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Anaximander and on which Heidegger focuses, runs as follows: 
“…along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one 
another (in the surmounting) of disorder.”21  
These heroic efforts of translation in English and the discrepancies between them from 
Heidegger’s difficult German show how radically different his interpretations really are. 
Heidegger’s readings think from a very different perspective, trying to undo what he 
thinks is a false sense of security and complacency with what we consider ‘normal.’ In 
the passage that concerned Heidegger the most, he translates e with Brauch and 
translates d and t s with Fug and Ruch. It is interesting to see what he says right 
after that and I will have to quote at some length:  
“We cannot demonstrate the adequacy of the translation by scholarly means; nor 
should we simply accept it through faith in some authority or other. Scholarly 
proof will not carry us far enough, and faith has no place in thinking. We can 
only reflect on the translation by thinking through the saying. But thinking is the 
poetizing of the truth of Being in the historic dialogue between thinkers. For this 
reason the fragment will never engage us so long we only explain it 
historiologically and philologically. Curious enough, the saying first resonates 
when we set aside the claims of our own familiar ways of representing 
things…”22 
Only when we set aside our claims to rightness can we engage what is ‘other.’ For 
Heidegger this means that we discard the dominance of metaphysics in favour of a 
different thinking. This is also exactly what comparative philosophy has to do. The 
notion of Brauch and its relation to language tell us another important thing. Although 
                                                
21 Heidegger 1975, 57. 
22 Heidegger 1994a, 372; 1975, 57. 
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the most common translation of Brauch is ‘custom,’ it also means use, usage and need 
(exigence), and with this notion Brauch Heidegger aims to show us how language as 
Saying (Sage) is both something we use and need for our understanding of the world. 
There is no understanding without (the need for and use of) language. We need language, 
but we need to rethink the way we see and use it. 
To come back to the English translations, the two versions offer some significant 
differences. Brauch is, as we have just seen, translated as ‘exigence/brook’ and ‘usage,’ 
for Fug ‘enjoining’ and ‘order’ and for Ruch there is consensus on ‘reck,’ not very easily 
used or understood words. But maybe Heidegger would not object to these different 
translations, as his own German was especially meant to retain the broad meaning of the 
original Greek. It is by retaining the openness and broadness of these words that he can 
pursue the interconnectedness or ‘belonging together in difference’ of all things that he is 
always eager to show.23 It is therefore probably not a question of whether Heidegger’s 
translations are better than others, because there is really no consensus on standards by 
which to judge them in that respect. The meaning of these words is so broad, that 
Heidegger says that words like these “cannot be enclosed within the boundaries of 
particular disciplines. ‘Broad’ does not mean here extensive, in the sense of something 
flattened or thinned out, but rather far-reaching, rich containing much thought.”24 
Heidegger’s translations do not bring us nearer to the original meaning; they are however 
supposed to bring us nearer to thinking, and they do so largely by challenging 
preconceptions of how Being has been understood. Heidegger shows that when we 
follow his readings, this will at least show how the Seinsvergessenheit has come to be. He 
                                                
23 Think of Geviert (fourfold) or his explications of what a ‘thing’ is, or of Welt, Auseinandersetzung etc. 
24
 Heidegger 1994a, 331; 1975, 21/22. 
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can then use his translations to show that Anaximander already intimated with e 
what Parmenides and Heraclitus were trying to say with a and  respectively, 
which is to think Being as presencing (Anwesen), in the sense of coming into presence, 
lingering a while and returning into absence. 
“Each presence is present, as long as it dwells, dwelling it arises and passes 
away, dwelling it exists as the enjoining of the transition from origin to 
departure. This ever dwelling existence of transition is the proper continuity of 
presence. This however does not consist of mere persistence.”25  
So we now see that Heidegger tries to read the fragment of Anaximander as a fragment 
on Being, not really a fragment about humanity. He does not read the fragment from a 
human perspective; he lets it speak from something else. In this reading he seeks to upset 
the metaphysical opposition of Subject and Object, of representational or propositinal 
thinking, and come to an understanding which would make the saying ‘resonate’ in the 
sense of giving us a different thinking relation to our world. By doing so, his 
interpretation differs, and this also allows him to undo the false pretension that 
Parmenides and Heraclitus were opponents. In fact, Parmenides (Being) and Heraclitus 
(transformation, transition) belong together.26 By reading Being in the nearness of 
‘weilen,’ which can be understood both as ‘sojourn’ and ‘abiding,’ but which I have 
translated here as ‘dwelling,’ Heidegger sees presencing as a coming from and returning 
to absence, and thus the continuity (Beständigkeit) of Being and nothing is thought to 
reside exactly in transformation, transition, change (Übergang), and this way of thinking 
                                                
25 See Heidegger 1994a, 357; my translation: Das je-weilig Anwesende west an, insofern es weilt, weilend 
ent-steht und ver-geht, weilend die Fuge des Übergangs aus Herkunft zu Hingang besteht. Dieses je 
weilenden Bestehen des Übergangs ist die fügliche Beständigkeit des Anwesenden. Sie besteht gerade nicht 
auf dem bloßen Beharren.” Also see Heidegger 1975, 43/44. 
26 Heidegger 1994a, 369/370; 1975, 55. See also: Heidegger 1961, vol. 1, 27 & 333/334; Nietzsche, 1979-
1987, vol I, 22 and vol II, 78. 
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I will argue later has strong similarities with a different than traditional reading of 
Daoism. 
The three most important things that can be learnt from Heidegger’s efforts on 
Anaximander are first to be very cautious with language and translations, second to see 
the idea of Being as transformation, and third to heed the matter of thinking in a 
thoughtful dialogue with what is different to us, which largely means not to extrapolate 
familiar terms to explain unfamiliar things, in this case ancient Greek philosophy, and we 
can see now that these three words themselves still stand in need of rethinking, thus 
opening them up to comparative philosophy, where it is crucial not to impose conceptual 
structures that are foreign to a different language or culture.  
1.1.2 PARMENIDES. 
Heidegger’s second engagement with early Greek thinking is his interpretation of 
Parmenides. In Vorträge und Aufsätze27 he takes the fragment known as   
s t t e e a or “the same is thinking and being” as his guide. Far from the 
normal interpretation which says that thinking is also a being, i.e. thinking can not be 
nothing, Heidegger again offers his own version, not so much in a translation this time, 
but more in an inquiry into the key words that make up this sentence of the fragment. 
Again he warns against imposing later concepts and thought structures on earlier 
thinking, and he says that an authentic inquiry should be a dialogue that asks not about 
things that seem familiar, but rather looks into “the obscure passages” in a “thoughtful 
translation of early Greek speech.”28 With help of the fragment 8 which is lengthier but 
                                                
27 Heidegger 1994b, 223-248. 
28 Heidegger 1994b, 231; 1975, 86. 
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deals with the same problematic, Heidegger reconsiders the text to say something of the 
belonging together in difference (being the ‘same’) of In-die-Acht-nehmen  and Anwesen 
(presencing, emerging or even unfolding). Especially the idea of ‘belonging together in 
difference’ with which Heidegger translates , or ‘the same,’ das Selbe, which we 
have already encountered, cannot be stressed enough in relation to comparative 
philosophy. This is Heidegger’s strategy in comparative philosophy: to treat different 
cultures as belonging together through difference and diversity. The fragment and its 
translation by Heidegger is important for another reason. This is because  is not 
translated as ‘thinking,’ which is the normal translation but which has led to the 
metaphysical readings of much early philosophy. Instead he translates it with In-die-Acht-
nehmen, which in English could be rendered as ‘taking in, facing up to, respectful 
perceiving’ and this is an effort to demolish the metaphysical reading of thinking as 
Vorstellen, as representational thinking, and to turn to a different kind of thinking like 
Andenken and poetic thinking, of which I will speak later. It is this approach which runs 
through Heidegger’s encounters with the early Greeks. If thinking is thus ‘changed’ from 
being merely metaphysical, representational and conceptual thinking, this bodes well for 
an eventual encounter with thinking in non-Western cultures, where these features get 
less attention.  
1.1.3 HERACLITUS. 
Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus is much more thorough. He gave two lecture courses 
on Heraclitus,29 and transposed some of this material in several writings. He also 
frequently made references to Heraclitus in other works, so there is a wealth of source 
                                                
29 Now published as volume 55 of the Gesamtausgabe. Heidegger 1994c. 
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material available. In it we can find fundamental reinterpretations of logos, physis, 
aletheia, polemos, and language. Heidegger wants to upset the traditional view that 
Heraclitus was the foremost proponent of a philosophy of becoming or change, as 
opposed to Parmenides, who is seen as the philosopher of a permanent Being. Heidegger 
reinterprets  (logos) here from the verb e (to gather, to say) as “the Laying that 
gathers” (die lesende Lege),30 thinking with this term that which consists of gathering 
together and letting things be in letting them lie before us. We should be mindful here of 
words like Auseinandersetzung and das Selbe, ‘con-frontation’ and ‘the same’ 
respectively, to realise how this gathering together and letting be of differences can go 
together. In other places Heidegger also translates logos as ‘gathering.’31 He thereby tries 
to release logos from its metaphysical translations, such as reason, ratio, God etc. He 
retains the idea that logos means ‘saying’ or ‘speaking,’ ‘discourse,’ but gives his other 
interpretation as something even more or equally originary. The connection between 
language and logos is thus brought to a deeper understanding. This logos was what the 
ancient Greeks lived in, their language was alive in this way, but they never thought 
through this situation themselves. As Heidegger says: 
“ , thought as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence of saying 
[die Sage] as thought by the Greeks. Language would be saying. Language would 
be the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing. In fact, the 
Greeks dwelt in this essential determination of language. But they never thought 
it—Heraclitus included.”32 
                                                
30 Heidegger 1994b, 208; 1975, 66. 
31 For example: Heidegger 1994a, 327; 1975, 18. 
32 Heidegger 1994b, 220; 1975, 77: “ wäre, als die lesende Lege gedacht, das griechisch gedachte 
Wesen der Sage. Sprache wäre Sage. Sprache wäre: versammelndes vorliegen-Lassen des Anwesenden in 
 31
Thus thought, the ancient Greeks lived language as saying from Being, as logos is the 
name for the Being of beings, but they did not think it thus. Heidegger thinks this logos 
as ‘gathering in letting be,’ but we should guard against seeing this as a metaphysical 
principle guiding all things. ‘Gathering’ is not to be read as a noun, it should much more 
be read in a verbal sense, as it hints at a temporal phenomenon, a process more than a 
principle. Seen in this way logos would then rather mean the ‘temporary gathering of 
things in their difference.’  
In another essay Heidegger goes over the notion of aletheia, usually translated as 
‘truth.’ Heidegger rejects this translation, giving his rendering of ‘unconcealment’ 
instead. Heraclitus thought concealing and unconcealing together, as Heidegger shows 
from fragment 123, f s pt es a . Usually translated as ‘nature loves to hide 
itself,’ Heidegger retranslates: “Rising (out of self-concealing) bestows favour upon self-
concealing,”33 and explains how physis as rising and coming to unconcealment and 
concealment are mutually related, belonging together, again das Selbe, the ‘same.’34 
Heidegger had already established that for “the Greeks, physis is the first and the 
essential name for beings themselves and as a whole. For them the being is what 
flourishes on its own, in no way compelled, what rises and comes forward, and what goes 
back into itself and passes away. It is the rule that rises and resides in itself.”35 In another 
part of the same volume of the Nietzsche work he seems to suggest that physis thought in 
                                                                                                                                                
seinem Anwesen. In der Tat: die Griechen wohnten in diesem Wesen der Sprache. Allein sie haben dieses 
Wesen der Sprache niemals gedacht, auch Heraklit nicht.” Italics in original. 
33 Heidegger 1994b, 263; 1975, 114. 
34 Maybe it would be better to leave das Selbe untranslated, but as long as we are alert to what is meant, and 
we remember that ‘same’ does not mean interchangeable or equal, ‘Same’ or ‘same’ will do. Compare 
Heidegger 1999, 35; 1974, 45: “Allein das Selbe ist nicht das Gleiche. Im Gleichen verschwindet die 
Verschiedenheit. Im Selben erscheint die Verschiedenheit.” 
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a Greek way was the “original configuration”36 or unity of Being and Becoming. 
Aletheia, physis and logos then show a closeness in belonging together in this 
unconcealing and concealing.  
The Auseinandersetzung, or con-frontation, or p eµ (polemos), will play an 
important part in this thesis, especially in its intercultural sense. Heraclitus is well known 
for having allegedly said in fragment 53 that “war is the father of all things.” Heidegger 
thinks again that this interpretation is mistaken or at least one-sided. There is again a 
more originary way of looking at the fragment, which starts with p eµ p t  
pat s t . Heidegger translates “Con-frontation (Auseinandersetzung) is indeed the 
begetter of all (that comes to presence)…”37 This is already a big difference, but even 
more important is the continuing sentence which is usually left out: …, p t 
ßas e , which Heidegger translates as “…but (also) the dominant preserver of all.”38 
So far from trying to say that war is the father of all things, Heidegger says that con-
frontation, as Auseinandersetzung, is the begetter and keeper of all things. Difference and 
the interaction of differences thus become extremely important. Heidegger even 
explicitly names polemos as “die Lichtung”39 (the clearing), making it resonate with 
another of his key terms in explaining his later thinking.  
From this it can safely be assumed that Auseinandersetzung is one of the most 
important terms Heidegger uses, together with logos, aletheia, physis and other such 
keywords from the ancient Greek language. There are numerous places where he speaks 
of these ancient terms in their relatedness, going so far as to say they are the same. Logos 
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is polemos, is aletheia, is physis, is moira. These are all interrelated and eventually point 
to that which cannot be spoken of, Being. As Heidegger says: 
“…the  which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of 
presencing, the a which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of 
presencing, the e which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing—all 
these name the Same. In the concealed richness of the Same the unity of the 
unifying One, the , is thought by each thinker in his own way.”40 
The stands for Being, which is always the ‘matter’ of thinking. Heidegger is 
convinced however that certain ways of thinking ‘hear,’ resonate or respond to Being 
better than others, and I have tried to show here that he was also of the opinion that the 
early Greeks thought more originary than later thinkers. Starting with Plato, things got 
confused: one side of the coin, thinking, took over at the expense of Being, destroying the 
‘belonging together.’ This was exacerbated significantly by the translations of Greek into 
Latin in later times, which according to Heidegger were so foreign to the Greek ideas and 
thus effectively destroyed the Greek meaning, as the Romans brought to philosophy a 
fundamentally different attitude, not sharing the same ideas and background that had 
made the Greek world what it was.41 But Heidegger is not pessimistic about translation 
per se, for as he says again in Holzwege: 
“Could a mere translation have precipitated all this? We may yet learn what can 
come to pass in translation. The truly fateful encounter with historic language is a 
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over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without the 
Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.” 
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silent event. But in it the destiny of Being speaks. Into what language is the land 
of evening translated?”42 
This English translation is inadequate since it fails to capture the wordplay of the 
German, which has geschichtlich, geschicklich and Geschick. It also fails to notice that 
the final question is not in the passive, but in the active tense, so it would be more 
appropriate to translate it “Into what language does the Evening-land translate?” This 
would more capture the fact that it is our translations which are wrong or one-sided and 
need to be looked at afresh. The encounter with other languages then needs to be a silent 
one, in which there is a thoughtful adherence to the sameness thought in a Heideggerian 
way, as well as to the differences of different cultures. In this encounter, translation 
(Übersetzung as setting across of a different way of thinking) plays a crucial role. It is 
vital to the project of comparative philosophy that this is acknowledged and that people 
who translate works from other cultures keep an open mind towards different possibilities 
and different forms that such encounters can take. Heidegger’s work on the early Greek 
thinkers and his translations have shown that such different meetings are possible, but 
have to remain vigilant against being overrun by metaphysical speculations, which are 
not ‘wrong’ in themselves, but are only one option amongst many others yet unexplored. 
One of the other options Heidegger chose to look into is the relation of poetics or poetry 
with thinking.   
                                                
42 Heidegger 1994a, 371; 1975, 57: “Eine blosse Übersetzung soll dieses veranlasst haben? Doch vielleicht 
lernen wir bedenken, was sich im Übersetzen ereignen kann. Die eigentliche geschickliche Begegnung der 
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1.2 HEIDEGGER AND THE POETS.  
“What is difficult to grasp about this work [Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, SVB] is not 
only its “content,” if it has such, but also its very character as a work. Of course, 
we are quick to propose a ready-made explanation: here philosophical thoughts 
are presented poetically. Yet what we are now to call thinking and poetizing dare 
not consist of the usual notions, inasmuch as the work defines both of these 
anew, or rather, simply announces them.”43  
Heidegger has extensively dealt with poetry in his search for a different thinking that 
would overcome to a certain extent the ‘forgetfulness’ of metaphysics. It is no secret that 
Heidegger saw the present metaphysical-technological configuration of the West in terms 
of a decline. This is not to say however that Heidegger wished to return to some purer 
state of thinking which supposedly existed before this decline. It is to say that he used 
different approaches to establish a certain resistance towards the dominating forces of 
philosophy, which exclude any form of thinking which can not be incorporated into its 
rigid frameworks. These forms of different thinking Heidegger found in the early Greek 
thinkers, in poetry or poetic thinkers and thinking, and in some forms of East Asian 
thinking, where Heidegger looked especially towards Daoism. Apparently he found 
important similarities between Daoism and early Greek and poetic thinking, or at least his 
approaches towards these show similarities. Therefore the second most important feature 
in understanding Heidegger’s efforts at establishing an intercultural dialogue, after his 
engagement with the Greeks and related to it, involves his thinking about the poets, and 
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his reinterpretation of philosophy as ‘poetic thinking.’ This will be of importance to 
comparative philosophy for two reasons. First is to show how Heidegger wished to 
engage the poets he dealt with, and from that derive a similar approach that he takes in 
encountering other cultures. Second, the way in which Heidegger identifies, locates and 
uses the ways of thinking which he finds in poetic works is interesting because it goes to 
show that not all thinking has to be along the lines of Western philosophy as it has 
evolved into metaphysics and thus into what Heidegger calls the technological way of 
thinking with its reductive totalisation that brings to a forced unity all that is different. 
There are more forms that thinking can take, or rather, thinking can happen in different 
forms. But it should be remembered that Heidegger did not first engage the early Greeks 
and the poets in order to then extract from that an intercultural thinking. It is more that 
the three different approaches were equal avenues to explore the possibility of an “other 
commencement”44 of thinking, which would be different from metaphysics. 
To expose the extent to which Heidegger engaged poetry, I will look at his work 
on Friedrich Hölderlin, Georg Trakl, Stefan George and Rainer Maria Rilke. It is 
especially in the way that language comes to speak that Heidegger finds these poets 
worthy of being called ‘the thinking poets.’ Heidegger’s focus on poetry however does 
not mean that all poetry is automatically related to thinking, or has some fundamental 
insights to show us. Only certain poets have achieved this ‘height,’ and it is in their work 
and more specifically in Heidegger’s interpretations of them that we can find hints on 
how Heidegger wants to engage other cultures. Especially Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin 
reveals a lot about the approach to what is das Fremde, or what is ‘other’ or ‘foreign.’  
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1.2.1 POETRY AND THINKING. 
So what exactly does Heidegger see in these poets, and what is the relationship of this 
poetry to thinking or philosophy? First of all, it is important not to understand poetry as 
mere poesy, or the poetic use of words or language to create some idea. Poetry (Dichten) 
has a much deeper and broader meaning for Heidegger. All language and thinking has its 
essence (Wesen) in poetry. This is not to confuse poetry and philosophy, and not to think 
that some more poetic form of philosophy or a more philosophical form of poetry is 
needed as a kind of fusion between the two. As Heidegger says:  
“All philosophical thinking – and precisely the most rigorous and prosaic – is in 
itself poetic. It nonetheless never springs from the art of poetry. A work of 
poetry, a work like Hölderlin’s hymns, can for its part be thoughtful in the 
highest degree. It is nonetheless never philosophy.”45  
Poetry and thinking are very close, yet they are not to be confused and one is not the 
logical ancestor or descendant of the other. Heidegger is very strict in this separation, and 
we will see why. For his idea is that only things that are different can have such a close 
relationship. “We must discard the view that the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking is 
nothing more than a garrulous cloudy mixture of two kinds of saying in which each 
makes clumsy borrowings from the other. Here and there it may seem that way. But in 
truth, poetry and thinking are in virtue of their nature held apart by a delicate yet 
luminous difference.”46 It is this difference that somehow speaks from an indefinable 
common ground that is the focus of Heidegger’s engagements with the various poets. 
Again and again he stresses this, maintaining that any similarity, equality, unity or 
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common ground is to be read only through or from this difference. In fact, we could say 
that this difference or diversity is the only form the common ground can have, as it is this 
difference that is constitutive for a dialogue between thinking and poetry to succeed, for 
only as long as this difference is firmly held in place can there be a real exchange of 
ideas, in which both talk about the same thing. Or, to put it in Heidegger’s words: 
“The poetical Said and the thinking Said are never identical (das gleiche). Yet 
both one and the other can say the same (dasselbe) in different ways. This 
however, only succeeds when the abyss between them is kept clear and 
resolute.”47  
Again it is important to understand clearly the difference between das Selbe and das 
Gleiche, or the ‘same’ and the ‘identical.’ The ‘same’ is not some metaphysical construct; 
it is not an overarching concept, but only functions because of difference. Heidegger 
says:  
“The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent 
oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves toward 
the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common 
denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of what differs, 
through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say ‘the same’ if we 
think difference.”48 
The ‘identical’ then is part of a typical metaphysical striving for identity, generalisation 
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and unity. Heidegger took an epigram that Hölderlin wrote to explain the difference 
between ‘same’ and ‘identical’: 
“Being at one is godlike and good; whence, then, this craze among men that there 
should exist only One, why should all be one?”49 
Hölderlin named this short fragment the “Root of All Evil,”50 and Heidegger certainly 
shared this concern. Things that are ‘the same’ should not be forced to become identical. 
And sameness only ‘exists’ as a function of difference. Differences, or the play of 
differences, must be understood as the more originary. This naturally brings me back to 
one of the key terms of this dissertation, Auseinandersetzung or con-frontation. It is only 
in the sense of Auseinandersetzung that has been discussed in the previous part, that we 
can understand Heidegger’s engagement with the poets he so carefully chose. It is a 
keeping apart in togetherness, or a thoughtful appropriation that leaves the other as it is 
itself, that is again his aim, as it was with his Auseinandersetzung with the Greeks. This 
gathering in difference can be understood as promoting the idea of the 
interconnectedness, the relationality of all things, which nevertheless should not be 
reduced to an ultimate guiding principle. We shall see later how a similar thinking is 
espoused in Daoism.   
1.2.2 POETRY AND LANGUAGE. 
Throughout his career Heidegger has valued the importance of language. Already in Sein 
und Zeit, the important paragraph 32 which discusses the fact that we always encounter 
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things as something, and that we thus always have some preconceived notions in our 
perceptions, shows the importance and necessity of language in our experience of the 
world.51 The hermeneutics that Heidegger thinks of acknowledges the fact that language 
is ‘how we think.’ Later on, language is called “the house of Being”52 and both Weg 
(way) and Ereignis (event of appropriation), two key terms in Heidegger’s later work, are 
closely intertwined with language. We can safely say that language was, together with 
Being, one of Heidegger’s most important focuses, since he understood that language is 
inevitable in our understanding, and in our experiencing and thinking of the world. 
Experience and thinking can only gain meaning through language, understood in the 
sense of signification structures. 
Thus the second important aspect in Heidegger’s engagement with poetry and his 
efforts at establishing or at least preparing the ‘other thinking’ through poetic thinking is 
found in his reinterpretation of language, as it is used in poetry. Heidegger finds that the 
normal functions of language, such as information exchange, everyday social language 
functions and even the more ‘spiritual’ sides of language, which are often used by poets, 
cannot explain what happens in poetry, or rather in certain poetry and certain poets. He 
therefore again tries to introduce new readings of these works, readings that are not at all 
obvious to ‘normal’ interpretations. When Heidegger says that it is language that speaks 
through humans, and not humans who speak, this is still close to normal interpretations of 
being inspired by and influenced by language. Yet Heidegger goes much further in saying 
that what happens in some poetry is really much more originary and fundamental than a 
reinterpretation of language by poets. Saying that poetry is derivative of normal language 
                                                
51 Heidegger 1993, 148ff; 1962, 188ff. 
52
 Heidegger 1996, 313; 1998, 239, translation slightly modified. 
 41
is therefore at fault, as Heidegger says: “Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode 
(melos) of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten 
and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer.”53 
Language has become something it was not before; it has flattened and emptied through 
its history of metaphysics. The Verfallen (Falling) of everyday language, everyday man, 
and everyday opinions, are all (negative) derivations of a more originary and fundamental 
region in which language spoke (or speaks, as it is not only in the past that we can still 
find this) from itself, like it did with the Greeks. Heidegger finds this more originary 
region in poetry. As he says: “Language itself is poetry in the essential sense.”54 Poetry is 
of course here taken “in so broad a sense and at the same time in such intimate unity of 
being with language and word, that we must leave open whether art, in all its modes from 
architecture to poesy, exhausts the nature of poetry.”55 Heidegger’s interpretation sees the 
work of (some) poets as the “deployment of certain key words which call for the 
thinker’s reflective analysis.”56 Heidegger’s analysis brings out the ‘other’ meaning of the 
work through giving other meanings to their key words.57 These other meanings are not 
necessarily better or more truthful, but at least also possible and call for a rethinking of 
language, which is Heidegger’s main concern. With regard to Heidegger’s intercultural 
steps it is important to notice that he took the same approach in his encounters with the 
East, for example when he, together with his Japanese guest, reinterpreted the word for 
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‘language’ in Japanese,58 or when he used the notion of dao as pointing to something 
roughly equivalent to his own version of ‘Weg’ or ‘way.’59 There will be more mention of 
these similarities in the next section. 
Language then has some other meaning, it is not as rigid as our everyday 
definitions seem to suggest. There is a certain ‘unsaid’ in language which to Heidegger is 
more important than the obvious definite meaning which we usually ascribe to words. 
This multiplicity of meanings of important words is hinted at in Heidegger’s readings of 
the poets he deals with, for as he says in an essay on a work by Georg Trakl:  
“This language is essentially ambiguous (mehrdeutig), in its own fashion. We 
shall hear nothing of what the poem says so long as we bring to it only this or 
that dull sense of unambiguous (eindeutigen) meaning.[…] Yet this multiple 
ambiguousness of the poetic saying does not scatter in vague equivocations (ins 
unbestimmte Vieldeutige). The ambiguous tone of Trakl’s poetry arises out of a 
gathering, that is, out of a unison which, meant for itself alone, always remains 
unsayable. The ambiguity of this poetic saying is not lax imprecision, but rather 
the rigor of him who leaves what is as it is…”60  
In German mehrdeutig has not only the negative meaning of ambiguity, but also means 
‘open to more than one interpretation,’ or could be said to argue for some kind of 
‘polysemy’ inherent in language. The translation of mehrdeutig with ‘ambiguous’ leaves 
this point in the air, the more as ‘ambiguity’ is usually referred to as negative, especially 
in the stricter regions of philosophy where identity and unity are the most important 
features. It also fails to capture the sense of mehr-deutig that relates to more than one 
                                                
58
 See Heidegger 1997b, 142-146; 1971a, 45-48. 
59 See Heidegger 1997b, 198; 1971a, 92. 
60 Heidegger 1997b, 74-75; 1971a, 192, German added. 
 43
meaning without being vague. If we leave aside translation problems for the moment, the 
point is that Heidegger wishes to retain a sense of openness and unfinishedness that is to 
him evident in thoughtful poetry. Because where there is really no final and definite 
meaning, we should not impose one artificially, as is often done with poems where we 
are supposed to find ‘the’ meaning in them. It is much better to ‘leave what is as it is,’ 
and Heidegger thinks there is a way to do this without sinking into a passive relativism of 
the ‘anything goes’ kind. That Heidegger was aware of this we can also see in the 
passage cited above, where he sharply distinguishes between mehrdeutig and vieldeutig. 
We must now take a closer look at Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung with Hölderlin and 
explore the polysemy and issues of translation which Heidegger’s readings of Hölderlin 
bring about.  
1.2.3 HÖLDERLIN, THE FOREIGN AND TRANSLATION. 
Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin can bring us very useful clues to understanding 
his ideas about comparative philosophy and what it should stand for. It also gives us 
access to the thinking about a different perspective on language which Heidegger derived 
from Hölderlin’s poetry. These ideas have to do with equivocality or polysemy 
(Mehrdeutigkeit),61 which, as we saw, Heidegger does not equate with vagueness. We 
must also bear in mind that Heidegger did not concern himself with literary scholarship 
on Hölderlin, and that his reading of Hölderlin is not necessarily what the latter thought 
of his own work himself, but first of all Heidegger’s effort to wrestle Hölderlin from the 
narrow bonds of philology, so as to open his words to a wider understanding, of which 
                                                
61 I would rather use the word ‘polysemy’ as a translation of Mehrdeutigkeit, as it seems to capture the 
ideas of Heidegger better, being closer related to language itself and not having the burden of metaphysical 
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the intercultural aspect is an important part.  
I will first look at the ideas of the approach to the ‘other’ or the ‘foreign’ (Das 
Fremde) which Heidegger extracted from Hölderlin, and after that explore the ideas on 
language. Florian Vetsch has compiled three steps of intercultural encounter which 
Heidegger took to be crucial and which he himself deduced from Hölderlin: 
“1) Before his departure to the foreign, the future wanderer is still caught in his 
own surroundings. 
2) The journey begins, and the wanderer encounters the foreign. 
3) The wanderer returns, but remains thoughtful of the foreign; in this something 
new shows itself.”62 
This goes to show that for Heidegger, the Auseinandersetzung with the foreign has two 
aims: the first is a learning of what the foreign has to offer. To establish this, the ‘self’ 
has to (temporarily) forget its own, not in the sense of losing oneself in a taking over of 
‘other’ habits and ideas, but in opening up a space for different ideas to be allowed 
access. If we remain closed, any ‘wandering’ will be futile. As Heidegger puts it: 
“…where it remains only a matter of refuting, or even of annihilating the foreign, what 
necessarily gets lost is the possibility of a passage through the foreign, and thereby the 
possibility of a return home into one’s own, and thereby that which is one’s own itself.”63 
This is the second aim of the Auseinandersetzung. The passage through the foreign is 
crucial for an understanding of what is one’s own. But again the ‘wandering’ has to be of 
a very specific character, and we come back to the Auseinandersetzung and the Same, 
because “…only where the foreign is known and acknowledged in its essential 
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oppositional character (Gegensätzlichkeit) does there exist the possibility of a genuine 
relationship (Beziehung), that is, of a uniting that is not a confused mixing but a 
conjoining in distinction (Unterscheidung).”64 It is thus not a matter of learning another 
culture as a “sum of learnable data,”65 which you can then take home, but to learn to see 
another culture as a living, historically moving open-ended totality, which is not readily 
at one’s disposal, but always open to renewed conversation.66 This is also a part of the 
Auseinandersetzung. In this way the relation between different cultures is then literally a 
never-ending story.  
It is also vital to fully understand the complexity of the relation between the ‘own’ 
or ‘homely’ and the ‘other,’ ‘foreign’ or ‘unhomely’ as it unfolds in Heidegger’s 
Hölderlin’s Hymn The Ister. It has already been noted that it is not a mere appropriation 
or incorporation of the other that is meant here. The other as other is not to be overcome 
in this way; it is the encounter that matters, so that “…the law of the encounter 
(Auseinandersetzung) between the foreign and one’s own is the fundamental truth of 
history.”67 The coming home is not then a return to a kind of safe haven, but it is 
precisely in the encounter itself that the wanderer finds himself. We could also say that 
the third step of the intercultural encounter is not so much then a return to one’s own, but 
a lingering in the encounter, a taking home of the encounter, to remain in the 
Auseinandersetzung. And this is exactly what the poets’ works show us, especially 
Hölderlin’s. As Heidegger says in a section on the Antigone in Hölderlin’s Hymn “The 
Ister”: “What is worthy of poetizing in this poetic work is nothing other than becoming 
                                                
64
 Heidegger 1984, 67/68; 1996, 54, German added. 
65 Vetsch 1992, 80, my translation. 
66 See Vetsch 1992, 81. 
67
 Heidegger 1984, 60/61; 1996, 49, German added. 
 46
homely in being unhomely.”68 And elsewhere in the same volume on Hölderlin he says 
that “The appropriation of one’s own is only as the encounter (Auseinandersetzung) and 
guest-like dialogue with the foreign.”69 Note that encounter in these passages is always 
the Auseinandersetzung that has been discussed.   
We know Hölderlin himself worked extensively at an Auseinandersetzung with 
the ancient Greek tragedies through his poetry and other writings and it is from there that 
Heidegger takes his clues as to his own intercultural ideas. The understanding that “[w]e 
have still scarcely begun to think the mysterious relations to the East that have come to 
word in Hölderlin’s poetry”70 and the realisation that the greatness of the ancient Greek 
world arose only through the encounter with the East (albeit Asia Minor), committed 
Heidegger to look for different ways of thinking, not just in a Wiederholung or 
de(con)struction of the Western tradition, but more and more in a turning towards the 
ways of thinking of East Asia. It is then Hölderlin who in this way encouraged Heidegger 
further on the trail to the ‘East’ and on the ways of engaging what is other. 
The second feature of Heidegger’s Hölderlin interpretation concerns language. In 
his later writings, Heidegger no longer sees poetry “in terms of the poet’s originary 
power of disclosure, of maintaining things in being, of the grounding, lighting, or 
opening up of a world; Dichten now has to be understood as the way of entering into the 
mode of being of Gelassenheit, the letting-go of things.”71 So poetry, according to this 
statement of Gerald Bruns, opens not so much Being, but a particular way of Being, 
which is Gelassenheit or Releasement toward the unsaid. It is in poetry that we can find 
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hints of this unsaid, and therefore Heidegger considers the language of poetry so 
important. Yet we must take care not to see this ‘unsaid’ as a last (or first) principle, 
toward which poetry would then point us. The unsaid never appears as such, for then it 
would be a thing and thus nameable and given back over again to metaphysics. As with 
aletheia, appearance and disappearance, or unconcealment and concealment, go hand in 
hand. There is no one without the other, so the unsaid always remains beyond our grasp, 
or rather only exists in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, and this is what 
poetry shows us, as it introduces us to the fact that language fails us when we try to grasp 
it, where on the other hand it is our only option. For this reason metaphysics dismisses 
poetry, as metaphysics is unable to deal with something that escapes its grasp by being 
unnameable. But to Heidegger this “Ohnmacht” (inability) of metaphysics is not a 
negative thing, as he says in the Letter on Humanism: “If man is to find his way once 
again in the nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless.”72 This is what 
Hölderlin and Trakl have taught Heidegger, or what he took their words to mean. This 
namelessness is interesting with regard to Daoism, for the obvious reason that dao is also 
considered to be nameless. I will come back to this in the next section.  
To exist in the nameless would not mean to give up speaking or language as a 
whole, but to shift attention from the word as a term for something else to the word as 
word, and to see that language is in Heidegger’s words “uncanny”73 because along with 
unconcealment it always involves concealment as well. Thus metaphysics comes to a 
closure, but as Bruns notes: “the inability to bring one’s subject under conceptual control, 
                                                
72 Heidegger 1996, 319; 1998, 199. 
73 Heidegger 1984, 63ff; 1996, 51ff, where Heidegger translates the Greek de ó as das Unheimliche, his 
way of dealing with the fact that de ó can mean ‘fearful,’ ‘powerful’ or ‘inhabitual’ at the same time. 
Notice that Heidegger openly accepts the fact that his translation is in many ways “incorrect”, adding that it 
might therefore be more “true”(78; 64). 
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fixing it propositionally, is not the end of thinking; on the contrary, it were better to say 
that the breakdown of concepts and the failure of words is an opening that takes us out of 
the realm where representation and calculation are all that matter to thinking.”74 
Metaphysics as a discipline of propositional and representational thinking which focuses 
on finding the final word or the final principle thus breaks down, for with the nameless 
comes the nothing, and “Nothing is not a word for Being…The nothing corresponds to 
the thinker’s experience of the lack of a word for Being. This speechlessness, this 
breaking of the sequence of words for Being, comes to be understood historically as 
marking the end of the succession of words for Being within metaphysics.”75 The fact 
that we can not find a word for Being does not mean that Being is something beyond 
language, but it does suggest that language as used by metaphysics falls short of thinking 
Being. We need a different understanding of language, one that incorporates equivocality 
or polysemy. 
Some interesting implications arise because of this equivocality or polysemy of 
language, and because of the impossibility of naming in the sense of ascribing a single 
meaning to a word. Again Hölderlin is Heidegger’s main source for showing this inherent 
polysemy in poetic work. In Hölderlin’s Hymn The Ister Heidegger says it in the 
following way: “The Greek poetic work is intrinsically equivocal (mehrdeutig), because 
what is to be poetized is equivocal in the truth of its essence (Wesens).”76 We only end up 
with a real translation problem if we keep looking for singular, definite meanings, where 
none are to be found. Elsewhere in the Ister work Heidegger devotes a few pages to the 
problem of translation alone. Because he sees translation as interpretation, his own 
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 Bernasconi 1985, 46, italics in original. 
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 Heidegger 1984, 130; 1996, 104/105, German added. 
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interpretation of Hölderlin is already as such a translation within one language, in this 
case German. Translation is interpretation and vice versa, every interpretation is also a 
translating. This does not mean that we should hand over the understanding of translation 
“to just any opinion,” but rather “making something understandable means awakening 
our understanding to the fact that the blind obstinacy of habitual opinion must be 
shattered and abandoned if the truth of a work is to unveil itself.”77 ‘Translating’ this idea 
to comparative philosophy means that with regards to language it is crucial to ‘shatter’ 
our own presuppositions in translating a work from a different culture. Heidegger was 
very aware of this problematic character of translation, and his work on the poets seeks to 
confront and address these problems, as did his work on the early Greeks. As he says: 
“the difficulty of a translation is never merely a technical issue but concerns the relation 
of human beings to the essence (Wesen) of the word and to the worthiness of language. 
Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you are.”78 This unusually 
strong individual message of Heidegger only strengthens the idea that translation, and 
foremost language, were among the pivotal concerns of Heidegger, especially in his later 
work. But even in the Letter on Humanism Heidegger calls language, as we have seen, 
the ‘house of Being,’ and continues to argue how “the metaphysical-animal explanation 
of language cover[s] up the essence of language in the history of Being 
(seinsgeschichtliches Wesen). According to this essence, language is the house of Being, 
which is appropriated (ereignet) by/from (vom) Being and pervaded by Being. And so it 
is proper to think the essence (Wesen) of language from its correspondence 
(Entsprechung) to Being and indeed as this correspondence, that is, as the home of 
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human being’s essence.”79 Although hard to retrace through this inadequate translation, 
Heidegger says that language is essential to the human experience of Being. Being only 
comes through language. 
But we must then proceed to ask what Heidegger did consider to be ‘good’ 
translations, since every translation is in itself violence and interpretation. We have 
already seen in the previous section on the translation of the early Greek thinkers that 
Heidegger thought a translation had to be an Über-setzung, in that it has to transport the 
way of thinking of what is to be translated, instead of an Über-setzung, which seeks to set 
what is foreign in familiar terms. Because translation is interpretation, and therefore a 
thoughtful dialogue,80 it in the end aims at a return to the self, but as we have seen, this 
return is to be found in the encounter itself. Genuine translation is always a con-
frontation, and this means translation is, according to Heidegger “an awakening, 
clarification (Klärung), and unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an 
encounter (Auseinandersetzung) with the foreign language.”81   
We have seen in the past two sections that both the early Greek thinkers and some 
(German) poets have had great influence on Heidegger’s thinking, especially on his 
thinking of language and its meaning. The most important conclusion we can draw from 
Heidegger’s approach is that we can only become what we are through and in a sustained 
encounter with what is genuinely ‘other,’ and that this encounter involves great caution in 
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thinking about language. Heidegger’s feelings on language can be summarised in the 
following citation:  
“We do not wish to assault language in order to force it into the grip of ideas 
already fixed beforehand. We do not wish to reduce the nature of language to a 
concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful view of language 
that will lay to rest all further notions about it. To discuss language, to place it, 
means to bring to its place of being (Ort ihres Wesens) not so much language as 
ourselves: our own gathering into the appropriation (Versammlung in das 
Ereignis).”82  
This view of language has direct consequences for his thinking encounter with different 
cultures, where, as has already been briefly noticed, he employs the same strategies and 
understanding. It is time now to take a closer look on Heidegger’s more ‘direct’ 
comparative thinking.   
1.3 HEIDEGGER AND THE ‘EAST.’  
“Who can be still and out of stillness and through it move something on to the 
Way so that it comes to shine forth?”83  
In this part we will explore Heidegger’s efforts to set up a dialogue with the East Asian 
world, a dialogue which Heidegger has been preparing for as inevitable. I shall first give 
a general outline of Heidegger’s thinking and some of his key concepts and their 
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meanings. This can then be used as a background as we proceed to investigate his views 
on comparative philosophy.  
Heidegger’s main contribution to philosophy has been the notion of Being (Sein) 
as opposed to beings (Seienden). This he called the Ontological Difference: Beings, 
including human beings, are things that are, while Being itself is nothing, for if it was 
something, then it would be a being. All beings share the characteristic of Being, that is, 
they are, but we cannot reduce Being to the category of beings. Being is often referred to 
as ‘happening,’ ‘becoming’ or ‘presencing’ (Anwesen), or taken as ‘event.’ Yet Being can 
not be properly named, it is in fact unnameable. This thought implies a fundamental 
criticism of Western philosophy and its dualistic approach. The Western metaphysical 
tradition has always concerned itself with beings, and with God, the Spirit, the Idea etc. 
as the highest or most real of the beings. It has thus neglected Being as a ‘temporal 
phenomenon’ that permeates the entire world. Heidegger’s main concern is the 
destruction of this ‘Forgetfulness of Being,’ with the aim of preparing a new way of 
thinking. Being, and not beings, should be the ‘source’ of thinking. Philosophy has 
forgotten this source (which is not a real source, for it cannot be named and is no-thing) 
and this, according to Heidegger, is the main reason for the pitiful state the West is in 
now. The manipulation of beings has been the main concern of Western philosophy, 
resulting in the technological way of thinking blocking out all other ways. Logic and 
reason have not just become the main, but the only criteria. Heidegger stresses that when 
pushed too far, this way of thinking will lead to its self-destruction as it effectively blocks 
all creativity outside its field. What Heidegger wants is not to leave this tradition behind 
and replace it with another thinking tradition or a new way of thinking, but to put it in 
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perspective as a phase of the history of Being and to put it in its proper place among other 
ways of thinking.  
Heidegger then proceeds to hint at what he calls ‘the other way of thinking’ or the 
‘other commencement.’ Although he remains vague as to what this actually consists of, 
he points in a number of directions. This is also a characteristic of his thinking which he 
calls ‘formal signalling.’ This means he does not provide the content of his ideas; he just 
points in directions and leaves it to us whether we are willing and ready to receive this 
message and to act on it.   
The later Heidegger then puts man in a position where he is not ruler, but mere 
part of the greater universe. This constellation he calls the ‘Fourfold’ (Geviert).84 It 
consists of the unity of and relations between the mortals, the divinities, the heavens and 
the earth. As this is a very difficult piece of Heidegger’s thinking on which there is much 
unclarity, I will not linger on it here but just use it at some point when describing 
Heidegger’s intercultural efforts.  
1.3.1 EARLY85 HEIDEGGER AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
Now against this background we can take a closer look at Heidegger’s work regarding 
comparative philosophy. Although Heidegger’s main concern was with the destruction of 
Western metaphysics, there are a number of places where he explicitly talks about other 
cultures and our relation to them. To start with a not so positive review, Heidegger’s 
earlier work cannot properly be called interculturally or comparatively inclined at all. In 
                                                
84 For a detailed discussion of the ‘fourfold, see Heidegger 1994b: “Das Ding”: 157-180; 1971b, 163-186. 
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section in a loose way. The point is only that Heidegger’s thinking in his later work is more suitable for 
comparative philosophy. 
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his earlier works it seems that Heidegger could be considered more a very Eurocentric 
thinker, the very opposite of intercultural. He does not get himself involved in other 
cultures. And even in some of his later work, there are instances where we can apparently 
read this Eurocentric inclination, and Heidegger even goes so far as to state that only in 
the West there is what we call ‘philosophy,’ and that for example India and China do not 
have philosophy.86 Heidegger wants nothing to do with other cultures, as can be heard in 
the warning that in everydayness, Dasein “confines its interests to the multiformity 
(Vielgestaltigkeit) of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity 
in the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact 
that it has no ground of its own to stand on (Bodenlosigkeit).”87 Heidegger advocates that 
a solution to the problems of the West should come from the West. Not very promising 
from a comparative perspective, and even within the West Heidegger has his preferences. 
As we saw, only some early Greek thinkers and some German thinkers and poets, such as 
Heidegger himself and Hölderlin and Rilke, can properly be called ‘thinkers’ according 
to him.  
Aside from this, throughout his career Heidegger mostly considered the English 
and French languages completely inadequate for philosophical purposes, with a couple of 
exceptions here and there. As we already saw in the introduction, Heidegger was not too 
enthusiastic about the possibility of English translations of his work, and generally of the 
philosophical reach of English as compared to German.88 Also, in an interview in the late 
sixties with the leading German magazine Der Spiegel, Heidegger is quoted saying: 
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“When the French begin to think, they start speaking German.”89 It is not hard to imagine 
that Heidegger was not very much loved in at least some English and French academic 
circles. So far he has demonstrated himself to be a very stubborn and one-sided thinker, 
which is contrary to what comparative philosophy aims to establish. But Heidegger 
explains himself. The reason that both French and English are inadequate is that they 
originate in or to a large extent follow Latin, and not Greek. As we saw, Heidegger is 
convinced that with the violent translation of ancient Greek into Latin in the course of 
history, so much of the original meaning was lost that the ground of Western philosophy 
was swept away and philosophy in general began its rapid deterioration and 
‘forgetfulness of Being.’ German supposedly suffers less from this since it is a 
‘Germanic’ language.  
The very important issue of translatability in comparative philosophy again rears 
its head. It is noted by everyone who has ever tried it that it is extremely difficult to 
translate work from Heidegger’s original German. And so it is in general with every form 
of translation. Translation is by its very nature a violent thing and it is almost always 
impossible to capture in one word the full meaning of another word. If this is already so 
between languages in Western cultures with a largely common ancestry and historical 
background, how is it ever possible to translate key concepts or notions of entirely 
different cultures from our own? Yet an intercultural dialogue must assume some form of 
translatability, if we are to understand what ‘the other’ means. I will come back to this 
point later.  
Up to now Heidegger does not seem to be a very interculturally inclined 
philosopher. His major work from the earlier period, Sein und Zeit, retains a strong 
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Western prejudice and outlook, although (and maybe because) Heidegger tries to give 
with the Daseinsanalysis a universal account of the structures of mankind. His focus in 
Sein und Zeit on the Ontological Difference between beings and Being has left Heidegger 
oblivious to the essential differences between beings (read cultures), or, as Safranski has 
formulated it, “the Ontology of Difference.”90 So the Daseinsanalysis, although it seeks 
to provide a universal existential analytic, proceeds from one point of view, without 
realising it is by no means obvious that this is the right or universal view. That means that 
Sein und Zeit is written from the standpoint of the Western individual in the early 20th 
century, who through increasing secularisation and mediocrity, has been left with the 
frightening prospect of a meaningless, empty and finite existence. To see what this means 
we can think of Heidegger’s term ‘Anxiety’ (Angst), a state in which the individual’s 
references fall away and the Dasein is left with literally ‘Nothing.’ Or we can think of 
‘Being-unto-Death’ (Sein zum Tode), which is the position that tries to take seriously the 
finiteness of existence the Dasein realises when the ‘Afterworld’ of the religions has 
fallen away. This position is the task of Dasein to actively take the finite existence on its 
shoulders. There are more examples, but the bottom line is that Sein und Zeit shows its 
origin and thus presents a Western, individualistic point of view, where we could easily 
claim that such a view is far from being universal.  
Still, while we have seen Heidegger so far as an anti-intercultural thinker, there is 
one paragraph in Sein und Zeit where he speaks positively about ‘primitive’ cultures and 
describes these cultures as having a more originary relation with the world of phenomena 
than the West.91 This more originary relation is what Heidegger was looking for 
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throughout his work. Regardless of the term ‘primitive,’ which is now considered 
derogatory,92 this is the one place in his early works where Heidegger takes an 
interculturally more positive position.  
1.3.2 LATER HEIDEGGER AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
After the less than favourable position I have bestowed on Heidegger from a comparative 
perspective, I now wish to turn to his later work. Having briefly been associated with the 
Nazis during the early thirties, Heidegger soon distanced himself from them93 and by the 
end of World War II, his thinking has undergone some fundamental changes. Although 
his efforts at deconstructing Western metaphysics continue relentlessly, these now lead 
him even more to the awareness of the fundamental limits to Western style philosophy. 
He also becomes during this period right after the war increasingly isolated, due to the 
fact that, because of his brief association with the Nazis, he was not allowed to teach by 
the Allied Forces. He finds himself again in comparison with Laozi, the supposed author 
of the Daodejing. Perhaps this personal confrontation is one of the reasons why 
Heidegger in the late forties and early fifties becomes increasingly aware of the fact that 
his major source of thinking, the ancient Greeks, were only able to achieve such greatness 
as they did in a direct confrontation with Asia (although Asia Minor). However, we 
should note here that the psychologism that lies in equating Heidegger’s comparative 
thinking with his personal experiences is out of place and merely a heuristic device. 
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All this leads Heidegger to a search for a possible other ‘commencement’ 
(Anfang) of thinking and to prepare the arrival of this other commencement. It is 
important to notice that Heidegger uses the word Anfang, which I have translated with 
‘commencement,’ in a different way than the word ‘beginning.’ With the other 
commencement of thinking Heidegger is not searching for some ancient starting point in 
history, perhaps in Asia or Africa, from which thinking evolved through Greece and 
Rome, to finally achieve its end or destination in Germany, as Hegel seemed to think. 
Heidegger’s other commencement is not a point of time in the past, but a task that lies 
ahead of us. The other commencement refers to the other way of thinking Heidegger is 
trying to develop and to the ‘Forgetfulness of Being’ that has dominated thought ever 
since Plato. The other ‘Anfang’ has to find ways to try to bring Being to light, without 
thereby losing its ‘essence’ or turning it into a being.  
With the working title “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (Das 
Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens)94 Heidegger now denounces his 
stance of Sein und Zeit, and actively seeks contact with other cultures to enlarge the 
thinking world and he looks to other cultures for ways of thinking that can assist him in 
his efforts of preparing the other way of thinking. For example, he says: “Who knows one 
day in Russia or in China ancient ways of thinking come to the fore that can help us in 
our struggle against Metaphysics.”95  
The working title explicitly refers to the end of philosophy, which by then 
Heidegger has come to see as something profoundly Western. With this Heidegger’s 
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statement that neither India nor China has philosophy96 comes to stand in a different 
light. Heidegger wishes to express the idea that philosophy is but one way of thinking 
(i.e. the Western one that has been characterised before by metaphysics, logic and reason) 
and that there may be greater ‘thinkers’ in other parts of the world than there are 
philosophers in the West. Thinking is much more than just philosophy.  
Through several encounters with Chinese and Japanese thinkers, by the early 
fifties Heidegger is acutely aware of “the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian 
world.”97 But how does Heidegger perceive this intercultural dialogue or encounter? A 
dialogue like this has to take place between the Self (das Eigene) and the Other (das 
Andere). Here the Self should be read as one’s own culture, the Other as the different 
culture. As we saw, for Heidegger the encounter with the Other has as its final goal a 
return of the Self to the Self. This means that there are two ways of encounter that 
Heidegger is not looking for. The first is a simple ‘melting of horizons,’ for this could 
only be the obscure world syncretism that is not directed at differences but at a unity in 
which all differences dissolve, thereby doing great injustice to the different ways of 
thinking. The second way of encounter Heidegger thinks is not right has two options. It is 
either the stubborn reluctance or refusal of the Self to encounter the Other, thereby 
denying the value of the encounter with something different than itself, or it is the 
complete losing of the Self in the Other, in the way adventurers or people that completely 
change their lives and ‘go native’ do. To Heidegger, the first option makes it impossible 
for the Self to become truly itself as we have seen that going through the Other is 
essential for the Self becoming itself. Of the second option Heidegger says that it merely 
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substitutes one culture for another, there is no real dialogue.  
Both these ways do not set up any serious dialogue between cultures, and thus 
what Heidegger is looking for is another way of encounter which he calls 
“Auseinandersetzung.” This German word that we have met before is hard to translate 
adequately. If we stretch the English language just a little the best option would probably 
be ‘con-frontation.’ Although usually thought of as a negative term in the sense of a clash 
between two identities unwilling to change, if we read this word more carefully we find 
the implication that we expose ourselves to the Other, and vice versa, which means we 
start the dialogue as much as possible without prejudice, or at least aware of our 
prejudices and open to different ways of thinking, and we create an atmosphere of mutual 
coming together in difference, in which things can show themselves as they are. But 
‘con-frontation’ also means that we position ourselves as different from the Other. The 
Auseinandersetzung is an encounter of the Self and the Other, and we must learn to let go 
of the assertively polemic connotations which often accompany the word confrontation, 
or rather, read them in a different way. For Heidegger has said already that polemos is 
really ‘clearing’ (Lichtung),98 one of the key terms of his later thinking, which is the 
opening that provides for the unconcealment of things. This roughly means that we 
should not look for too many similarities, lose ourselves completely or remain stubbornly 
by our own convictions, never questioning them. Heidegger bases the intercultural 
dialogue on difference and proceeds to set the encounter in the three stages we have seen 
earlier: 
1 before the encounter the Self is naturally turned inwards, its own cultural truths 
and values are therefore not questioned. 
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2 The actual encounter takes place and truth and value of the Self are temporarily 
placed in the background, not forgotten but in a kind of suspended animation. In the 
encounter the Other is more important, for it is there that we hear other truths and values.  
3 Afterwards, the Self returns to its own sphere, but changed by the encounter. The 
experience of ‘Otherness’ has pervaded the Self, which thereby becomes aware of the 
original unity of the Self and the Other, a unity which could be conceived of as Being, if 
we leave this nameless. We could also think of equivalents in other cultures, maybe 
things like satori in Zen Buddhism or the unnameable dao. At the same time however, 
equally important, the Self also becomes aware of the unbridgeable differences between 
itself and the Other. With this double awareness, the Self is now truly it-Self, as it realises 
it has of all times been related in an originary way to ‘Otherness’ already, and without 
knowing this relation of unity and diversity, it was really not it-Self.  
Seen in this light, Heidegger can be acquitted of the criticism of Emmanuel 
Levinas that he is oblivious to the ‘Other.’ Levinas has made extensive studies of the 
relations between the Self and the Other,99 and although Heidegger does not say a lot 
about the direct relations between individuals, it can by no means be argued that he has 
neglected the ‘Other.’ But for Heidegger, the ‘Other’ is not as for Levinas the other 
human being as individual, it is rather the ‘other’ way of thinking Heidegger wishes to 
explore.  
Having now shown the structures of how Heidegger would like to see the intercultural 
encounter, one of the finest examples of this encounter is Heidegger’s own “From a 
dialogue of language / between a Japanese and an inquirer” (Aus einem Gespräch von der 
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Sprache / zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden).100 For inquiring into 
Heidegger’s comparative thinking it is necessary to delve deeper into this conversation. 
Heidegger presents himself not as a philosopher or a Westerner, but as someone who asks 
questions, an inquirer. In the dialogue itself no arguments are made, no positions are 
taken or defended, but there is a mutual reaching out to each other in order to learn from 
each other’s ways.101 ‘Way’ (Weg) is a very important concept in Heidegger’s thoughts. 
Thinkers are always on the way, there is no fixed abode to stay or positions that are 
always correct, there is only the eternal going of the way. In this light we have to see our 
own cultural truths and values; they are provisional. Ways can go in different directions, 
and there is no one way which is the only right or true one. We do not necessarily try to 
replace our own truths with truths of another culture, for both ways are provisional. Being 
aware of this is ‘half the way’ on a never ending road that leads to nowhere in particular. 
In comparative philosophy, it is not where we go, but that we go and how we go. To go to 
the Other, or the readiness to go, is much more important than any eventual ‘destination,’ 
which sounds too much like a final, metaphysical truth. Thus Heidegger’s dialogue with 
the Japanese scholar teaches us an attitude of openness. Besides this, this dialogue also 
brings to light another important aspect of Heidegger’s thinking that he calls the ‘danger’ 
(die Gefahr). This danger is the ongoing Westernisation and thus the technologisation of 
the world and our worldview. We can see this where the ancient Japanese traditions seem 
to be fading into obscurity, and the Japanese is unable to translate into a Western 
language Japanese key concepts. That means Heidegger is acutely aware that this same 
danger is also to be found in language. We already saw that translation is difficult, if not 
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impossible, and as the practice is that most conversations are in a Western language, the 
thoughts and traditions that come with Western languages are not easily avoided. The 
problem is how to avoid getting trapped in the dominant Western ways of thinking while 
recognising that the language of the intercultural dialogue is usually or often Western and 
even the word ‘dialogue’ is an inheritance of a Western form of conversation.  
I do not think I have to further explain the term Westernisation. Heidegger is 
especially concerned with it as it is a consequence of the attitude of science and 
technology. Often disguised as development, Westernisation is visible all around us. 
Ancient cultural traditions, truths and values are evermore bulldozed aside to make way 
for the technological and economic world view of the West. It invades in every part of 
our lives and non-Western cultures seem to have little choice but to follow or be left 
behind (economically and technologically that is) for good. The most important problem 
with this is that Westernisation often brings more welfare in the short term, and that the 
negative side effects are not easily or directly noticed. The technological world view, of 
which the key words are calculability, economic efficiency, economic achievement, etc, 
produces such dangers as environmental problems, huge differences in distribution of 
wealth, not to mention neo-imperialism and what is popularly known as the ‘coca-
colonisation’ of the world. One could object that these problems have their origin and 
major impact in the West, but Heidegger answers this by saying that although that might 
be true, these problems have gone beyond the West to threaten the entire world and are 
therefore no longer purely Western, but truly universal problems.  
The more important danger for Heidegger as a thinker lies, as we have noticed, in 
language. Western languages, says Heidegger, are so infested with metaphysics and the 
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specifically Western form of logical rationality, that in fact every intercultural dialogue in 
a Western language risks the danger of corrupting the thoughts of other cultures. Even 
German can not escape this, although Heidegger was more hopeful of its possibilities. 
The problem has more to do with the metaphysical tradition and modern technological 
thinking: 
“Who would want to dispute that these German words are firmly rooted 
locutions? Today nothing in us takes root anymore. Why? Because the possibility 
of a thoughtful conversation with a tradition that invigorates and nurtures us is 
lacking, because we instead consign our speaking to electronic thinking and 
calculating machines, an occurrence that will lead modern technology and 
science to completely new procedures and unforeseeable results that probably 
will push reflective thinking aside as something useless and hence 
superfluous.”102 
These limitations and the ensuing one-sidedness of Western philosophy show themselves 
in translation. Translation in itself is always corruption, as we saw was the case with the 
translation of ancient Greek into Latin, which started the impoverishment of Western 
thinking. There are no easy ways to escape these dangers that constantly threaten us, but 
Heidegger tries it by urging us into another idea and usage of language. In the dialogue 
with the Japanese he perceives language as ‘Saying’ (Sage), which is close to speech, and 
for him the essence of language lies as much in being silent and listening as it does in 
speaking. Logos, the Greek word that was wrongly translated into the Latin ‘Ratio’, or 
rationality, actually means speaking, speech, the use of language in a correct way. So if 
man is the rational animal, we can change this false translation into: man, the animal that 
                                                
102 Heidegger 1992, 32/33; 1991, 15. 
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has logos, speech. Seen together with the earlier notion of logos as ‘gathering,’ mankind 
in its deepest reality is dia-logos, dialogue. We can speak and listen. Heidegger’s attitude 
to language also shows his hostility towards dualism. We as subjects are no longer the 
beginning or centre, but it is language that speaks through us and it remains for us to try 
to be willing and able to listen and hear the message of what is said. It is not the formal 
definitions of words that we want to hear, rather we want to understand what is being 
said. Interculturally, Heidegger is urging us to try and retrieve what is actually said in 
‘other’ cultural expressions and not to look at verbal contents only. It is in this sense that 
translation is extremely important. For as long as we seek to find literal translations of 
words, we will not notice that we are working from our own metaphysical background. In 
order to upset that background, which is necessary if we want to convey profoundly 
different ways of thinking in our own languages, we must make an effort at real 
Auseinandersetzung. And this Auseinandersetzung means then that we look for ways to 
‘transport’ (übersetzen) different ways of thinking, and not seek to accommodate words 
or concepts of these ways of thinking into our own idiomatic structures. Since different 
conceptual schemes can not be accommodated into our own metaphysical schemes, we 
need to upset these preconceived notions and that means we need to look for different 
forms of translating and different forms of understanding language.  
With this the ‘poetic’ thinking comes back into play. For it is not only in essays 
and scientific journals that we find knowledge; it can be found, if looked for, in other 
cultural expressions as art, poetry, literature and in dance, ceremony or ritual as well. But 
this will not be the clean-cut knowledge we are used to, so we have to be careful how to 
approach it. In the dialogue with the Japanese Heidegger is very cautious about the ways 
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in which to communicate. We cannot learn from other cultures if we adhere to strict 
definitions. In comparative philosophy therefore, we are not to be hindered by 
conventions on translation or on what is called knowledge. As receivers of other ways of 
knowing and thinking, we have to keep a very open mind and stretch our definitions. In 
this way, the dialogue with the Japanese is a good example of inter-cultural philosophy. 
In this dialogue, Heidegger not only asks the ancient wisdom of another culture to try to 
express itself as it is, but the dialogue as an exploration of the possibilities of intercultural 
encounters also shows us the dangers involved and the fact that theory and practice 
cannot be separated. The dialogue is theory and practice in one, especially in its 
realisation of the dangers of language.  
Besides this dialogue with another culture, Heidegger has worked in other ways 
on what he called the ‘other thinking,’ which has taken many forms, but is always aimed 
at overthrowing the dominance of metaphysics. I shall now proceed to explain a few of 
the key notions of this ‘other thinking’ which can be related to comparative philosophy. 
The first one is the already mentioned ‘Fourfold’ (Geviert). Fourfold is the unity of and 
relations between mortals, divinities, heaven and earth. Mortals are those who actively 
accept their finite existence and who are aware of the finiteness and temporality of all 
earthly existence. The divinities are the ‘beckoning messengers of divinity.’ It is very 
controversial and difficult to understand what Heidegger means by this, especially since 
he was a fierce opponent of the influence of religion on philosophy. He seems to mean 
that divinity is an essential part of the world, which means that he is trying to say that the 
world is not just the superficiality of things we see, but that all things have a deeper or at 
least a different meaning that we cannot imagine with our scientifically oriented way of 
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knowing. So with the term divinities, Heidegger says that we have to keep an open mind 
towards the mystery of the world. Heaven is the constantly developing movement of 
night and day, sun and moon, weather and wind. It refers to the cosmos and to time, but 
placed in a far more encompassing reach than science gives these concepts. The earth 
Heidegger typifies as the ‘serving bearer of fruit, plant and animal.’ With regards to the 
earth’s serving and bearing character, Heidegger states that that is in principal its essence, 
but that in the present time the earth is being exploited, polluted and threatened, so it 
cannot anymore perform its natural function. Mortals, divinities, heaven and earth are 
very much interrelated. In fact, Heidegger perceives these four as a unity of existence, 
thus directly criticising dualistic philosophy and implying a more cosmological way of 
thinking. Fourfold does not place man opposite the world, but implies that he is a part of 
it and that he needs to play an active role in keeping its unity, not forgetting he is but a 
part of the greater whole.103  
Another aspect of the ‘other thinking’ is ‘Releasement’ (Gelassenheit). 
Releasement, or detachment, is an attitude to be taken towards things. It is not a passive 
detachment, but an attitude that lies beyond the opposition passive versus active. 
Releasement is an open mind towards the mystery of the world and of existence. It is 
aimed at creating an openness in which things can ‘be’ what they are, it is to let things be 
as they are, and not, as in dualistic philosophy, to oppose them and see them as 
something usable. Things are, and it is this Being of things that Heidegger tries to give 
room, in letting them be without naming them, since naming them usually involves 
stigmatising and fixating them relative to man and other things.  
Then there is the aforementioned ‘aesthetic’ and ‘poetic’ thinking. This is not to 
                                                
103 For the ‘fourfold’, see Heidegger 1994b. 
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be confused with thinking about art or poetry, but as I have said it is also a way of 
thinking that tries to bring us closer to the world we live in. It is a more originary and 
truthful way of thinking, where again it has to be reminded that truth, for Heidegger, is 
‘unconcealment,’ so that this way of thinking tries to perceive of the world as disclosing 
itself in a way that is more direct and original than metaphysics and science make us 
believe. It is up to us whether we can hear this disclosure, whether we are ready and 
willing to change our attitudes. Heidegger himself has remained very reluctant to say 
what this other thinking actually in reality consists of. All he wants is to prepare us for a 
different relation to our world. It is up to us to put these thoughts into existence, and of 
course, existence differs. There is more than one way that these thoughts can be 
understood, there are different ways. Yet he seems to be pointing to a more experiential 
way of thinking that aims to reunite us with the deeper meaning of the universe, and I 
believe that this is one of the reasons Heidegger turned to the East. The fundamental 
experiences of man are those that place him firmly in this world, for example ‘Anxiety’ 
(Angst) as an experience of ‘Nothing,’ and therefore, of Being. Heidegger has frequently 
argued that ‘experience’ should become a far more encompassing concept, and not just be 
seen as an experience of an object by a subject.104 Experience is the form of thinking. The 
concepts of Fourfold and Releasement can easily be thought of as advocating a more or 
less experiential thinking, close to some forms of mysticism, if we do not forget that it is 
not something otherworldly that Heidegger aims to unite us with, but that thinking and 
experience are meant to bring man closer to the reality and interrelatedness of existence.  
The interculturality of this other thinking is very obvious. Everywhere Heidegger 
hints at the importance of different ways of thinking, no one way is better than another. 
                                                
104 See for example Heidegger 1994a, 115-208. Also see Heidegger 1983a and 1983b. 
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His work does have a lot of relations with mysticism, yet again we have to stress that 
Heidegger has maintained that he wanted nothing to do with mysticism, as he considered 
it an attempt to escape from the finite world, and it is this finite world that he takes to be 
our final base. In this way Heidegger can be said to have developed a ‘mysticism after the 
death of God.’ The mystical influences in his work are not aimed at releasing us from this 
world into a state of bliss, but at seeing it for what it really is: a finite world yes, but with 
a lot more meaning in it than has been advocated by science and rationality. 
Interculturally, the West has to let go of its prejudice of scientific truth and has to admit 
that even in our finite world, meaning can not be reduced to scientific meaning.  
1.4 CONCLUDING HEIDEGGER. 
Having put Heidegger’s thoughts into relation with comparative philosophy, we might 
ask what the implications of this way of thinking are. With regards to language and 
communication, we can say that as long as comparative dialogues are held in a Western 
language without explicit awareness of the dangers this brings with it, little progress will 
be made in the direction of trying to retrieve the thoughts behind expressions and key 
concepts of cultures profoundly different from the West. In other cultures languages may 
have other functions than the exchange of information. We can also relate this to the 
motives behind comparative philosophy. It appears that much of what is referred to as 
comparative philosophy might actually be Western in origin, motive or discourse. It is the 
West that is now seeking to start a dialogue, and it remains to be seen whether this 
attitude of wanting a dialogue is itself inter- or cross-cultural at all. Heidegger urges us to 
take different cultures ‘as they come,’ and not to try to read too much into them that is 
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just not there. Too much of ‘other thinking’ is still bent and curbed until it fits our 
Western discourse, and that which does not fit in or has no equivalent in something 
known to us, is dismissed and not allowed to participate in the dialogue. As long as this 
remains the case, there might be little incentive for another culture to participate when it 
knows beforehand that it can not express itself anyway. This is where Heidegger has said 
that we have to change our ideas of language and meaning to be able to start a truly 
intercultural dialogue.  
But Heidegger has also protested fiercely against total cultural relativism. All 
thinking everywhere is based on the universal source of thought, Being, the unity on 
which the distinction of Self and Other is based and to which it has to return. But because 
Being itself is nothing, it is not something we can identify and thus as source it will 
remain forever in the background, retreating further the harder we try to expose ‘it,’ 
because ‘it’ is non-existent, it is nothing other than the play of differences. Being cannot 
be identified, but Being can come to unconcealment in the differences, if we are ready 
and willing to look and hear. Keeping this in mind, we must come to a constructive 
dialogue that can provide a counterforce to the ongoing threats of Westernisation both 
within philosophy and in the wider world. We must constantly be on guard against 
Western, but also against Eastern, prejudice and presuppositions if we wish for a rich and 
diverse source of thinking. For that is what the diversity of cultures is too; an unnameable 
source from which thinking can be derived. So if we allow the Western point of view to 
become the dominating or even the only true one, we lose in many ways.  
The West still dictates, albeit hardly traceable and very subtle, the rules of 
dialogue and exchange. Although thinking itself is universal, the ways of thinking are so 
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diverse that we cannot afford to lose sight of this differentiality. Thinking goes on all 
across the planet, and that is what Heidegger meant when he stated that we need a 
“planetary thinking.”105 Not in the sense of one way of thinking for the whole planet, but 
in a realisation that there are different ways of thinking around. 
What I have tried to show is three things. First is that Heidegger’s thinking is 
useful in seeing both the possibilities and the dangers of comparative philosophy, which 
stem mainly from language. Second is that the nothingness, or clearing, or openness 
between differences need not be understood as a metaphysical guiding principle, but 
must, according to Heidegger himself, be purely understood from the interplay of 
differences itself. Third is that even with the best intentions, comparative philosophy is 
still easily dominated by Western traditional scholarship. And as Heidegger himself met 
with great resistance from the establishment, so a truly intercultural dialogue also faces 
great difficulties. But I am convinced that if we are serious in our comparative efforts, the 
only way open to us is to face the decision to widen the range of philosophy. And, as 
Heidegger saw well, then we had better leave behind the heavy burden of the term 
philosophy altogether. If I can venture a conclusion of this chapter, this might be the most 
important task of comparative thinking, paving the way for different kinds of thinking; 
from one universal philosophy to different kinds of planetary thinking. 
                                                
105 Heidegger 1977, 44, my translation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DERRIDA: OTHERNESS, CONTEXT AND OPENNESS.   
“I must nonetheless formulate in a somewhat dogmatic way [….] a very dry 
necessity whose consequences could affect our entire problematic: what is proper 
to a culture is to not be identical to itself. Not to not have an identity, but not to 
be able to identify itself, to be able to say “me” or “we”; to be able to take the 
form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the 
difference with itself [avec soi]. There is no culture or cultural identity without 
this difference with itself.”1  
In order to get a better understanding of the relevance of Jacques Derrida’s work for the 
field of comparative philosophy, it is important to have a closer look first at Derrida’s 
efforts in reinterpreting what he sees as the mostly Western, metaphysical tradition of 
philosophy. These efforts are found in his attacks on phono- and logocentrism. Together 
with these attacks come his criticisms and reinterpretations of the oppositional structure 
of much of Western philosophy, where thinking has always seemed to develop in some 
form of dualism, in which opposites or dichotomies emerge, and of which good/evil, 
mind/body, being/nothing, presence/absence, essence/appearance and identity/difference 
can be examples. This way of thinking is in itself questionable, meaning that such clear-
cut distinctions are never really possible, and Derrida’s work is meant to show that the 
                                                
1 Derrida 1992a, 9/10, italics and French in original. I work mainly with English translations of Derrida’s 
works, so references will be of these translations, unless otherwise stated, and they will be referred to as 
‘original.’ References to articles or other contributions by Derrida in volumes edited or written mainly by 
others will either be referred by name of editor/author and year of publication, or by: Derrida in: name of 
editor/author, followed by year of publication (of volume).   
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drawing of the borders, limits or dividing lines between the subsequent opposites of the 
distinctions are always open to various deconstructions. Furthermore the hierarchy 
imposed on and within these dichotomies, whereby one side of the oppositions or 
differential structures is favoured above the other, is also arbitrary or untenable according 
to Derrida. He questions this longstanding tradition through such non-concepts as 
deconstruction, differance, tracing, supplement, iterability etc, and it is precisely this 
questioning which we have to look at before we can turn more directly to the project: 
‘Derrida and comparative philosophy.’ For it is really in the dislodging and 
deconstructive enterprises that Derrida’s ideas about something beyond or other than 
philosophy in the logocentric sense can be located.   
Another reason for inquiring into Derrida’s relation to Western, metaphysical 
philosophy2 before looking into his relations with other ways of thinking is that direct 
references in Derrida’s work to non-Western or non-metaphysical philosophy are not 
only sparse, but problematic and ambiguous in themselves. This is especially so if we for 
a moment ignore the numerous references to Algeria (Derrida’s birthplace), or to the 
Jewish, Christian and Islamic world.3 In dealing with these traditions, Derrida tries to 
show that they are essentially speaking from the same roots, as they can be traced to the 
‘Abrahamic’ background, and are thus squarely located within the metaphysical tradition. 
Although Derrida locates numerous differences within these views and in their relations, 
the essence is that all three share the same metaphysical background and direction. There 
                                                
2 Although Derrida’s criticism is to a large extent aimed at Western philosophy, it is really the metaphysical 
sensibility that he is arguing against. This metaphysical way of thinking can also be found in parts of the 
‘East,’ and this is one of the reasons why the categories of East and West are no longer or never have been 
appropriate. In many instances I shall therefore use the distinction between metaphysical and non-
metaphysical thinking, or between dualistic and non-dualistic philosophy, or logocentric and non-
logocentric thinking, as my guideline, fully aware that these distinctions must in the end also be 
deconstructed with equal force. 
3 See for example Derrida 2002a. 
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is very little mention in any of his works of anything beyond the Middle East, or of Sub-
Saharan Africa or any other place for that matter. In Acts of Religion Derrida goes further 
in showing that the whole notion of religiousness is seemingly reserved for the 
Abrahamic traditions. When he deconstructs the religious vocabulary and finds it to be 
Western and Christianised, this then in turn is taken to explain the “globalatinization,”4 
meaning the universalising intentionality of these religions, through their language. As he 
puts it: “In any case, the history of the word ‘religion’ should in principle forbid every 
non-Christian from using the name “religion.””5 However, Derrida does not further 
explore the consequences of these ideas for other ways of thinking, and neither does he 
ever incorporate other ways of thinking into his own critique of Western metaphysics. So 
in a very surprising fashion, since Derrida is noted for criticising the tradition of Western 
metaphysics and for arguing for the interconnectedness and relationality of what seem to 
be separate identities at first glance, he leaves out any serious approach to other cultures 
and ways of thinking which might show him some possible forms of non-logocentric 
thinking. We must keep this in mind when trying to locate Derrida in comparative 
philosophy, and thus realise that it is mostly not any actual encounters of Derrida with 
other cultures, but the way of thinking he has developed which is interesting in that it 
might shed more light on the guiding ideas behind comparative philosophy.  
In order to see therefore, whether his thinking has any resonance in Daoism or 
could engender different readings of this tradition, we must first locate in the 
deconstructions of the metaphysical sensibilities those features which could bear 
importance on a positive (or at least a different than the ‘usual’) appreciation of non-
                                                
4 Derrida 2002a, 89. 
5 Derrida 2002a, 72. 
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Western cultures, as opposed to those which merely criticise certain structures. And for 
this, we need first to locate Derrida’s views with regard to the future possibilities of 
Western thinking as well as its limitations. In second place we need to look at his ideas of 
alterity, what is ‘other’ or different and how this other or difference functions or relates to 
the Western world. This notion of the ‘other’ will figure prominently in this chapter as it 
holds some importance for deconstructing the strict difference of identities that has been 
supposed to hold between East and West.   
The project of relating Derrida to the non-Western cultural and philosophical 
sensibilities in Daoism can then be seen to have three aspects or parts: first, a 
comparative part, where we look for resonances between Derrida and Daoism, and try to 
explain the relevance of these relations for a better understanding of both. Second, but 
closely related, we must try to give a differential or Derridean reading of classics such as 
the Daodejing or the Zhuangzi, in order to shed a different light on these important 
works. This is not to be understood as imposing Derridean sensibilities onto Daoism, but 
more in the sense of a hermeneutical understanding, where we use Derrida to try to more 
fully appreciate Daoism on its own terms, which in turn can only mean that we try to 
provide at least a wider terminology and a wider discourse or context in which to 
understand Daoism. Third, there must be an explanation of the attempt, by various 
scholars who have compared Derrida to Daoism, to use Daoism as a critique of or 
supplement to Derrida’s deconstructive process, or in other words, I must give an 
explanation of the attempt to read and criticise Derrida from a Daoist perspective. This 
attempt has taken various forms, and again it is not meant to impose Daoist ideas on 
Derrida but looks for a wider understanding of both. We must then see whether this 
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Daoist criticism is valid by exploring both Derrida and Daoism. However, this third part 
of relating Derrida to Daoism must wait until after Daoism has been more closely studied 
in the next chapter, so it will be part of the final comparative chapter. 
While incorporating parts of these three aspects, this chapter however has a 
slightly different construction, exploring the above mentioned in three different parts. In 
the first part I will look more closely at ideas of identity and difference, and of differance 
and other Derridean terms, and I will focus on the deconstruction of Western ideas and on 
Derrida’s relation to Heidegger. Of course anyone even vaguely familiar with Derrida 
will realise that these terms need to be deconstructed and put ‘under erasure,’ that is they 
will be used but reinterpreted and ‘reinscribed’ in a different discourse, one that not so 
much hopes to circumvent metaphysics, but at least to point to its inconsistencies and 
from there maybe find ‘openings’ to non-metaphysical thinking and with that to some 
non-Western cultures. This part will mostly be concerned with Derrida’s deconstruction 
of the Western tradition and forms of metaphysics and thus provide a sort of platform 
from which to proceed to look more closely at his possible relations to non-metaphysical 
thinking. 
The second part will focus specifically on the notions of language and translation, 
important as these are to both Derrida and comparative philosophy. The possibilities and 
impossibilities of translation, the relation between signifier and signified, phono- and 
logocentrism in language, the idea of ‘writing,’ ‘context,’ ‘textuality’ or ‘discourse’ in a 
broad sense; all these bear strongly on any intercultural encounter or comparative 
philosophy from a Derridean perspective. It will be argued that a different perspective on 
language and discourse is vital both to understand Derrida as well as to locate him 
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intelligibly in comparative philosophy. 
The third part will then try to initiate a reading of Derrida and the possibilities of 
his work with special regard to comparative philosophy. This part will then, by means of 
the notion of the ‘other’ in Derrida and its usefulness for comparative philosophy, try to 
‘apply’ Derrida and by this I mean look for the possibility of relations of Derridean 
thinking to non-metaphysical ways of thinking. This means there will be a research into 
the possibilities of an intercultural dialogue ‘on Derridean terms,’ thus to see how 
comparative philosophy might benefit and strengthen its ideas of openness to difference 
if we look at it through Derrida’s thinking. There will also be the initial exploration of the 
possibility of different and differential readings of East Asian thinking by pointing to the 
inevitable metaphysics inserted in various readings from metaphysical6 perspectives and 
by pointing to the fact that if we wish to do comparative thinking through Derrida, other-
than-metaphysical readings are necessary. As I pointed out before, I will also give an 
interpretation of readings and criticisms of Derrida from a Daoist perspective, but in a 
later chapter.  
This chapter as a whole needs of course to address the inevitable question of 
relativism or nihilism, of which Derrida has often been accused, but against which he has 
vehemently tried to defend himself. The refutation of relativism and nihilism by Derrida 
is important as well for intercultural encounters, where it is also one of the most common 
criticisms comparative philosophy has to defend itself against. I hope to show however 
that a serious and thorough reading of Derrida will provide a certain idea of relations, 
perspectives and language or discourse that will itself take away much, if not all, of the 
                                                
6 Again, these metaphysical readings have mostly been the Western interpretations, but they can also be 
found in some Chinese scholars and commentators throughout the history of Chinese thought. 
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force of the criticisms of relativism and nihilism levelled against Derrida. I will try to do 
this by suggesting that although Derrida might at first glance come across as a relativist 
who questions all the long-standing notions of philosophy without offering a ‘way out,’ 
his questioning should be seen more as a way of complicating the oversimplifications that 
absolutists take for granted.  
2.1 DECONSTRUCTING THE IDEAS BEHIND METAPHYSICS.   
“[Writing] inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-
sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source 
in that of the logos. […] All the metaphysical determinations of truth, and even 
the one beyond metaphysical onto-theology that Heidegger reminds us of, are 
more or less immediately inseparable from the instance of the logos, or of a 
reason thought within the lineage of the logos, in whatever sense it is 
understood.”7  
2.1.1  MISREADING DERRIDA. 
Before we begin the exploration of Derrida’s thinking about Western metaphysics, it 
might be appropriate to provide a short aside dealing with popular misreadings of 
Derrida’s work in general, or of some of his (non-)concepts, as well as his replies and 
elaborations on these readings. A better understanding of these misreadings and Derrida’s 
explanations will function to deflect certain unwarranted and hasty criticisms of his work, 
and will thereby enable us to both depopularise the supposed relativism or nihilism of 
                                                
7 Derrida 1976, 10. 
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Derrida, and to better focus on Derrida’s own ideas, and on more warranted criticisms 
and Derrida’s replies to them. I realise however that this undertaking of looking at 
misreadings might in itself be questionable. Derrida has frequently questioned the notions 
of authorial intent, univocal meaning, the proper and property, and he has also argued for 
the important place of the reader in understanding any text. The criticism goes that since 
reading is interpretation, there can be no ground from which to judge between a good and 
a bad reading. We are left with the question whether there is a possibility of 
distinguishing misreadings from proper readings, which has Jonathan Culler claiming 
that “understanding is a special case of misunderstanding.”8 This has led some people, 
both critics and followers of Derrida, to assume a certain philosophical ‘anything goes’ 
attitude in his work.9 Notwithstanding this, Derrida has made certain claims to what is at 
stake in his works and words, and he has argued against at least some of the 
interpretations that have been given of his work. So perhaps there are better 
misunderstandings and worse ones. Alternatively and in my opinion more Derridean, we 
could see understanding as something provisional, something which always gets 
fragmented (and as we shall see, right from the beginning), or at least never reaches the 
fullness that is its ideal. This is also the meaning of the putting ‘under erasure’ of 
concepts as I understand it. I think this latter position is what Derrida has in mind in most 
of his texts, and it is in this light that I offer some of the misreadings and Derrida’s 
responses to them. 
First of all there is the by now (in-)famous notion of ‘deconstruction.’ This notion 
has arguably become one of today’s most used concepts, terms or slogans, thereby losing 
                                                
8 Culler 1982, 176. 
9 For examples, see Rorty and Searle in Madison 1993. 
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much of its original force and direction. It could be seen on par nowadays with terms 
such as ‘culture’ and ‘post-modern,’ or ‘dao’ for that matter in having started a life of its 
own. Of course Derrida is really in no position to lament this development, since he has 
always argued for the inherent openness of terms and words, and for their insertion or 
iterability10 in (any) historical discourse right from the moment they are conceived.11 
Derrida realises this, but does however want to clarify that this inevitable 
Wirkungsgeschichte or history of the term is not his invention, and that he is not to be 
held responsible for the development of the word as such. On several occasions, for 
example in The Ear of the Other, he has explicitly denounced the purely negative side of 
deconstruction, where he says some critics think it is “a technical operation used to 
dismantle systems”12 or structures and nothing else. Derrida tries to explain that the 
function of the dismantling of deconstruction “is accompanied, or can be accompanied 
(in any case, I would hope to accompany it), by an affirmation. It is not negative, it is not 
destructive.”13  
Originally taken from Heidegger, Derrida had intended the word ‘deconstruction’ 
much more as Heidegger took it, in the sense of Destruktion and Ab-bau, and maybe even 
related to Heidegger’s Wiederholung, signalling indeed a dismantling of a structure, but 
for the purpose of seeing “how it is constituted or deconstituted.”14 So deconstruction is 
not just destruction, it is more of a dissecting, and also a certain reconstruction, and its 
function is more to make us realise that certain structures are more complicated, less 
                                                
10 For the notion of ‘iterability,’ see Derrida 1988, and the part on language and translation in this chapter. 
11 Indeed, concepts or words, or any sign or mark for that matter, can only function as relative identities 
because of this iterability, the possibility of repetition and citation is literally vital for the existence of a 
concept, but we shall have plenty more to do with this so I will not dwell on it here. 
12 Derrida 1985, 85. 
13 Derrida 1985, 85. 
14 Derrida 1985, 87. 
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simple and less univocal than they seem to be presented at first. Elsewhere Derrida has 
argued similarly that the moment of affirmation in deconstruction lies in the realisation 
that supposedly complete identities, or closed structures, ideas or systems are always 
open-ended (and from both ends), and can therefore never attain the perfect self-presence 
on which so much of metaphysical philosophy is founded. This realisation does not 
therefore denounce what is deconstructed, it merely reinscribes it, makes it more 
provisional. As Derrida himself explains it: 
“Deconstruction certainly entails a moment of affirmation. Indeed, I cannot 
conceive of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by some 
sort of affirmation, acknowledged or not. Deconstruction always presupposes 
affirmation, as I have frequently attempted to point out, sometimes employing a 
Nietzschean terminology. I do not mean that the deconstructing subject or self 
affirms. I mean that deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity 
which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. [….] It is in this rapport with 
the other that affirmation expresses itself.”15 
In a wording remarkably similar to Heidegger which will be further explored in the next 
section, Derrida thus denounces the wrongful interpretations of ‘deconstruction’ that have 
flourished, mostly, as he says, in the interpretations of his work in the United States.16 
Derrida is much more interested in limiting the overly optimistic interpretations and ideas 
of metaphysics and resituating them accordingly, than he is in destroying them altogether. 
More important for comparative philosophy, he suggests that the affirmation lies to a 
large extent in the ‘rapport with the other.’ We will see what this means later. And again, 
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 Derrida in: Kearney 1984, 118, italics in original. 
16 Compare for instance Derrida 1988, 115/116, or Derrida 2001a, 15-19. See also Burke 1992, 162-168, 
and compare for example Cheney 1995, where ‘postmodernism’ as it is understood to function in 
Humanities departments in the USA, is attacked for its lack of commitment to truth.  
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he does not share in the optimism regarding the possibilities of the concept of 
deconstruction, it is just a provisional word to be replaced and “determined by such other 
words as ‘ecriture,’ ‘trace,’ ‘differance,’ ‘supplement,’ ‘hymen,’ ‘pharmakon,’ ‘marge,’ 
‘entame,’ ‘parergon,’ etc. By definition, the list can never be closed…”17 That is also to 
say that by definition there can be no one formula or definition of ‘deconstruction’ as this 
would reduce ‘it’ to “an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible 
approaches.”18 And more recently Derrida has said there can only be deconstructions, in 
the plural, since it is not one definable thing.19 This is something of importance for 
comparative philosophy as I see it, in that it also cannot be a fixed theory or 
methodology, which can then just be applied. Any theory of comparative philosophy can 
only be found in the practice of comparative philosophy.  
The same defence is used with regard to the idea of ‘the death of the subject,’ a 
common Derridean expression that has also taken on a life of its own. In reply to a 
question about the critics who accuse him of nihilistically getting rid of the notion of 
human subjectivity, Derrida explains that: 
“[they] need not worry. [….] To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny 
its existence. There are subjects, ‘operations’ or ‘effects’ (effets) of subjectivity. 
This is an incontrovertible fact. To acknowledge this does not mean, however, 
that the subject is what is says it is. The subject is not some meta-linguistic 
substance or identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in 
language. My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to 
                                                
17 Wood & Bernasconi 1988, 4, translation slightly modified. 
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 Derrida 1989b, 36. 
19 See Derrida 2001a. 
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resituate it.”20  
Again, Derrida makes an effort to show that he is arguing against the oversimplifications 
that seem to occur necessarily or inevitably in the idealisations of metaphysical 
philosophy and its dualistic approach, and that his work is directed at reinterpreting these 
ideas.  
In close connection to the previous two is the last example I shall give of 
misreadings of Derrida’s work and this concerns the idea that there is nothing beyond 
language. One of the most frequently used quotations of Derrida must surely be: “There 
is nothing outside of the text,”21 and this is at the same time easily one of the most 
misunderstood sentences in Derrida’s work. It is not a statement to the effect that we are 
trapped in language, that we are bound by it. Again, since this aside is a defence of 
Derrida’s intentions, if we can properly speak of his intentions, I shall let him do the 
talking: 
“I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that 
there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in 
fact, saying the exact opposite. The critique of logocentrism is above all else the 
search for the ‘other’ and the ‘other of language.’ Every week I receive critical 
commentaries and studies on deconstruction which operate on the assumption 
that what they call ‘post-structuralism’ amounts to saying that there is nothing 
beyond language, that we are submerged in words – and other stupidities of that 
sort. Certainly, deconstruction tries to show that the question of reference is 
much more complex and problematic than traditional theories supposed. […] But 
to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or 
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 Derrida in: Kearney 1984, 125, italics in original. 
21 Derrida 1976, 158, italics in original. 
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complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that 
there is nothing beyond language.”22 
Again Derrida seems to be suggesting that he has been misunderstood on this part of his 
thinking. His is exactly the search for that moment where language fails to achieve its 
idealistic fullness, where rendering an object present as such through language becomes 
impossible, and where language returns to itself and makes reference to something 
outside of language, something not contaminated by language, something on its own 
(terms), problematic. Many of Derrida’s opponents have taken to this idea of ‘nothing 
outside the text,’ criticising what they think to be some ‘all or nothing’ attitude, a 
nihilistic or relativistic position which argues that we are imprisoned in language.23 
Derrida’s explanation of what the terms ‘writing’ or ‘text’ stand for gives us a different 
story, as he explains that ‘text’ is “limited neither to the graphic, nor to the book, nor 
even to discourse, and even less to the semantic, representational, symbolic, ideal, or 
ideological sphere. What I call “text” implies all the structures called “real,” “economic,” 
“historical,” socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. […] every referent, all 
reality has the structure of a differential trace.”24 Elsewhere in the same work, Limited 
Inc, he also affirms the idea of reference, if taken as regarding difference that is always 
there already, there is reference, yet it is never pure.25 We are therefore always embedded 
in referential situations, where clear and distinct presence of something unto itself is 
immediately challenged and where language always stumbles onto that which is other to 
it. Language is thus more a stumbling block if seen from the subjective point of view, but 
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 Derrida in: Kearney 1984, 123/124, italics in original. 
23 For example: Searle’s contributions to Madison 1993, 170-188, or Jung 1984 and Ch’ien 1984 for similar 
claims. 
24 Derrida 1988, 148, also see Derrida 1981a, 35/36. 
25 Derrida 1988, 137. 
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what Derrida shows is that this stumbling block is all we have, it is unavoidable to work 
with(-in) it. He is looking for a kind of non-dualist approach to reference, understood as 
our inevitable embeddedness in situations, which would place us inside the world rather 
than outside of it or struggling to get outside. To think of ourselves as transcendental 
subjects who could somehow step outside of these circles and obtain an objective look at 
them, is itself a fallacy that others besides Derrida have also criticised, and it is in this 
very tradition that Derrida moves.26 Thus the statement that ‘there is nothing outside the 
text’ means rather that there is always context, and this context is both constitutive for 
our being, as well as structurally open-ended. 
In all fairness to his critics, there is a lot of room for these misunderstandings to 
arise, and Derrida has to some extent been instrumental in their appearance and 
persistence. For example, the complexity of his texts, their inherent ambiguity and play 
with words are not exactly conducive to any clear-cut understanding. But of course we 
should remind ourselves that one of Derrida’s main objectives seems to be exactly to 
ambiguate the notion of such a unitary understanding of full presence, but that this does 
not mean ‘no meaning at all.’ Besides this, the parts that function as his explanations are 
(usually) of a much later date than the ‘original’ quotations which have offended or 
provoked so many. But, in order to save him from his readers, we need to understand that 
the things he writes and says are in the end not those of his interpreters, whether they are 
followers or critics. This will hopefully become clearer through the comparison of 
Derrida and Daoism. We also need to appreciate the fact that Derrida’s approach stresses 
the negative against the positive of metaphysics, not to stay in this inversion, but 
precisely in order to overcome or undo this duality or dichotomy inherent in metaphysical 
                                                
26 We can think for example of Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Gadamer. 
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philosophy. This is important for now, as well as two other aspects of this aside. First of 
all is that we have already hinted at Derrida’s close relation to Heidegger, which will be 
explored in the next section, with special attention to those similarities or conflicts which 
could be of use in comparative philosophy. Second, or more in particular, many if not all 
of these criticisms and refutations stem from an interpretation of the notions of ‘identity’ 
and ‘difference,’ which are crucial to Derrida’s thinking, as well as to Heidegger’s. It is 
therefore these notions, together with corresponding notions of subjectivity, presence, 
and alterity, or otherness, which we need to address.  
2.1.2  BEYOND HEIDEGGER? 
This part focuses on the rather complex relations between Heidegger and Derrida. One of 
Derrida’s main criticisms of Heidegger has to do with the latter’s notion of the 
Ontological Difference. This thought of Being as opposed to beings is supposedly 
overtaken by Derrida’s notion of differance (différance). In order to appreciate what 
differance could mean, it is best to look at the notions of identity and difference first. To 
start with the notion of ‘identity,’ various parts of Derrida’s work seek to undermine the 
traditional notion of any lasting identity, also and especially in the case of any enduring, 
transcendental subjectivity. Identity itself is not so much denied, but Derrida sees it as 
ever shifting in moves which remind one of Heidegger’s Identity and Difference. This 
means that all forms of identity and all forming of identity or subjectivity rely on the 
always already implicit reference to ‘the other.’ Derrida mentions in Monolingualism of 
the Other that identity is only formed at “a site always referring elsewhere, to something 
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other, to another language, to the other in general.”27 Something is never fully sufficient 
on its own, it always and ever anew needs to deal with its other, and as such also defined 
by its other. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s work is exactly about 
this relation with the other, and about seeing this relationality (and thus difference) as 
fundamental to, and not as something derivative from, the idea of identity. I shall deal 
more explicitly with this notion of the ‘other’ in a further section of this chapter. 
One of the important things to show in this section is then how by using the 
notion of differance Derrida goes or at least thinks he goes ‘beyond’ Heidegger. The 
main contribution or addition of Derrida seems to be the awareness that Heidegger was 
still looking for ‘authentic’ words that would somehow speak directly from the matter of 
thinking, and thought he could locate these words in ancient Greek, German or the 
classical Chinese language of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Against this Derrida 
wants to show that all such supposedly authentic words eventually fall short of what they 
aim for and only function within arbitrary webs of signification. This applies also, of 
course, to Derrida’s own words, and he is extremely aware of this; it is the entire 
intention of his work to show this relatedness which functions everywhere and makes it 
impossible in principle to divide the world into strict identities. 
Taking a closer look at the notion of differance we find that it is in itself 
problematic. Derrida’s insistence that it is “neither a word nor a concept”28 should make 
us realise that we are definitely not talking about something which would simply replace 
notions as Geist, God or Reason, if these can be taken as representatives of the 
metaphysical tradition, functioning as transcendental principles. But this in itself does not 
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 Derrida 1998, 29. 
28 Derrida 1982, 7. 
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mean Heidegger is surpassed in any way. For the same things that have been said about 
differance up to now apply to Heidegger’s notion of Being. Heidegger equally considers 
the fact that Being is not a word in the proper sense, for then it would be a being. He also 
resorts to crossing out the word itself, and is most definitely opposed to any onto-
theological or metaphysical interpretation of Being, realising very much that Being is in 
beings and nowhere else. But Derrida may be right in suggesting that Heidegger was 
always looking for authentic words and hoped to find these words in poetic thinking and 
in other cultures, as well as locating them in the ancient Greek way of thinking and of 
course in his own words. However, Heidegger also warned against any such 
metaphysically optimistic interpretation of these words, since it was only in a quite 
radical reinterpretation of these words that Heidegger could show something of his take 
on them, and then immediately warned that even if they were to be considered in some 
way as authentic or disclosing, this only ever happens together with inauthenticity and 
closure. As we have seen, every unconcealing of necessity entails concealing. Thus every 
effort at making the ontological difference appear is useless, because as such, as 
difference, (it) can never appear (itself).29 This should prevent the reader and thus also 
Derrida from focusing too much on the supposed nostalgia or metaphysical inclinations 
of Heidegger. In fact, Derrida is aware of this when he says that “one can find several 
passages in which Heidegger is self-critical and renounces his nostalgia: his practice of 
cancelling and erasing the term [Being, SVB] in his later texts is an example of such a 
critique. Heidegger’s texts are still before us…”30 Derrida is deeply aware of Heidegger’s 
importance to his own works, and even admits that “in a certain aspect of itself, 
                                                
29 See for example Heidegger 1975, 51. 
30
 Derrida in: Kearney 1984, 110. 
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différance is certainly but the historical and epochal unfolding of Being or of the 
ontological difference.”31 But the fact that he uses the words “in a certain aspect” already 
suggests that Derrida is not willing to stop there. He goes on to show that there is indeed 
a difference between the two. This difference is that Heidegger was still looking for a 
meaning or truth of Being, however he conceived of these. Differance does not succumb 
to this inclination. Instead differance is called:  
“The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose 
play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, or the 
différance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no 
maintaining, and no depth to, this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put 
into play.”32 
Derrida acknowledges that it is only by thoroughly thinking through the ontological 
difference that anything like differance can be thought. But whereas Heidegger in Der 
Spruch des Anaximander still hopes for “the unique word”33 which could somehow speak 
of the ‘root unfolding’ (Wesen) of Being, or out of ‘the matter of thinking’ (die Sache des 
Denkens), Derrida aims to show that there is no such word, that language always and 
necessarily falls short of the expectations of providing such presence, and that we must 
affirm this without nostalgia, indeed in a Nietzschean way. And it is indeed appropriate 
here to recall Nietzsche’s words: “There are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no 
monads; here, too, beings are only introduced by us […] Linguistic means of expression 
are useless for expressing “becoming”; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve 
                                                
31 Derrida 1982, 22, italics in original. 
32 Derrida 1982, 22, italics in original. 
33 Heidegger 1994a, 366; 1975, 52. 
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ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of “things,” etc.”34 Differance as trace does 
not point towards some origin of presence, or to stability. Trace (is) the play of what is 
‘other’ inside the structures of signification. It is therefore that differance is neither a 
word nor a concept, and most certainly not the word. This is the most important 
difference between Heidegger and Derrida. We should now leave this particular question 
of the relation between Heidegger and Derrida and return to our exploration of differance.  
If differance is not a concept, then what (is it)? Derrida explains by saying that 
although differance is not a concept in the traditional sense, it is more to be seen as “an 
aconceptual concept or another kind of concept, heterogeneous to the philosophical 
concept of the concept, a “concept” that marks both the possibility and the limit of all 
idealization and hence of all conceptualization.”35 Does that help? At least we are 
beginning to understand that Derrida wishes to question the whole notion of 
conceptuality, as he questions notions of identity, subjectivity and language in general, 
again, remember, not so much to destroy them, but to reinscribe them in a less 
totalitarian, less idealistic web he calls ‘writing.’ All his ‘keywords’ thus also and 
immediately become questionable themselves, and this is why he never lingers around 
one ‘concept’ for long, as Heidegger may have done by lingering around ‘Being’ his 
whole career. We can also note the shift from the nouns to gerunds within Derrida’s 
thinking. ‘Writing’ is an example of this, and it is part of a larger effort on his side to 
overcome identity based metaphysical philosophy and work towards a more processual, 
non-dualist understanding. In this line we can think of the ‘a’ in differance, implying the 
notion of temporality, deference, and think of the “texture” of the text, implying context. 
                                                
34 Nietzsche 1968, 380. 
35 Derrida 1988, 118, see also 127. 
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Another important factor to note in Derrida’s relation to Heidegger is that 
Heidegger offers a very different interpretation of logos, one of his key terms. But we 
need to find out to what extent Derrida still reads logos in the way it has traditionally 
come down to us, that is as discourse guided by a thread of reason and logic. Derrida 
takes logos, and indeed the derivative of logos that is logocentrism, to be the main feature 
of Western metaphysics.36 Read in this way the metaphysical tradition is indeed 
logocentric, but it remains to be seen whether this can be used as an argument against 
Heidegger. As we have seen in the previous chapter Heidegger relates logos to other 
terms such as ‘clearing’ and polemos and through this reading offers a possibility for 
seeing logos in a new way that is really not the same as it is understood in metaphysics. 
Has Derrida taken this new reading for all it is worth? In several writings Derrida has 
expounded on the notion of logos, but as we will see he uses the term mostly to describe 
the most important traits of metaphysical thinking, as according to the logos understood 
as thinking and speech. This is exactly what the idea of logocentrism means, that there is 
a standard, the logos, towards which Western metaphysical philosophy has aspired. And 
it has done so by seeing speech as prior to writing and as closer to the standard than 
writing. The fullness of the spoken word was the guarantee for any real meaning in 
thinking, writing was just derivative. Derrida’s whole ‘philosophy’ is about challenging 
this idea by showing the interrelatedness of signs and of all signification, by complicating 
ideas of identity and difference, reference and presence etc. Heidegger can definitely be 
accused of (to some extent) favouring the spoken language over the written, and of 
looking for authentic words, examples abound where he goes in this direction, and 
examples abound where Derrida points this out. Yet to me this valid criticism does not 
                                                
36 See quotation of note 7 of this chapter. 
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seem to warrant suggesting that Heidegger had the same interpretation of logos as the one 
which is at the basis of the metaphysical tradition. In fact, it is most obvious that he did 
not. And then the question arises whether Derrida is fully appreciative of this different 
reading. When Derrida speaks at length about the relation between logos and polemos in 
Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV),37 it seems obvious that he sees 
polemos almost solely in the negative way, as ‘struggle,’ ‘war.’ This is partly so because 
this particular piece of writing is as much about logos and polemos as it is about 
Heidegger’s engagement with Nazism in the early thirties. The much more positive 
allusions which Heidegger hints at with polemos, logos and with the translation of the 
latter as Auseinandersetzung to which I have tried to direct the reader in chapter one, are 
not taken at full value by Derrida when he suggests that even Heidegger is logocentric in 
that he focuses on the logos. Heidegger does focus on the logos, but his is a very different 
and much broader concept of logos altogether. In other words, Derrida has chosen but 
one part of Heidegger’s logos to focus on and thus does injustice to the full picture. 
Derrida is well aware of this and his attempts at deconstructing Heidegger consequently 
focus more on the idea behind logocentrism, which he calls phono-centrism, and by 
linking the two together.38 But as we shall see later, phono-centrism need not develop 
into logocentrism39 and maybe Derrida should have taken more notice of the profoundly 
different meanings that logos has for Heidegger.  
Then, as we have seen before, Derrida emphasises his shifting between different 
terminologies as a necessary movement. But Heidegger, while his lifelong work on Being 
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was indeed the focal point, also shifts attention between different concepts; there is a 
clear development to be seen in his work from Dasein to Being, to aletheia, to logos, to 
Ereignis, to Way, to Fourfold, to Welt, etc. Is Derrida doing anything different? Is he not 
also trying to say the same thing again and again, but in always shifting terms and 
perspectives? As I have tried to show, these questions can be answered either 
affirmatively or negatively. Yes, it would seem Derrida employs the same ‘methodology’ 
as Heidegger, although both would object to this word. The better word to use would be 
‘strategy,’ as both Heidegger and Derrida are concerned with showing the inadequacy of 
language in general and of metaphysical language in particular. Yet, to come to the 
negative answer, we have seen that in the end Heidegger believed that language itself 
could provide its own critique, and that a reinterpretation of certain words could lead the 
way to an (although not unambivalent) understanding of Being, or of the ontological 
difference. Derrida points out that all language inevitably suffers from inadequacy, 
including his own.  
It is obvious that Derrida thinks Heidegger’s texts “harbour a future of meaning 
which will ensure that they are read and reread for centuries.”40 It also seems 
unmistakably true that Derrida has to some extent expounded on Heidegger’s works, 
mostly so in the field of discourse and language, but also in expressing what might have 
been some underlying assumptions of Heidegger that would warrant placing him (at least 
partly) in the tradition of metaphysics. Of course neither Heidegger nor Derrida claim to 
be totally outside this tradition, yet both hope that somehow, in interrogating this 
tradition, they can partly overcome it. Yet I feel that Derrida is right in claiming in 
various works that deal with Heidegger that the latter was to some extent still within 
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metaphysics, more so than Derrida himself. For Heidegger did look for a way out of 
metaphysical thinking that would somehow disclose the ‘secret’ of Being to us mortals, 
and Heidegger obviously thought that his thinking would bring us closer to a more real 
understanding of what ‘really is as it is,’ and this sort of eschatological goal of thinking, 
whereby he foresees the end of metaphysics and a new beginning for the world and 
philosophy, mostly through his own thinking, locates him much more securely inside the 
tradition of philosophy, whereas Derrida on more than one occasion challenges exactly 
this eschatological structure of thinking.41 The fact that by doing so Derrida is inevitably 
showing us to a certain extent ‘how things really are’ and thus that his thinking is 
immediately appropriated into a certain metaphysical position is part of the double bind 
which suggests that we must always be drawn back into what we are trying to undo. 
The importance of all this for comparative philosophy lies in the fact that we can 
now see that although Derrida mostly lacks the actual encounters of or active search for 
other ways of thinking that Heidegger displayed in his later years, his thinking seems to 
be even more open towards difference than Heidegger’s. Where Heidegger may be read 
to suggest that the other is a necessary step for the development of the self,42 Derrida 
goes further in suggesting that the other or difference is always already inserted into any 
form of cultural or other identity. This play of differance suggests that there are no pure 
identities, there is rather pure relationality of which identities are at best useful heuristic 
functions. There is an interesting passage in Limited Inc. that could make us fully 
understand and appreciate this profound relationality in Derrida’s thinking. Expounding 
on the infamous “There is no outside of the text,” Derrida says that what he was really 
                                                
41 See Derrida 1992b for example. 
42 This reading is possible, although my own interpretation gives otherness in Heidegger a more prominent 
place, and seeks to thus establish that Heidegger is closer to Derrida than is usually thought. 
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saying with this is “that nothing exists outside context . . ., but also that the limit of the 
frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside 
penetrates and thus determines the inside.”43 The context itself is constitutive of any 
identity, and as context it can never be closed off, it is structurally and inherently open, 
since it is nothing more or less than “the entire ‘real-history-of-the-world.’”44 
It is doubtful whether Heidegger would go this far, so I would suggest that in the 
work of Derrida there lies much that is important for comparative philosophy, especially 
the extreme openness towards alterity and the importance of alterity, otherness and 
difference, concepts which are being unmistakably elevated to the same level as identity 
and which thereby seek to undo the harsh distinctions with which Heidegger was still 
struggling in his Auseinandersetzung with different cultures. In the end, Heidegger kept 
some very clear demarcations between cultures and ways of thinking. Strange to say, but 
it looks like Heidegger was more of a differential thinker than Derrida, in his insistent 
keeping to difference. Derrida would, to be true to his work and in the event of any real 
encounter with different cultures, have to go further in explaining how these distinctions 
can be problematised, without thereby undoing them or denying the differences in 
cultures. But in doing this, Derrida is very aware of the necessity of an 
Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger’s work and of the debt of his own work to 
Heidegger’s. Especially in the field of language and its importance both for comparative 
philosophy and for philosophy as a whole, Derrida has had a tremendous influence on the 
way we think. So it is imperative that we should look into these aspects of Derrida’s 
thinking before locating him in the comparative field. 
                                                
43 Derrida 1988, 152-153. 
44 Derrida 1988, 136. 
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2.2 LANGUAGE, TEXT AND TRANSLATION IN DERRIDA.  
“The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects all 
signifieds in general, affects them always already, the moment they enter the 
game. There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of 
signifying references that constitutes language.”45  
This part will focus more specifically on Derrida’s ideas of language and its functions, in 
special relation to comparative philosophy. We will see whether Derrida’s attacks on 
familiar concepts, and with that on the metaphysical ideas of conceptuality and 
conceptions of language, can provide an opening towards other ways of thinking. I will 
also try to explain the invalidity or ineffectiveness of the criticism that to a certain 
important extent Derrida’s own work might still be based on or parasitic to some idea of 
metaphysics.   
Derrida has done almost all of his work on language by concentrating on Western, 
logocentric languages, and on their metaphysical assumptions. We should ask whether 
his findings could also apply to significantly other languages, as for example (classical) 
Chinese. This is a question for the next part of this chapter. Suffice it here to remember 
that Derrida is usually speaking about, or deconstructing, Western languages and with 
that a very specific idea of language comes along. The whole history of Western 
philosophy has assumed that language has its priority in speech, where there is direct 
transference of meaning, and that writing is but a mere incomplete derivation of the 
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phonic and semantic fullness of speech. This is the background of the conception of 
language that Derrida wants to interrogate.  
One of the most straightforward ideas Derrida has on language is that words can 
only function by what they are not themselves. This is made obvious in the statement 
which is taken from Ferdinand de Saussure: “In a language, in the system of language, 
there are only differences.”46 In itself this might not seem so problematic, as anyone 
would agree that for example the word “lamp” only functions by being different from the 
words “lamb” and “ramp.” But Derrida goes further and extends this idea to every 
signification structure, which he together then calls “writing.” Words, sentences, in fact 
any and every form of signification, any mark can only function in relation to other signs, 
marks etc. This should make it clear that Derrida holds that nothing in (any) language, or 
again in any system of signification or reference, has any other than an arbitrary relation 
to something outside itself, or reality. Or as Robert Magliola puts it: “By applying to all 
signs the term ‘writing,’ [Derrida] coerces us into the ‘recognition’ that all signs are 
artificial.”47 With this recognition that speech is also a sign structure and thus suffers 
from the same artificiality as writing, Derrida denies the priority normally given to the 
spoken word. But by doing this, Derrida is not arguing for the inversion of importance or 
priority, which would mean that writing should come to be seen as prior to speech. This 
inversion is just strategic and provocative; it is not the goal itself, which is to show the 
interconnectedness or relationality of both writing and speech, and their sameness as 
artificial structures, and as such to undo or transform the oppositional structure itself. 
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This is also why differance is “between speech and writing,”48 and it is exactly this 
betweenness that is the focus of Derrida. Because it is not only so that signs can function 
only because of other signs, they also only function because of the interval, spacing, or 
nothingness that is between them, and this is so in both speech and in writing.  
Derrida wants to change the notion of language as something describing things 
outside of it, although he retains the idea of reference. But while he retains this, he 
challenges the idea of fixed reference. This might lead us to think that he is arguing for a 
certain openness of words themselves in that they can have different meanings, but in 
reality Derrida does not think that such a notion of polysemy goes far enough. Words do 
not just have different meanings according to different times or circumstances; the notion 
of polysemy has to be replaced by what Derrida calls dissemination. What does he mean 
by this term, and what does he want to achieve with it? The notion of polysemy does not 
suffice since it “always puts out its multiplicities and variations within the horizon, at 
least, of some integral reading which contains no absolute rift, no senseless deviation—
the horizon of the final parousia of a meaning at last deciphered, revealed, made present 
in the rich collection of its determinations. […] All moments of polysemy are, as the 
word implies, moments of meaning.”49 As such, even though polysemy admits of 
different meanings, it does not question the structure of meaning or signification as 
reference to or representation of something outside, and it is exactly this structure that 
Derrida does question because it is arbitrary and problematic. This is why instead of 
poly-semy ‘dis-semination’ provides a better alternative. For dissemination evades 
arbitrariness because it can not be referred back to any origin or truth, or as Derrida puts 
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it: “the quasi-‘meaning’ of dissemination is the impossible return to the rejoined, 
readjusted unity of meaning, the impeded march of any such reflection”50 and as such 
represents the affirmation of the ‘non-origin.’ One could cite the film Rashomon51 as an 
example here, since it describes four different and contradictory interpretations of one 
event, such that nobody seems to be able to give one single meaning to it. Not that the 
event itself is thereby denied, but since the meaning of it is fragmented or unclear, we 
could say in the words of Steve Odin that “what gradually emerges is a total displacement 
of the event into a bewildering multiplicity of perspectival interpretations, an irreducible 
plurality of meanings.”52 Meaning of any event only arises out of interpretation, and 
interpretations differ. In that sense any pure experience loses much of its force, since it 
can only gather meaning by losing its purity. What Derrida is telling us seems to be that 
the idea of polysemy still presupposes some sort of original meaning within a finite 
horizon, whereas dissemination challenges that idea by saying that meaning is always 
already divided, fragmented, relational etc. Signs only function within history, and as 
such are structurally open to unlimited differing meanings. As Barry Allen puts it: “Each 
occasional sign has a historically conditioned, circumstantial effect but not a durable, 
self-identical content.”53 This can also be tied to the idea of iterability, which Derrida has 
put forward in Limited Inc. Iterability means that every word or sign only functions by 
being able to be cited or repeated. No sign can function as a sign if not for this iterability, 
which does not just mean that signs need repetition in order to be recognised as signs, but 
more importantly that every repetition, every citation is in fact different from what it 
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repeats or cites. Signs then are only traces without any origin. Reproduction, repetition, 
citation, all these do not just recall what they reproduce, repeat, or cite, but there is 
always something different in them. “Iteration alters, something new takes place.”54 Since 
signs thus have no enduring stability, but only a certain relative, historically contingent 
value, our ideas of them should be reinterpreted.  
This interpretation of Derrida again surfaces when we take a closer look at the 
problem of translation. Admitting and denying the possibility of translation, Derrida 
negates the traditional understanding of translation, precisely because he questions the 
absolute privilege of any original to be translated by some text derivative of it, in a 
similar way as he challenges the priority of speech over writing and the priority of 
identity over difference. Since all words, text and signification is immediately 
incorporated into and only functions because of context or webs of significance, Derrida 
can say that he does “not believe that translation is a secondary and derived event in 
relation to an original language or text.”55   
The traditional project of philosophy has always presupposed and looked for a 
meaning or truth behind or beyond words, and thus it also has to presuppose 
translatability, because if there is such a meaning apart from language, any language 
should be equally able (or unable) to describe it. Traditionally seen, translation thus has 
to do with the transfer of meaning. But the impact of Derrida’s thinking is exactly the 
realisation that such a meaning is never pure, it is influenced or contaminated by 
language. Neither the ‘original’ language nor the ‘translation’ language can escape this 
predicament. 
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As we have seen, language functions out of difference, and as such the truth 
behind language is denied access through language.56 This means that what is called the 
‘original’ is never original in the first place, since it never refers to its outside (meaning) 
any more or any better than the translation. So the notion of translation as the simple 
transfer of a univocal meaning from one language to another becomes problematic and 
needs to be rethought:  
“…a notion of transformation must be substituted for the notion of translation: a 
regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. We 
shall not have and never have had to deal with some “transfer” of pure signifieds 
that the signifying instrument—or “vehicle”—would leave virgin and intact, 
from one language to another, or within one and the same language.”57  
Why would the term ‘transformation’ function better as a word for the process Derrida is 
describing? Because according to Derrida, it captures two aspects of his ideas which 
translation fails to capture. First of all transformation implies that, as we said, there is no 
original and derivative, both texts can be eternally transformed by reading, there is an 
open-endedness to both. Secondly, transformation captures the fact of the radical 
‘violence’ of every translation, in that it always is something different from what is 
translated, as a matter of necessity it transforms instead of merely transfers the ‘original.’ 
Now with this denial of the status of what is traditionally seen as the ‘original text,’ 
Derrida is not so much denying that there is one text which is translated or transformed 
into another, but he is questioning the way the relationality between these texts is 
traditionally perceived. This means he questions the idea that the ‘original’ would mean 
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anything outside of or without its (ever expanding) context, which consists precisely of its 
interpretations and translations. He thus argues that “the so-called original is in a position 
of demand with regard to the translation. The original is not a plenitude which would 
come to be translated by accident. The original is in the situation of demand, that is, of a 
lack or exile. The original is indebted a priori to the translation. Its survival is a demand 
and a desire for translation…”58 Again we see that Derrida challenges the idea of a 
fullness or completeness of any identity (the text to be translated), and insists on this 
identity being relative to difference and iterability (the text translated and as such, living). 
With regard to Daoism the impact of following Derrida here would be that every so-
called direct experience of dao can only become meaningful by placing it in context, in 
fact it is always already immediately incorporated into contextuality. And that there is 
really no one meaning to the original classics, but that meaning only arises out of 
interpretations. What this means will become more obvious in the following chapters.  
Now the real problem is not that since no translation is innocent, every translation 
means an interpretation. The real problem is that this interpretation however, “does not 
begin […] with what is commonly called translation. It begins as soon as a certain type of 
reading of the ‘original’ text is instituted.”59 How we read is what causes certain 
interpretations to flourish and others to wither. Taking this problem to comparative 
philosophy it would seem to be that our ideas of communication and of the function of 
language are not neutral, but might nevertheless appear or be presented as such. There is 
no neutral or meta-language, since “philosophy finds its element in so-called natural 
language. It has never been able to formalize itself integrally in an artificial language 
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despite several fascinating attempts to do so in the history of philosophy.”60 In 
comparative philosophy one set or kind of these natural languages, being the Western 
metaphysical one, has always presented itself as the one that would be the most suited or 
best option, thus indirectly setting itself up as a model to which other languages have to 
concur. Speaking of ‘public communication’ Derrida has thus warned us that “[s]uch a 
discourse tends to impose a model of language that is supposedly favourable to this 
communication. Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common 
sense, or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things, and as 
if naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model.”61 What is profoundly 
‘other’ might then be excluded on the basis of lacking certain criteria, and we should be 
aware that it is our Western languages and way of thinking that impose those criteria, 
since they are full of metaphysical sensibilities. Yet the challenge for comparative 
philosophy is given by the very fact that “philosophy does not take place outside of a 
natural language,”62 which causes Derrida to be extremely aware of the difficulties of 
translation, and of the seemingly impossible “necessity in fact of making cohabit in a 
same text or of grafting codes, motifs, registers, voices that are heterogeneous,”63 which 
we can read as coming from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. How exactly 
do these views of language bear on the project of comparative philosophy? They are 
important since it is in language that intercultural encounters take place,64 and Derrida 
seems to be suggesting that Western conceptuality is not suitable for such encounters:  
“What then, is this encounter with the absolutely-other? Neither representation, 
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nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the same. The ego and the other do not 
permit themselves to be dominated or made into totalities by a concept of 
relationship. And first of all because the concept (material of language), which is 
always given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other. 
[….] Language, therefore, cannot make its own possibility a totality and include 
within itself its own origin or its own end.”65  
Thus we need to get rid of the idea of our own supposed totality and work towards an 
understanding of ourselves that is more based on provisionality.  
But there has been criticism on Derrida’s choice of words and his philosophy if 
you can still call it such, which amounts to saying he has retained a certain metaphysical 
perspective. He has been frequently ‘accused’ himself of using a form of transcendental 
language which is then taken to inevitably point to some metaphysical position, 
especially since his work bears some resemblance to negative theology.66 In Différance 
for example, while stressing the fact that differance ‘is’ not, he nevertheless speaks about 
‘it’ as “what makes possible the presentation of the being-present.”67 Speaking in this 
way one might get the idea of something which makes something else possible, and that 
looks like a metaphysical principle. Similar criticisms have attacked Derrida’s notions of 
spacing, the openness between, without which nothing functions, but which is implicit in 
thinking differance. And Derrida has spoken about differance as that which “produces”68 
differences and is “older”69 than Heidegger’s Being. Now as much as this is indeed the 
use of metaphysical language, it should by now be obvious that Derrida does not 
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subscribe to its underlying ideas. He is well aware of the fact that he has to use this 
language, and that there is no other way, so that although it is a neo-logism, “différance 
remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it receives in our language are still, 
as names, metaphysical.”70 But the fact that this name remains metaphysical is not 
because it points to some ineffable being beyond naming. The play of differance is not 
beyond anything, but as soon as we name it, it takes on metaphysical form. With this 
realisation of what Derrida is about we turn to the relation of his thinking to other non-
metaphysical ways of thinking.  
2.3  DERRIDA IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY.  
“We stand opposed to whatever would prohibit philosophy from [….] opening 
itself up to new objects in a way that knows no limit of principle, from recalling 
that it was already present there where no one wanted to acknowledge it.”71  
Having so far positioned Derrida only in regard to his critics or followers, in his relation 
to Heidegger, and in his thinking on language structures, his ideas have become only 
relatively clear. I now wish to focus the final part of this chapter on Derrida ‘himself.’ I 
am of course fully aware that relativity and relationality are to be given more attention 
and are in a way ‘prior’ to and inherent in Derrida’s thinking, much more so than seeing 
Derrida’s thinking itself as a sort of identifiable entity, apart from these relations. This 
especially since much of this dissertation focuses on these ideas of relationality. 
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Presenting Derrida himself can then only mean taking a closer look at the way of thinking 
that he suggests and in this case especially with regard to its relevance for comparative 
philosophy, before moving more specifically to the non-metaphysical thinking in some 
non-Western cultures. I thus merely wish to give my view on what I think to be the most 
important features of his work and how they compare with the ideas of openness and 
difference that are so prominent in comparative philosophy, so as to have a background 
to work with.  
2.3.1 IDENTITY AND OPENNESS. 
To start again with differance, the clue to understanding (it) lies in its duplicity as 
differing and deferring. For the ‘term’ differance, like other Derridean terms and no 
matter how many times we go back to it (and I certainly have), is forever erasing itself, 
which is to say that Derrida always considers differance and every word in general 
provisional, temporary and inscribed in a web of signifiers that immediately take it up. It 
is therefore that he has insisted, as we have seen, on not lingering too long with the term 
(or any term) itself, and has tried to use as many different terminologies as possible to 
underline this fact of provisionality and historicality of language and words in particular. 
Thus he says about ‘deconstruction’ that “the word has interest only within a certain 
context.”72 These words then do not depict something outside of the text, but signal the 
play within writing in the broad sense which always situates us. This provisionality which 
does not give in to relativism is conducive to comparative thinking. 
Another place where we could gain some insight into how Derrida sees his 
relation to other ways of thinking outside of the logocentric metaphysical tradition is to 
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see what he has to say about ‘culture.’ The word ‘culture’ is, according to Derrida, a 
“very obscure word,”73 but this could be interpreted both in a negative and a positive 
way. If culture had not been ‘obscure’ to start with, it would have suffered the same 
deconstruction as other words which appear ‘clear and distinct.’ But like identity, “a 
culture never has a single origin,”74 and thus if we speak of any single culture as of a 
unity, complete unto itself, we would have to say that “it would gather this center, 
relating it to itself, only in the extent that it would open it up to […] divergence.”75 The 
completeness that is longed for is thus never achieved, relationality is always already 
inserted. Again Heidegger, as we have seen, does something similar in noting that the self 
and the other are always mutually involved, and it is only in becoming unheimlich 
(uncanny, not-at-home) that the self becomes it-self, which is only achieved and then has 
to be ever anew re-achieved, since it is only a relatively stable identity, by constantly and 
incessantly ‘dealing’ with and going through what is ‘other.’ Derrida does the same when 
he suggests that we should stay in the Unheimlichkeit of the tension between self and 
other, in the sense that we admit affirmatively the impossibility of any closure, any strict 
identity. This is why traces of otherness continuously upset pure presence.  
Combining the previous notions, Derrida, speaking of cultural identity, proclaims 
for Europe the task of actively living up to the ideas of openness and tolerance, in a 
recognition of the ‘always already there’ of the other. This recognition entails what 
Derrida calls a double bind, in the following way:  
“it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a 
difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself 
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off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it 
is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other, indeed—and this is 
perhaps something else altogether—toward the other of the heading, which 
would be the beyond of this modern tradition, another border structure, another 
shore.”76  
The double bind thus consists in affirming certain ‘European’ values and ideas, insisting 
on their universality, however problematic this universality seems, while at the same time 
opening up towards and embracing difference and pluralism. This can only be done if we 
conceive of ourselves as provisionally right. He thus makes a similar move here as in his 
other works, in describing a situation where values are not so much denied, but affirmed 
in a renewed and more complex situation or context.  
Derrida frequently argues for exactly the kind of openness that is needed in 
comparative philosophy. In moves which challenge the conventional Western notions of 
philosophy as metaphysics he argues for a different kind of thinking. The difference with 
Heidegger is in my opinion that Heidegger (actively) sought out different ways of 
thinking, as we have seen, mainly in the ancient Greek thinkers, poetic thinking and 
Daoism. Derrida does not seem to make this move, but he does, as we have just seen, 
argue for openness toward that which is other. Similar to Heidegger, Derrida is interested 
in freeing thinking from what has become the too strictly metaphysical and scientistic, 
logic-based version of philosophy. As he says, he cares “about… a ‘thinking,’ let’s say, 
that is not confined within the particular way of thinking that is philosophy or science. 
There are forms […], there are perhaps “pensées” that are more thinking than this kind of 
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thinking called philosophy.”77 This move reminds us of Heidegger’s statement that there 
might be “greater thinkers”78 outside of metaphysical philosophy. Derrida also says that 
philosophy is that thinking which is no longer purely philosophical, or it is differently 
philosophical, in that it questions the traditionally philosophical from various standpoints 
not necessarily philosophical in the earlier sense. Deconstruction is one name of this 
thinking, which “is perhaps no longer scientific or philosophical, in the sense in which 
these words can be determined today. It is in fact this indetermination and this very 
opening that we designate […] by the word “thinking.””79  
I would suggest that one of the functions of comparative philosophy is a similar 
thinking, in that in and through its comparisons it questions the standard conceptions, 
interpretations and explanations that traditional philosophy offers, from a differently 
philosophical or thoughtful standpoint, meaning from a culturally different paradigm of 
thinking. Derrida says that systems of thought which are different from those in the West 
are first of all “not necessarily limited” to the philosophical form of the West, neither are 
they “reducible to what, from a philosophical standpoint, we name with categories like 
“culture,” “worldview.””80 
The necessity for our limited way of thinking to seek discourse with other ways of 
thinking can be read from such statements, even though Derrida himself does not really 
use any other traditions in a serious way, neither for the purpose of showing the 
limitations of Western style metaphysics (although there is some hinting at this aspect 
which we will discuss later), nor for a development of what this ‘other’ thinking might 
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be. Yet the whole of Derrida’s work is precisely concerned with boundaries, limits, 
limitations and with their artificiality, and argues incessantly for the traversal and 
disruption of these limits. First of all there is the sense of traversal or disruption which we 
see in the fact that nothing is ever so full and complete as it might present itself. This is 
meant to show that everything only functions by constantly traversing through, and by 
being traversed through by, what it is not. Secondly Derrida takes this idea of traversal as 
an imperative, as we have seen in the case of opening up towards difference or otherness. 
So what is important is that Derrida is suggesting not only the inevitability of the first 
kind of traversal, but closely connected to this argues for the necessity of philosophy to 
go beyond its own limits, “toward the encounter with other types of knowledge, 
discourse, writing.”81 Thus, reminiscent of Heidegger, Derrida argues that it is only by 
going through what is other that thinking works. The characteristics of metaphysics could 
then be seen as having denied or belittled the necessity of this encounter. 
The crucial thought in Derrida is that identity and difference are very much 
functions of each other. Only in asserting some fundamental openness and 
incompleteness inside the idea of identity, and thus problematising its self-reliance, self-
sufficiency and wholeness, can it be retained as a useful heuristic notion, meaning that 
identity is more an effect than it is an origin. This is, as we have seen briefly, also the 
idea behind the deconstruction of the ‘Subject.’ The same then necessarily goes for 
difference or for the workings of differance, in that we have seen that we cannot think 
difference or differance without as much as a moment of affirmation or identity. In my 
opinion it is this idea which is fundamental to understanding Derrida: he argues for the 
provisionality of understanding, the constant deconstruction of fixed identities, the 
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inadequacy of language, and the impossibility of assigning any lasting univocal meaning 
to ‘writing’ or the ‘context’ of our experience, because the play of differance and the 
notion of trace constantly challenge such univocality. And as such, Derrida’s work is 
important for comparative philosophy, as it challenges preconceived notions of truth, 
reference, identity and wholeness or completeness, thus opening the way for a new 
understanding of relationality and difference. It thus forms an interesting background 
from which we can explore the thinking in other cultures. We must now proceed to look 
at some places where Derrida flirts or plays with this possibility before we can 
acknowledge his possible place in comparative philosophy.  
2.3.2 DERRIDA’S HINTS AT DIFFERENT CULTURES. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s position in comparative philosophy 
remained ambivalent. While he seemed to recognise important similarities between his 
own thinking and certain Eastern traditions, especially Daoism and to some extent 
Chan/Zen Buddhism, he also held quite strongly to his own interpretations and to his own 
originality as a thinker. In this light it might seem even more inappropriate to speak of 
Derrida in intercultural perspective. Apart from some places where he includes his own 
background and the Middle East in his writings, there are very few mentions of the Far 
East in his extensive oeuvre. In Glas for example, there are lengthy discussions of 
Judaism and Christianity, but as we have seen these can easily be placed in the 
metaphysical way of thinking. There are almost no mentions of Far Eastern religions or 
thinking, and even in his recent papers on religion, gathered in the book Acts of Religion, 
it is again just the Abrahamic religions (Jewish, Christian, Muslim) that are interrogated. 
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As Spivak has put it in the preface to Of Grammatology:  
“The relationship between logocentrism and ethnocentrism is indirectly invoked 
in the very first sentence of the ‘Exergue.’ Yet, paradoxically, and almost by a 
reverse ethnocentrism, Derrida insists that logocentrism is a property of the West. 
He does this so frequently that a quotation would be superfluous. Although 
something of the Chinese prejudice of the West is discussed in Part I, the East is 
never seriously studied or deconstructed in the Derridean text.”82  
It is indeed true that Derrida never offers any alternative or other reading of any Chinese 
thinking, he does not deconstruct China or any other non-Western thinking. He does 
however criticise the idea that Chinese as writing was seen in the earlier Western 
interpretations as being in an inferior position with regard to Western writing, which, as 
phonetic, was supposedly closer to the ‘phoneme’ and thus to real meaning than the 
largely ideographic Chinese. Derrida challenges this outdated idea by pointing to the fact 
that “we have known for a long time that largely non-phonetic scripts like Chinese or 
Japanese included phonetic elements very early.”83 But the interesting thing about 
Chinese seems to be that these phonetic elements never overtook the ideogrammatic 
structure of Chinese, and as such Chinese never developed into the kind of phonetic or 
alphabetic language we find in the West. Thus Derrida says that we have in the classical 
Chinese language “the testimony of a powerful movement of civilization developing 
outside of all logocentrism.”84 As we shall see shortly, Derrida seems to hold that 
logocentrism does not apply to the Chinese tradition since the move towards phonetic or 
alphabetic writing was never made, or made only to a small extent. However, Derrida 
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seems content to stop just there, nothing is done with this observation, and it seems as 
though Derrida treats Chinese as just another way of writing, with the same ideas 
applying to it. This can be seen from the fact that he says that just as any other sign or 
sign structure, the Chinese signs can also never function without iterability and without 
being different to other signs in the system. Derrida does not subscribe to the idea that 
since the Chinese language is to some extent non-phonetic, it would therefore have some 
privileged access to reality, or that its signs would somehow be structurally different from 
‘Western’ signs.85  
But later in his career Derrida seems to be slightly more nuanced in speaking of 
Eastern languages. When asked in an interview whether logocentrism is a Western 
phenomenon, he answers that “logocentric philosophy is a specifically Western response 
to a much larger necessity which also occurs in the Far East and other cultures, that is, the 
phonocentric necessity: the privilege of the voice over writing.[….] But this phonocentric 
necessity did not develop into a systematic logocentric metaphysics in any non-European 
culture. Logocentrism is a uniquely European phenomenon.”86 The phonocentric 
necessity can quite simply be read as the historical fact that in any language the spoken 
word seems to have preceded the written. It is unfortunate that Derrida does not further 
elaborate upon this statement in the interview or elsewhere. For it seems to be that in his 
earlier statements in Of Grammatology Derrida seems to be suggesting that 
phonocentrism is not a major factor in (classical) Chinese language. The idea in Of 
Grammatology seems to be that Derrida is not denying the link between phone and 
writing in Chinese, but that “it is a question of dislocating, through access to another 
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system linking speech and writing [which would be the Chinese system, SVB], the 
founding categories of language and the grammar of the episteme.”87 The ingrained 
categories of Western metaphysics are challenged by the Chinese language structure, not 
so much because Chinese writing does not have a link to speech, but because this link is 
structurally different and therefore does not seem to admit of the radical prioritising of 
speech over writing as was done in the Western metaphysical languages. Hwa Yol Jung88 
argues that Derrida has misread the Chinese language, and that in Chinese language there 
is such a prioritising of speech, a claim which I will take up again in the fourth chapter.  
Again it is unfortunate that Derrida does not seriously expand on this finding to 
enhance his own ideas, or to reflect deeper on the possibilities of non-metaphysical 
thinking which could be located in non-Western languages, which he could have done by 
expounding on this idea of Chinese language. Derrida fails to take the opportunity and 
returns to his own critiques of Western metaphysics, in that these passages in Of 
Grammatology and in the mentioned interview that deal with a non-Western language 
function only as an imperative to question the traditional Western metaphysical notions 
of language.  
However, the idea of a non-phonetic writing, or at least of a non-phonetic moment 
or movement in writing, is an important and returning issue for Derrida, especially in Of 
Grammatology, because such an idea “menaces substantiality, that other metaphysical 
name of presence and of ousia. First in the form of the substantive. Nonphonetic writing 
breaks the noun apart. It describes relations and not appellations.”89 And this is of course 
reminiscent of differance and its play-structure, the criticisms of both lasting identity and 
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permanence behind appearance. What non-phonetic writing then suggests to Derrida is 
the possibility of a reinterpretation and revaluation of impermanence and relationality, of 
the ever shifting perspectives that he himself has tried to show underlying all notions of 
permanence.  
There are ways to read these attempts at de-absolutising by Derrida in or into 
Daoism, and the structure of the Chinese language seems to play at least a part in making 
this possible. Although the temptation is always there to absolutise in a logocentric 
manner the ‘ideas’ and ‘concepts’ of East Asian traditions (an example being The Dao in 
capital letters translated back towards the reifying and ‘noun-thinking’ Western 
standards) and this temptation is apparent both in Western and subsequent Asian readings 
and interpretations of the Daoist tradition, the resistance against this kind of reading 
could be a match between Derrida and (some forms of) Daoism. In other words, my point 
would be that it is still very much possible to take a Derridean, differential or non-
dualistic approach to Daoism, and this is not (just) imposing Derrida’s standards on the 
Daoist tradition (at least not more so than ‘normal’ interpretations impose their 
metaphysical ideas on them), but can, as I will later show, (also) be read in the texts (and 
in differing commentaries and interpretations) themselves, in the ambiguity or 
equivocality, or polysemy (dissemination) of the ‘concepts’ that are found in Daoism. So 
this means that I am not so much arguing against logocentric interpretations per se, I am 
however, with Derrida, arguing against their monopolising of rightness and for the 
possibility of radically or very different readings.  
The question then arises in how far Derrida has done justice to Chinese thinking 
and especially to Chinese language. It is obvious that Derrida’s knowledge of Chinese 
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language and philosophy was not very great, and maybe this can be one of the reasons for 
his reluctance to venture deeper into this area. Yet, as we have seen, Derrida does not 
simply reiterate the most common mistakes in interpreting Chinese, like the one that says 
that classical Chinese would be non-phonetic. In finding some non-phonetic elements in 
the Chinese language though, Derrida saw himself justified in claiming a non-logocentric 
movement present in Chinese thinking, to which I of course wholeheartedly agree. The 
point here is not to judge Derrida on his lack of knowledge of Chinese language and 
philosophy, but to understand that his hints at things ‘Eastern’ are exactly that, hints at 
some way of thinking which might not be logocentric in nature. We must also understand 
that this hinting is done as a part of and in support of the deconstruction of Western 
metaphysics, and that Derrida was therefore not what we would consider a comparative 
thinker. I have argued at the beginning of this chapter that it is in the way of thinking that 
Derrida espouses that there lies great value for comparative philosophy, but not in 
Derrida’s personal efforts, at least very much less so than in the case of Heidegger.  
There are however more occasions where Derrida hints at the East through 
wordplay, for example when he is arguing for the openness or the opening up of Europe 
towards that which is other, which comes from another shore. This propounding of a 
double bind, which we have seen already, is immediately followed by a sentence in 
which Derrida says he wants to “orient”90 himself, a play on words not to be taken too 
lightly in Derrida’s work, for it is usually only in such playful hinting that he refers to the 
‘East’ and by that to any thinking other than Western metaphysical philosophy. Such we 
can also see in the wordplay on the French ‘est’ (the ‘is’ of which Western metaphysical 
thinking on Being speaks) versus ‘Est’ (the East, which is ‘other’) which Derrida 
                                                
90 Derrida 1992a, 30. 
 117
develops in Dissemination. Dissemination seems to be by far the most ‘intercultural’ 
book by Derrida, if only in the sense of this play on ‘Est,’ the relevance of the Chinese 
characters in Philippe Sollers’ book Numbers, about which Derrida talks in a large part of 
Dissemination, and in the fact that some Chinese classics are mentioned. So let us take a 
closer look at these examples. 
To start with Sollers’ Numbers, Derrida approaches the text as something which 
absorbs its reader, in that it forces the reader to interpret and rewrite the text from the 
start. Any text requires this, but Numbers “is remarkable in that the reader […] can never 
choose his own place in it. […] There is at any rate no tenable place for him opposite the 
text, outside the text, no spot where he might get away with not writing what, in the 
reading, would seem to him to be given, past; no spot, in other words, where he would 
stand before an already written text.”91 As was the case with translation, the text forces 
interpretation, but what is to be interpreted is not something simply given, but divided 
and fragmented. Because the text is “[n]umerous and plural in every strand […] it breaks 
up the complicity of belonging that ties us to our habitat, our culture, our simple roots.”92 
These considerations already bear witness to a different approach to textuality, but the 
interesting thing is that Derrida suggests that this idea of “a displacement and a rift, […] 
the open system consisting of the repetition of rifts”93 is at work in (among others) non-
Western thinking, or what he calls the “enormous, condemned margins of our domestic 
library.”94 These margins contain such diverse works as to make it impossible to assign 
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94 Derrida 1981a, 296. The “margins of our domestic library” contain “Islamic, Mexican, and Indian 
mythologies, the Zohar, the Tao Tö King; Empedocles, Nicholas of Cusa, Bruno, Marx, Nietzsche, Lenin, 
Artaud, Mao Tse’tung, Bataille, etc.” They can be read perhaps as the alternative history of philosophy. 
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them a common place besides referring to them as non-metaphysical in the traditional 
Western sense, and Derrida specifically mentions the Daodejing amongst these works. 
The section on Numbers is complicated and difficult to read, and we need not go into 
details about Derrida’s interpretation of Sollers’ book itself, but we can grasp from the 
above fragments that a certain displacement of metaphysical sensibilities usually found in 
Western philosophy is practiced in non-metaphysical thinking, and that Derrida locates 
some non-Western thinkers and works in this non-metaphysical thinking. This is a 
positive approach for comparative philosophy, but the question arises why Derrida 
locates non-Western thinking in the margins of ‘our domestic’ library, which again seems 
to suggest that he has not looked at Eastern thinking from beyond the perspective of it 
being the West’s ‘Other.’  
The next example has to do with the insertion of Chinese characters into the text 
of Numbers. Derrida suggests that this has been done frequently (he thinks of Ezra Pound 
in particular), and that until now this kind of insertion has always been ornamental, or 
had to do with the fascination for what is illegible and thus incomprehensible. But in 
Numbers, the characters become seriously disruptive of the phonetic sequence, and as 
such they are “(under)mining the organism and the history of your domestic text,”95 
signalling the invasion of differences in the domestic text that “becomes more and more 
massive and inescapable, coming from the other side of the mirror—from the est.”96 I 
read this to mean that Derrida, in his own evasive and suggestive ways, argues that we (in 
the West) can no longer avoid an Auseinandersetzung with the East, since we are more 
and more aware of the East as our ‘other,’ and this means at the same time an awareness 
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of our identity depending on such an Auseinandersetzung. The incompleteness, which 
nevertheless presents itself as a completeness, of the ‘est’ or ‘being’ of metaphysical 
philosophy should be solicited, interrupted, displaced and supplemented by the ‘Est’ or 
the thinking propounded in the East (if the East is seen as part of a non-metaphysical 
tradition).97 Even if we think not of Chinese characters, or any other non-Western script, 
but think instead of the Romanisation of these scripts, we could still hold to the position 
that ‘foreign’ words such as for example dao, tian, ziran, xin etc, do and should 
increasingly invade and thus interrogate our domestic texts. What I am trying to say is 
that our Western interpretations, in being metaphysical, can no longer come up with 
complete or satisfactory translations of these words, since these have no real equivalent in 
Western languages. Thus these ‘foreign words’ do not so much disrupt the phonetic 
sequence, but they do disrupt our ‘metaphysical sequence,’ in that we can no longer 
assign them a place inside our traditional discourse.  
The last example, which I shall mention only briefly, is the play of the numbers 3 
and 4 in this section of Dissemination. Because it is too much to expound on all the 
instances where this play of numbers in Numbers functions in Dissemination, let us just 
take note of the idea behind it, which for Derrida means that the ‘three’ symbolically 
stands for Western metaphysics, (the trinity, dialectics), while the ‘four,’ which is found 
in Heidegger’s Geviert (fourfold) and more general in Eastern thinking, challenges again 
this idea of completion (Aufhebung) of dialectics.98 
In conclusion these examples seem to point to a positive revaluation of the 
possibility of non-metaphysical thinking as a critique of metaphysical philosophy. Even if 
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in indirect terms (but does he ever speak in direct terms?), Derrida suggests the necessity 
of opening up towards other ways of thinking if the metaphysical West is not to smother 
itself in its closedness. But this is also what could be seen as a problem of these 
examples, which is the danger of which Heidegger has already warned us, and which 
consists in treating the East as ‘the other of the West,’ thus not so much in itself, but 
always as the mirror which is held before the Western eyes. And in saying ‘the East’ we 
thus unjustifiably lump together many different traditions solely in their supposed 
otherness from Western philosophy. But we should be careful of reading Derrida in this 
way. Although on the one hand it would seem that he does take the non-metaphysical 
East merely as the metaphysical West’s supplement, on the other hand the Derridean 
notion of ‘supplement’ is not derivative from or an unnecessary addition to what is being 
supplemented. The notion of supplement, which functions as another name in the line of 
differance, trace, etc, as we have seen, directly argues against such a traditional reading 
of supplementarity. In the same way as writing is not a supplement in the traditional 
sense to speech, so the ‘East’ is not seen as a ‘mere’ supplement to the ‘West.’ It is more 
the non-metaphysical thinking found in some Eastern traditions which supplements the 
metaphysics found to be dominant in the history of Western philosophy in that the 
supplement complements the lack or one-sidedness of Western metaphysics.99 
It might be that Derrida is taking this strategy because of his conviction that it is 
hard, almost impossible to get away from our metaphysical perspective (meaning we can 
only point to inconsistencies etc. in our own tradition), we are so to say ‘stuck’ in the 
West, it is what we have to start with, and that because of this he considers the (non-
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explicable. The fact that what is ‘other’ is constitutive for what is ‘self,’ does not necessarily mean we 
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metaphysical) East to be something which is ‘radically other,’ and thus always beyond 
our Western grasp. This would essentially mean that our metaphysical ideas are so 
ingrained as to not permit the opening towards this non-metaphysical East under current 
metaphysical assumptions. This would be the relativism of Derrida, as he points to the 
inability of metaphysics to go beyond its own categories. But this relativism would not 
mean that East and West can never meet. Some criticism levelled against Derrida 
amounts to saying that they cannot meet because the East is seen by him as radically 
other, but to this I think we must add the crucial supplement: other to the Western 
metaphysical sensibilities. In short, when seen as two distinct identities with their own set 
of contradictory, mutually excluding or incomparable assumptions and world-views, East 
and West might indeed find it very hard to meet. But Derrida’s efforts are located in 
trying to overcome these sensibilities (while realising he is still at least somewhat in 
them), and he constantly tries to point to the relationality and provisionality of these so-
called identities and the priority (or at least and in the end the equality) of this 
provisionality and relationality over any strict identities. If relationality thus comes 
‘before’ any clear-cut understandings, if the “other is always already there,” if it thus 
always distorts the pure notion of identity and reinscribes it, then much of the criticism of 
relativism loses force. Things are not complete and full unto themselves, but as we have 
seen, the fact that Derrida criticises this fullness or completeness does not mean we are 
left with meaninglessness per se. The complication to which Derridean thinking points is 
not a rejection of value or meaning, it is just a restriction on its possibilities, its self-
understanding is widened instead of narrowed in that it is shown that the dualistic 
presuppositions of metaphysical philosophy only function relative to non-dualistic 
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sensibilities found in some non-metaphysical ways of thinking. Here we must take a 
closer look at the notion of ‘other’ or ‘otherness’ as it is used in Derrida’s work.  
2.3.3 “THE OTHER IS ALREADY THERE, IRREDUCIBLY.”100 
The notion of (the) ‘other’ or alterity in Derrida’s work is a difficult one. We have 
already seen that deconstruction “is always deeply concerned with the ‘other’ of 
language” and that “[t]he critique of logocentrism is above all else the search for the 
‘other’ and the ‘other of language.’”101 So the non-concept of ‘otherness’ is an important 
one in Derrida’s work, and a persistent theme.102 The problem with the other then seems 
to be how it can possibly have any effect on the self, since if it is considered as the other 
of language, then it is also the other of all our reference structures, thus inaccessible. 
Elsewhere Derrida has said: “Every other is completely other.”103 In a similar way to 
what is called ‘different,’ what is ‘other’ always escapes our efforts at appropriation, yet 
it seems constitutive of our being while remaining ever singular and evasive. It is thus 
exemplary of the double bind we find in so much of Derrida’s work, the combination of 
possibility and impossibility.  
To come back to the supposedly total and radical alterity of what is considered 
‘other,’ it is my opinion that Derrida would not want to hold on to this position. We can 
again take a look at a work where Derrida takes on Heidegger, Aporias.104 Here Derrida 
argues that Dasein cannot be understood totally from its capacity for dying, its possibility 
of not being there. For if this death is what is completely other to Dasein, it can never 
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become constitutive to it. Therefore, Derrida argues that death is never totally other from 
the living Dasein, there is always dying in living. For comparative thinking this is a 
useful idea since it tells us that what is other is never really so radically other as not to 
allow some sort of communication or encounter. Other and self are mutually inserted in 
each other. 
What is ‘other’ is then not something we can summon with our language, it is 
something which has to come of its own, “[y]et it is necessary to prepare for it; for to 
allow the coming of the entirely other, passivity, a certain kind of resigned passivity for 
which everything comes down to the same, is not suitable. Letting the other come is not 
inertia opening to anything whatever.”105 This reminds one immediately of Heidegger’s 
Gelassenheit. Gelassenheit also is not anything like a passive attitude; it is an active 
opening up of your own thought structures which is necessary for other ways of thinking 
to find an entrance. Derrida is arguing for a similar attitude, a responsible opening. But 
the difference with Heidegger could be that it is actually deconstruction(s) which provide 
the possible opening “by bending [the] rules with respect for the rules themselves in order 
to allow the other to come or to announce its coming in the opening of this dehiscence. 
That is perhaps what we call deconstruction.”106 This notion of ‘dehiscence’ also features 
in Limited Inc, where it is similarly used as opening towards what is other. The Oxford 
English dictionary lists ‘dehiscence’ as: “gaping, opening by divergence of parts”107 and 
states that the term is mostly used in plant life. It signals the opening towards what is 
other in the opening of the flower or seed, and that opening up what is closed is therefore 
constitutive for life. Thus the space opened by opening up our thought structures, by 
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deconstructing what is supposedly an identity, is what makes any intercultural encounter 
between the self and the other possible. 
The status of the other is therefore not something which can be subsumed in 
Hegelian fashion under the category of the same. It is the other that is equally active and 
this can be read in the closing lines of Psyche: Inventions of The Other, where it is said 
that “[t]he call of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices.”108 
This can be read in a couple of ways, and the English translation makes this only slightly 
apparent. In French, the sentence runs as follows: “L’autre appelle à venir et cela n’arrive 
qu’à plusieurs voix.” First of all, this means that the call (appelle) to come can be the 
other calling as well as the other called. Then, since the future (avenir) is always 
uncertain and to a certain extent undecidable, any arriving of the other (arrive), if it 
happens at all, invariably involves multiple voices, and thus not an unequivocal one. The 
point Derrida seems to be making is that any encounter with what is other can never 
beforehand be appropriated, it is an encounter with multiple voices and thus structurally 
open-ended. Yet it is always there. Of interest for comparative philosophy is what 
Geoffrey Bennington summed up well by saying that in Derrida’s work “[t]he point […] 
is not to reintegrate remains into philosophy, but […] to introduce a radical 
nondialectisable alterity into the heart of the same.”109 And therefore to remain with the 
tension this implies in the Auseinandersetzung that deconstruction is.  
In this way Derrida has always seen himself as both on the inside and outside of 
philosophy. He remains inside because he often asks the same or similar questions as 
philosophy, and because he wants to expand the notion of philosophy to encompass more 
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ways of thinking. He is outside as he has, like Heidegger, identified philosophy with 
Western metaphysics and onto-theology, and tries to overcome this one-sided way of 
thinking in a certain way, as Heidegger had done before him. He is also outside of 
philosophy as this relentless questioning and thinking that is often given the general name 
of deconstruction takes on many forms that are not easily identifiable within the stricter 
versions of philosophy, and he has thus often been ostracised from the community of 
‘real’ philosophers. The alterity and outside are not to be subsumed under traditional 
philosophical categories, they are to remain outside so as to upset the comfort of the 
inside. 
One other interesting aspect for comparative philosophy of the idea of the ‘other’ 
or alterity in Derrida is that he seems to link these notions closely to those of duty and 
responsibility, in ways reminiscent of Emmanuel Levinas.110 The singularity of every 
other that has already been hinted at makes every other irreplaceable, and as such, we are 
responsible for it. Derrida establishes this by extending the notion of responsiveness to 
the other (which is the sort of Heideggerian Gelassenheit which we have already 
encountered) towards that of responsibility.  
In all this openness towards the East or what is other we must not forget that this 
is much more an interpretation of the possibilities of Derrida’s work, and not so much 
that Derrida has actively pursued this Auseinandersetzung himself, although his later 
works do focus a lot on international problematics. We should therefore look closely at 
some of his non-concepts and see how they can provide a basis for a Derridean, and that 
means a non-metaphysical, reading of Daoism. To again start with differance, Derrida 
says that “’There is no name for it’: a proposition to be read in its platitude. This 
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unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no name could approach: God, for example. 
This unnameable is the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary 
and atomic structures that are called names…”111 Derrida’s insistence that his work is not 
negative theology should prohibit us from taking the direction of the Christian-Buddhist 
dialogue which is evident in for example the works of the Kyoto school. In my opinion 
Derrida is not talking in terms of transcendence/immanence, the play of differance/trace 
is wholly immanent, and there is no outside. The ‘other’ of language is not another or 
superior being. As Derrida insists, and I shall have to quote at length:  
“Already we have had to delineate that différance is not, does not exist, is not a 
present-being (on) in any form; and we will be led to delineate also everything 
that it is not, that is, everything; and consequently that is has neither existence 
nor essence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent. 
And yet those aspects of différance which are thereby delineated are not 
theological, not even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies, 
which are always concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the 
finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always 
hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to 
acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. Such a 
development is not in question here, and this will be confirmed progressively.”112 
Exactly because the notion of differance is beyond or not of the order of anything 
“present or absent” can it not be reduced to negative theology. Derrida’s play of 
differance is nothing outside of the play of differences; the master narrative, however 
negatively stated, is totally denied. There literally is nothing ineffable. The nothing of 
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negative theology is not the object of Derrida: “Deconstruction is not an enclosure in 
nothingness, but an openness towards the other.”113 
Related to this is the idea of the blank, the empty space between words, the 
spacing, whether in speech or writing, which Derrida takes to function as the condition of 
possibility for words to function as relative identities. Derrida says of the empty space, 
the blank: “since it has no meaning, it is not The blank proper, the transcendental origin 
of the series.”114 Again there is a reading that tries to undo any metaphysical notions of 
transcendentality, or of first principles, in favour of an idea of the play of the world itself.  
The same could be said for the notions of supplement, trace and all those other 
words Derrida has used. They do not denote a transcendental presence of any sort, they 
are carefully designed exactly to denounce this metaphysical way of thinking. A 
supplement is not accidental to a fullness, a trace is not a trace of something absent which 
by language or thinking can be brought to presence. What Derrida is about is just the way 
of the world where the metaphysical need for identities, closure, neat demarcations and 
an idea of the Other as a metaphysical ineffable presence beyond our means, ideas which 
are never really possible, is exposed as this metaphysical need, and through this exposure 
deconstruction gives us back at the same time these ideas in a different possible setting, 
since they are the only structures we have.  
2.4 CONCLUDING DERRIDA. 
To come to a conclusion of this chapter, I think we could say the following things about 
Derrida and his interest in comparative philosophy. First, it is obvious that it is in his 
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work, and in the way he thinks and writes, his strategies of deconstruction, and not so 
much in any actual intercultural encounter between himself as a thinker and another 
cultural sphere, that we have to locate Derrida with regard to comparative philosophy. 
And this requires very close reading and a constant awareness of the difficulties and 
implications of what comparative philosophers try to achieve, as well as an awareness 
that we are almost always reading ‘out of context.’ 
Second, we can use his (non-)concepts for an intercultural understanding by 
comparing them with the function of some (non-)concepts of other cultures, if we stay 
aware of the fact that for Derrida, these concepts are not the names of ‘transcendental 
signifieds’ in any way, and that as such, they ultimately have no value and are therefore 
used ‘under erasure.’ As long as we keep that in mind, we can use words like differance, 
supplement, spacing, trace etc. safely to further our understanding of thinking in other 
cultures. 
Third, that much of his work revolves around the possibility of the impossible, or 
the impossibility of the possible, and that as such, any relation between self and other will 
always remain ambiguous. The other is never radically other, but also never fully to be 
appropriated. There is always a rest, a trace left by the other in the self. Dealing with 
these aporias, which are inevitable, is what Derrida does in his work. But he does not deal 
with them in the sense that Western philosophy has always done, by denying them their 
place and pushing them to the margins of philosophy, but by showing how we 
continuously have to deal with them, with the contamination and infusion of what is other 
into what is considered the self. Ambiguity, as we saw in Heidegger’s equivocality 
(Mehrdeutigkeit), is not a bad thing, it is the possibility for not closing off our 
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understanding to things different, and it is always there. Not avoiding this ultimate 
relationality, but giving full justice to it, is also what comparative philosophy tries to 
stand for, and it is thus that a close reading of Derrida can help comparative thinking in 
how to approach thinking in other cultures. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REREADING DAOISM; THE OTHER WAY.  
“For the Daoist, there is an intoxicating bottomlessness to any particular event in 
our experience.”1  
In the previous chapters I have provided an interpretation of Heidegger and Derrida that 
puts them in a different light regarding comparative philosophy. In this chapter I would 
like to offer a different than standard reading of some of the classical texts of Daoism, 
mostly of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. In following up on the conclusions of the first 
two chapters on Heidegger and Derrida, I wish to explore the possibility of an 
interpretation of Daoism that is not logocentric, not onto-theological or metaphysical in 
its nature, in other words, a deconstructionist reading. With this intention also comes the 
realisation that we should probably not speak of Daoism as a single entity or tradition 
with an identifiable core metaphysical teaching, but rather see ‘it’ more as a loosely 
connected variety of texts with overlapping, but also different intentions and purposes. 
Traditional interpretations of Daoism have been at pain to explain the underlying unity of 
the Daoist textual corpus, whereas this unity is now supposed to be at least not so strict.2 I 
should therefore explain what I mean by the notion of Daoism that I shall be putting 
forward here. Initially, when following Derrida, we should say that it is in principle 
impossible to separate the foundational texts of Daoism from both their philosophical, 
political, or religious interpretations and developments in any strict sense. In the case of 
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religious Daoism, which developed not too long after the tentative historical dates of 
appearance of the classical Daoist texts, and has as a whole had more influence on the 
Chinese way of life, including intellectual life, it might seem impertinent not to take this 
development into account. Nevertheless, many scholars have pointed to the differences 
between philosophical Daoism (Daojia) and religious Daoism (Daojiao).3 Maybe I could 
explain and justify my choice for looking mainly at the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi as 
philosophical works by looking at Heidegger’s notion of Seinsvergessenheit. The fact, 
Heidegger would say, that there has been a whole history (both in the West and in China) 
of more than two thousand years of a certain dominant interpretation (if there can be such 
a thing) does not make this interpretation in any way justified as the only one. More or 
less beginning with Plato, the (wrongly named) Presocratics were interpreted according 
to the Platonic ideas that helped shape the metaphysical history of Western Being, in 
itself in fact a one-sided approach to Being which focused on beings and the highest 
being of them, instead of on the Being of beings. We could argue then, that so too have 
the Daoist classics been predominantly interpreted in ‘a certain way’ that has been 
instrumental in their dissemination and understanding in the wider world.  
In this dissertation I will focus on philosophical Daoism instead of religious 
Daoism. For the most part, those works that belong to the philosophical tradition, 
meaning the Daodejing, the Zhuangzi, but also the Liezi and parts of the Huainanzi, argue 
against the idea of immortality, as well as against the arising cults related to immortality, 
whereas religious Daoism is mainly focused on just that same immortality. The 
distinction is only of importance here because in focusing on philosophical Daoism I 
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would like to explore the possibility of a reading of the Daoist classics that does not 
presuppose any transcendent quality. 
In looking at the history of Daoism, we have to be aware that even the name 
Daoism did not appear until much later than the classical texts themselves, and was 
coined in the belief that both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, together with other texts, 
somehow shared some core philosophy through their sometimes similar, but often 
different teachings. I agree with Graham when he says that the Daodejing and the 
Zhuangzi “do share one basic insight, that while other things move spontaneously on the 
course proper to them, man has separated himself from the Way by reflecting, posing 
alternatives, and formulating principles of action.”4 But in a way this is not to be seen as 
a definition of Daoism, because as the title of Graham’s well-known book suggests, all or 
most of the early Chinese thinkers were in some way ‘disputers’ of the dao. All major 
classical Chinese thinkers were ‘Dao-ists’ in that they were involved in second-order 
thinking about specific daos and which one among them humankind should follow. Only 
those who were subsequently named the Daoists were involved in questioning the whole 
idea and notion of dao itself. I think it is therefore right to use the name Daoism to denote 
that strand of Chinese philosophy that particularly addresses the question of what dao 
(is), or rather how dao functions. This should not however blind us to the fact that 
Daoism as a name is a retrospective invention that brings together diverse texts. But in 
the interest of clarity I propose to stick by the name of philosophical Daoism and to write 
it with a capital letter, since it is admittedly a fluid, but still identifiable and heuristically 
viable description of the way of thinking that is propounded in the Daodejing and the 
Zhuangzi.  
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On the Romanisation of the character dao I am of a different opinion. For reasons 
that are becoming more and more obvious, I think that writing Dao with a capital letter 
perpetuates the idea of reading it solely as a noun denoting a substance or a something, 
and thereby seeing it as a transcendent or metaphysical entity beyond the ‘ten thousand 
things.’ Other words, such as tian, you and wu, ziran etc. have suffered a similar fate, and 
it is my intention to argue against this interpretation. Chad Hansen for example has 
argued extensively against imposing such Western background assumptions on classical 
Chinese language and thinking.5 In unison with recent post-modern scholarship on and 
the consequently non-metaphysical reading of the Daoist classics, I therefore propose to 
write the Romanisation of dao in lower case letters, not capitalised, except when it is 
capitalised in quotations.  
The traditional Western readings have supposed either of two hypotheses in dealing with 
Daoism. One is that Daoism has to some degree the same sort of principles functioning 
behind it as Western philosophy, and thus interpretations of this kind have almost 
invariably focused on reading Daoism according to the standards of the interpreters. In 
other words, they have thought of Daoism in Western categories, even while 
acknowledging profound differences in the way these categories are employed. Imposing 
these categories on the Chinese classics was defended by stating that the Chinese people 
were supposed to at least share our (Western) ideas about intelligibility, or put rather 
simply, whatever the differences between Western and Chinese philosophy, we were 
eventually all talking about the same things, we were all thinking in the same categories, 
because those are the categories of thinking per se. For example, Fung Yu-lan says that 
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“[e]very philosophy has that which is permanent, and all philosophies have something in 
common. This is why philosophies, though different, can yet be compared with one 
another and translated one in terms of the other.”6 This way of thinking seems to rely too 
much on the sameness of what is considered permanent; it seems to imply that what 
different traditions consider permanent has to be the same as it can then be translated.  
The other hypothesis is that Daoism is so different from Western thinking that any 
form of access to it using philosophical means is denied, and Daoism is then usually 
taken as a form of mysticism that is beyond any philosophical or rational approach. This 
hypothesis is common as well, and works from the similar mindset that if we can not 
explain Daoism from our Western philosophical perspectives, in line with our own 
presuppositions and categories, then it has to be beyond explanation per se and therefore 
can be dismissed as mystical, mythological or obscure, and be dismissed in much the 
same way as Western mysticism and myths were disqualified.  
Now I have to reiterate that I do not think these interpretations are either 
completely wrong or have no basis at all, I merely wish to convey the possibility of 
different readings that are also and at least equally possible, and thus point to the 
extraordinary richness of the Daoist classics. I would like, however, with the help of 
some divergent readings that have already been offered and with textual evidence, to 
challenge some of the standards of reading and thereby take a different approach to the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. I will also focus on other texts of what is called the Daoist 
tradition, such as the Liezi and the Huainanzi, and some of the neo-Daoists, for support of 
this different reading. My argument is that such a non-metaphysical reading is not only 
possible, but that this possibility of a different reading is actually a better reflection of 
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Daoist sensibilities on the whole than the traditional interpretations. But to do so, we 
must first take a closer look at these ‘traditional’ interpretations.  
3.1  METAPHYSICAL READINGS OF DAOIST PHILOSOPHY.  
“tao meant ‘the way the universe works’; and ultimately, something very like 
God, in the more abstract and philosophical sense of that term.”7  
I should first give an explanation of what I mean by metaphysical readings or 
interpretations. This tradition as I use it has not so much to do with the way Daoism itself 
has evolved throughout history. The tradition of metaphysical readings I am referring to 
is mostly that of the early Western scholars of sinology, translation, and philosophy, who 
have tended to take an approach to Daoism that is coherent with Western metaphysics in 
many of its features. For several reasons this approach has also caught on in China itself 
and elsewhere in the non-Western academic world, and many early and contemporary 
Asian scholars, having been educated in the same principles in Western(-ised) 
establishments of scholarship, work from the same perspectives.8 By this tradition I then 
understand the approach to Daoism that is metaphysical in nature, and thus works from a 
dualist perspective, an approach which in other words shows the inheritance of the ideas 
found and valued in main-stream Western philosophy.9 I have to agree with Chad Hansen 
                                                
7 Waley 1934, 30. 
8 For example contemporary Chinese scholars like Mou Zongsan and Li Minghui: see Hall & Ames 1998, 
222-232. 
9 Of course a lot of generalisations are made here. Western philosophy is anything but this unified view of 
itself, and there are many dissenting voices within that tradition. Yet it has persisted even through the 
current onslaughts of post-modernism. It is the same sort of philosophy as has been questioned and attacked 
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that there are two main features of this established tradition of scholarship in classical 
Chinese philosophy. These are an overemphasis on the importance of Confucianism and 
the import of Western conceptual structures to understand the Chinese classics.10 I will 
try to explain these features by focusing on certain translations and interpretations by 
scholars from the last two centuries. To these main features can be added a third one, 
whereby some commentators interpret the early classical texts by standards of later times. 
Thomas Cleary, for example, speaks extensively about later developments of religious 
Daoism and meditation in his introduction to the translation of the Daodejing.11 My point 
is that we have to be very cautious when looking at earlier works from a later perspective, 
so as not to impose features of these later developments on the classics. If we remember 
Heidegger’s case of Plato and the ‘Presocratics’ this should be obvious. Of course we can 
not help the fact that our understanding always begins from a certain point. We must 
however be open to the fact that other understandings from different perspectives are 
equally possible. In the case of classical Chinese thinking, although historically different, 
this means that we should be aware of how we measure different strands of thinking 
against Confucius and the Confucian tradition.  
On this basis again I see no objection against not taking the whole history of 
Daoism into account in my reading of classical Daoist texts. At the same time of course, 
as we shall see, this does not mean that the commentarial tradition of philosophical 
Daoism is irrelevant.  
Among the first Western interpretations and translations of Chinese classics were 
                                                                                                                                                
by Heidegger and Derrida, as shown in the previous chapters. Daoism is equally diverse and not just one 
unified whole. 
10 Hansen 1992, 6/7. 
11 Cleary 1991, xxv and on. 
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those by Roman Catholic and Jesuit priests and other missionaries who went to work in 
China. While contemporary comparative philosophy owes a lot to these pioneers, it is 
quite naturally to be expected that they were biased in several ways; as missionaries they 
came with their fixed ideas and motives and tried to read these ideas into Chinese classics 
wherever they could, or otherwise to denounce the works where they could not find 
appropriate similarities. Their translations obviously show this bias, both in how they 
translated and in which works were considered for translation. Herbert Giles, in his 
translation of the Zhuangzi, translates tian as God and says that Zhuangzi offered an anti-
materialist answer to Confucius. Inserting obviously Christian ideas he states that those 
“who are dominated by a religious craving for something better than mortality, find in his 
[Zhuangzi’s, SVB] pages much agreeable solace against the troubles of this world, with 
an implied promise of another and a better world to come.”12 One example to show that 
in his translations he makes dao a metaphysical principle of substance will make this 
clear. Thus the passage in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi which Graham translates as “The 
Way has never known borders, saying has never had norms”13, is translated by Giles as 
“Before conditions existed, TAO was. Before definitions existed, Speech was.”14 Those 
who read translations of Chinese texts like those of Giles will have no difficulty in 
thinking that East and West were indeed talking about the same thing. 
But even in those days there was already some criticism against overly optimistic 
readings from a Western (religious) viewpoint. James Legge, for example, already argued 
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 Giles 1980, 17. 
13 Zhuangzi, Graham 1981, 57. As I mostly deal with English translations of the classical Chinese works, 
mainly the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, references will be to the title of the work itself, and to indicate 
from which translation the reference stems, the name of the work will be followed by the translator and 
year of publication of the translation, and then the page number of this translation. For example: Zhuangzi, 
Watson 2003, 25. 
14 Zhuangzi, Giles 1980, 42. The biblical resonance is obvious: “In the beginning there was the word.” 
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against translating dao and tian along Christian Western lines in the introduction of his 
work on Daoism.15 Yet in the same introduction Legge insists that Daoism was wrong in 
opposing knowledge, and that it was only right that “the Simplicity of the Tâo disappear 
before Knowledge.”16 The use of capital letters and the idea behind this sentencing is 
enough to show that Legge definitely saw Daoism and dao as some sort of transcendent 
and mystical principle, not fully developed though and thus to be overcome by the 
superior Western understandings of philosophy, science and religion, indeed as we shall 
see in Hegelian fashion. Other early thinkers who had any interest in China exhibit a 
similar bias, whether positive or negative. Chinese classics were read from the viewpoint 
of Western philosophy, religion or science. Two major philosophical examples of this 
type are Hegel and Leibniz. Hegel never seriously engaged Chinese thinking, but he 
incorporated what he knew into the grand structure of the development of the absolute 
Geist towards its culminating moment, Hegel himself. He thereby incorporated Chinese 
philosophy into the same history as the West, albeit at a lower level of development, and 
stagnated at a phase of thinking overcome by the dialectics of the superior West. Leibniz 
on the other hand was much more positive about Chinese philosophy, Confucianism in 
particular, and he saw Chinese religious thinking and language as a means to escape from 
the shortcomings of Western philosophy, a sort of salvation and reinvention of the 
perennial organicist philosophy he was after. He especially thought of Chinese characters 
as representative of a universal language, since he supposed that they expressed universal 
ideas directly. Consequently he was disappointed when he found out that this was not the 
case. Although he took an active interest in Chinese language, Leibniz was not well 
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versed enough in classical Chinese language or history, so his interpretations of Chinese 
thinking were naturally coloured by the available translations in more than one way.17 
Not many translations were available, and we already saw that those translations 
available to Leibniz were biased by the views of the translators. The missionaries took 
the most interest in neo-Confucianism and its focus on the principle li, which they found 
easiest to transport towards Christianity and the personal God, and consequently most 
translations were of neo-Confucianist works. The main sources Leibniz used were thus 
heavily Christian in orientation and he himself accordingly displayed that same bias, even 
to the extent of defending the Chinese against the accusation made by certain 
missionaries that they were atheists!18 
Thus in general we can say that most early translators and other scholars read and 
interpreted in a theological and logocentric style, thinking that the dualistic or one-many 
metaphysical tradition of the West with its focus on some primal source, be it in the form 
of a creative entity or of an unalterable principle, must have some sort of correlation in 
the Chinese history, or trying to appropriate what was known of Chinese thinking for 
their own projects. Today still, this kind of interpretation is favourite with many. The 
option of translating dao as ‘the Way,’ a steady feature of this metaphysical reading, is 
still the most obvious and popular.   
Enter the early days of comparative philosophy, in which some progress was 
made, but in which certain features of the religious, but more of the metaphysical 
background of the scholars remained largely unchallenged. And we have to add that it is 
not just Western, but also some Chinese scholars who operate within this metaphysical 
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 See for example Mungello 1992, 186-188. 
18 See Cook & Rosemont 1992, 82-91. 
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system. Wing-tsit Chan can be squarely located within this metaphysical framework 
when he says that Daoism “oppos[ed] Confucian conformity with non-conformity and 
Confucian worldliness with a transcendental spirit,”19 seemingly lumping together 
philosophical Daoism (Daojia) with religious Daoism (Daojiao) which developed later. 
Both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are said to contain mystical elements and to regard 
dao as “transcendental.”20 Although admittedly Chan mentions that both the Daodejing’s 
and the Zhuangzi’s concerns are with this world, the classification of mysticism and 
transcendentality for both speaks of a metaphysical prejudice. Chan also compares 
Zhuangzi21 to Hegel in a couple of instances, and although again he expresses 
reservations as to the possibilities of such a comparison, I think he is wrong in suggesting 
that Zhuangzi’s opposites which produce and imply each other are therefore “identical” 
and are thus part of a “finite series.”22 This move is meant to bring Zhuangzi in the 
direction of Hegel’s dialectic, but I think this is problematic as the yin-yang working of 
opposites that Zhuangzi espouses does not suggest identity to one who is not enamoured 
by the metaphysical idea of oneness as a dialectic form of identity or unity or Aufhebung 
in the Western sense of these words. In short, my thesis is that the ideas of unity and 
identity in the West are different from those supposed equivalents of unity and identity in 
classical China. It is exactly the construal of certain ideas of Daoism to fit into Western 
categories that has been at the forefront of comparative philosophy for too long. Herrlee 
Creel says something similar in the following: 
“Tao at first meant “road” or “path.” From this it developed the sense of a 
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 Chan 1963a, 136. 
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 Chan 1963a, 178. 
21 I shall use the personal names Laozi and Zhuangzi in a loose manner, as embodiments of the works that 
go by their respective names, without however assuming that they were in all cases the actual authors of all 
that goes in their name. 
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method, and of a course of conduct […] And the Confucian tao was also an 
entity, since an individual or a state might “possess the tao” or “lack the tao.” 
But this Confucian tao was still only a principle; it was never regarded as a 
substance, like the tao of the Taoists.”23 
Interpreting ‘the Dao’ as an ontological substance is but one of many instances of reading 
Daoism according to Western metaphysical ideas and standards. Statements like these 
easily confuse the reader into believing that Daoism is really about transcendence, as 
opposed to Confucianism which would not be.24 It shows that interpreters were anxious 
to regard dao as the metaphysical principle around which all of the Daoist classics were 
essentially circumnavigating. Needless to say this was also done to impose on Daoism the 
sort of unity and teleology it seemed to be lacking from a Western perspective. I will try 
to show later that other interpretations of what dao is or means are more viable.  
There are other terms to point to, whose translation into Western languages has 
also asserted a metaphysical meaning of Chinese characters and grammar. For example, 
xin was usually translated as mind, suggesting first of all a mind-body dualism largely 
absent in Chinese thinking, and second failing to denote that xin primarily means the 
heart, which was considered the locus of thinking in classical China. Xin is thus, for lack 
of a real equivalent in Western languages, better translated as ‘heart-mind,’ since this 
points, as Hall and Ames have made clear, “indifferently to activities we would classify 
as thinking, judging, and feeling, and arguably reflects all three modalities of the tripartite 
model in an undissected form.”25 Another famous example is tian, usually translated as 
‘Heaven.’ This Western notion immediately brings connotations of Christianity and the 
                                                
23 Creel 1970, 2, italics in original. 
24 The point I would make is that neither Confucius nor the Daodejing nor the Zhuangzi promote any 
conceptual or metaphysical transcendentality familiar to Western ears. 
25 Hall/Ames 1998, 29. 
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other Abrahamic religions with an identifiable afterworld of transcendent quality. Or the 
translation of wuwei by ‘no action’ or ‘doing nothing,’ which immediately conjures up 
images of quietistic sage hermits who have detached themselves from this world to 
meditate in forests or caves or on mountain tops, whereas wuwei is much better translated 
as ‘non-assertive action’ or something similar pointing to the fact that the Daoist does not 
do nothing, he does things differently, that is without imposing on the natural inclinations 
of things. Of course these statements need to be backed up by textual evidence which will 
provide an understanding of why the non-metaphysical readings and translations are a 
better reflection of classical Daoism. I will provide this later on in this chapter.  
The metaphysical prejudice is also present in the translation of you and wu as 
‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ or ‘Non-being’ respectively. Graham, amongst others, has pointed 
out that these are misrepresentations of the classical Chinese characters and language, in 
which you and wu respectively denote more a presence, having and non-presence, not-
having of things.26 There is thus at least a very different metaphysics at work if we can 
even speak of metaphysics here. The relation between Being and Nothing in the West is 
different from that of you and wu in Daoism. This means that categories like Being and 
Nothing, when used as translation of you and wu respectively, import a way of thinking 
that is foreign to classical China. I will explain this in more detail later in this chapter, for 
now it is important to remember that Western categories, concepts and ways of thinking 
are easily transported into different cultures. In general we can say that importing 
Western notions, which were then supposed to delineate their Chinese equivalents, was 
for a long time the standard, especially in early sinology, as the following quote from 
Arthur Waley makes abundantly clear:  
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“tao meant ‘the way the universe works’; and ultimately, something very like 
God, in the more abstract and philosophical sense of that term. Now it so happens 
that all the meaning-extensions of this word tao (even including the last: ‘I am 
the Way’) also exist in European languages, so that Western scholars have had no 
difficulty in understanding it.”27  
To say that dao meant ‘the way the universe works’ is not that false, but then go on to say 
that it ultimately means ‘God,’ and then to state that since this is so Western scholars 
have no problem understanding it, is indeed a perfect example of importing Western 
ways of thinking into a foreign culture, a failure at the very least to notice the many 
different meanings of dao which are not so easily transferable.    
Burton Watson can be said to be guilty of the other form of scholarship on 
philosophical Daoism that has been predominant, that of seeing it as an essentially 
mystical tradition, beyond the realm of rational explanation. In his introduction to the 
complete translation of the Zhuangzi of 1968, he makes it clear that to him this is the 
work of a mystic, who has found freedom from the normal world in clinging to the 
“inexpressible Absolute.”28 Although his introduction to the revised version of the 
Zhuangzi, Basic Writings is much more refined, he evidently still considers it a work of 
mystical thinking, of freeing yourself from the world.29  
Fung Yu-lan mentions that “the craving for something beyond the present actual 
world is one of the innate desires of mankind, and the Chinese people are no exception to 
this rule.”30 Although he takes caution not to thereby say that Chinese are religious in the 
same way as Western people are, he nevertheless compares the Daoist sage-king to the 
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Platonic philosopher-king,31 and says that “the spiritual achievement of the Chinese sage 
corresponds to the saint’s achievement in Buddhism, and in Western religion.”32 This 
might seem a bit unfair to Fung Yu-lan, in that overall he is quite careful not to conflate 
the Chinese and Western traditions, and in the introduction to his translation of the 
Zhuangzi he keeps repeating that dao is not about transcendence. But he did see the 
Zhuangzi as proposing a similar religiousness as Spinoza, where God is everywhere in 
the world, but not something outside of it.33 Thus I think expressions such as the above 
give us an insight into how normal it was to use Western assumptions, terminology etc. in 
trying to make Chinese philosophy understandable for a Western audience, a process in 
itself to be applauded, but which came with certain presuppositions that can be read in 
most of the early Sinologists, and which consequently made it very easy for later 
interpreters to start off on the wrong foot. Notions of religiousness and mysticism were 
essentially superimposed on Daoism. But there are many forms of mysticism, or of 
mystical states and approaches. I will try to explain later that if we insist on 
understanding Daoism as a form of mysticism, it must be made clear that Daoism would 
then function as an a-typical sort in being a this-worldly mysticism, and is then not 
similar to the Western form of mysticism that seeks a unification of humanity with a 
transcendent God or Heaven.  
Another instance of such imported reasoning is found in D. C. Lau’s translation of 
the Daodejing. As he says in the introduction, “the entity called the tao existed before the 
universe came into being. […] It has an essence which is genuine, and this genuineness is 
vouched for by the existence of the universe which it has produced and continues to 
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sustain.”34 This passage sounds similar to that of Fung Yu-lan mentioned earlier, in that it 
reminds us of Spinoza. Although Lau is quick to add that to say that the dao ‘produced’ 
the universe is really “misleading” and only works “in a figurative sense,”35 he 
nevertheless denotes dao as an ‘essence’ and calls ‘it’ an ‘entity,’ which seems to be the 
same mistake made in the history of Western philosophy again and again, to which 
Heidegger drew our attention when he tried to point to the ontological difference of 
Being and beings. The same idea of essentiality is expressed by Isabelle Robinet, when 
she says that the dao is often understood as a first cause, yet this cause is not to be 
understood in the normal cause and effect relation: “That the Dao was ‘cause’ does not 
imply that the world is its ‘effect,’ because here it means nothing more than that the 
world is its unfolding, its manner of appearance. The Dao is ‘cause’ in the sense of 
motion, not of creation ex nihilo.”36 Although I find it unclear how something can be both 
a cause and at the same time be seen as just the mere unfolding of events, Robinet 
perpetuates the metaphysical interpretation of Daoism by stating that there are “two 
notions of the Dao: one that is indeterminate, and the other which is at the same time the 
source of all things and its production.”37 She speaks of the essence of the Dao and 
suggests that this essence is something beyond the visible world, thereby creating a 
metaphysical principle. Arguably, her interpretation comes from looking at many 
different interpretations, so it is not just her own view. Yet this is precisely the fact I wish 
to argue against: Just because dao has more often than not been interpreted as a 
metaphysical source does not mean that this interpretation is the only true or necessary 
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one. Again it is making the same substantialist mistake in seeing a being simultaneously 
just as an entity and also as the highest transcendental being. 
Another scholar who seems happy to perpetuate the idea that Daoism is about 
some metaphysical entity wrongfully or inadequately named dao is Benjamin Schwartz, 
who speaks of Daoism as “a kind of speculative meditation […] on the nature of Tao that 
seems to parallel later Neoplatonic meditations in the West on the nature of the Logos.”38 
Many philosophers have thankfully taken this parallel and found ways of inserting the 
metaphysical values associated with the traditional understanding of logos into Daoist 
philosophy. As we will see when comparing Daoism with Heidegger and Derrida, there is 
also a different understanding of logos that needs not be metaphysical in nature. 
In his later work Schwartz still considers the Daoism of the Laozi and the 
Zhuangzi a form of mysticism. Thus dao is considered the ineffable, unknowable reality 
which itself is non-being, but nevertheless the source of all beings.39 Schwartz further 
argues that humans, or at least some of them, can achieve a unity with this unknowable 
dao. He thus takes dao to be a metaphysical entity, to be approached in a mystical way 
because common sense knowledge runs short for knowing it, and he explicitly explores 
the parallels in Western and Indian religious mysticisms, especially those of negative 
theology.40 He thereby also introduces the classical idea of dualism into his 
understanding of dao, as he speaks on the one hand of the dao as ultimate, unnameable 
and ineffable reality, on the other hand of dao(s) of which you can speak.41 
One last example of the metaphysical reading is Max Kaltenmark’s Lao Tzu and 
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Taoism, which again seeks to convey dao as “Heavenly Order or Way.”42 This is the 
same sort of imposition of Western metaphysical ideas on classical Daoism. 
The outline I have tried to give here of traditional Western scholarship and 
translations of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi might have focused on the negative 
aspects of these interpretations a bit too much and I wish to reiterate that present and 
future scholarship still benefits from these interpretations, if only because they show us 
how easily we import our ideas, through the language we use, into understandings of 
other cultures. Criticism of and warnings towards reading too many Western ideas into 
Chinese classics have always existed amongst scholars of Sinology and comparative 
philosophy, but the fact still remains that inadvertently many foreign structures of 
thinking were incorporated into the interpretations of these classics, and these structures 
have usually reinforced the metaphysical outlook.  
The outline given is especially important as it shall, in the further part of this 
chapter, be used to compete with interpretations that are in some important ways non-
metaphysical in nature, such as those of A.C. Graham,43 J.J.L. Duyvendak, Chad Hansen, 
Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, and of course my interpretation of these readings.   
3.2  THE METAPHYSICAL TRADITION AND COMPARISON.  
“Beware of the abysses and the gorges, but also of the bridges and the barriers.”44  
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In this part I want to focus on readings that have been offered comparing Daoism in 
general with specific Western philosophers, and show that many of these comparisons 
inadvertently retain the metaphysical perspective, in that they try to pronounce the 
‘ineffable’ dao as something transcendent, some metaphysical principle of origin. This 
part is not meant to deny the fact that interpretation always has to have a starting point, 
and that it is thus quite naturally to be expected that interpreters and comparative 
philosophers start from their own cultural and philosophical background in trying to 
understand other cultures. In this way many translators and comparative philosophers 
have been, whether consciously or unconsciously, reading the Daodejing and the 
Zhuangzi through their favourite philosophers’ eyes. However, what I want to show is 
how these interpretations might be a bit too overenthusiastic about the possibilities of 
such comparisons between their favourite Western philosophers and classical Chinese 
philosophy. Many interpretations were (and some still are) content to overlook important 
differences in order to create a semblance of equality or sameness where there might only 
be a similarity in a minor part of the thought-structures involved, and in so doing have 
inadvertently recreated their own particular version of what Daoism is or can offer. Some 
have tried to subsume dao to Western sensibilities, some have tried to say it is totally 
different from Western thinking. Most have offered Daoism as a valuable alternative 
which provides a way out of the suffocating self-defeating strands of Western 
metaphysics. It will later be argued that such a way out might be equally self-defeating, 
and that to think of philosophical Daoism as providing this way out is itself an imposition 
of an ideal on the texts which assumes some sort of transcendental thinking.  
I am of course aware that this dissertation in a way suffers from the same flaws, 
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yet I shall defend my approach of using Heidegger and Derrida since I think that the 
similarities in thinking between certain parts of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism are in 
fact conducive to an awareness of these flaws, meaning that the comparison will make us 
more aware of the inevitability of having a perspective, and caution us against being 
overly optimistic about the possibilities of such intercultural encounters, while not 
denying their value for furthering understanding amongst different cultures. This 
realisation of difference is exactly one of the features of Heidegger and Derrida, and 
leads them to both an appreciation of and openness to difference.  
As we shall see later, the metaphysical language of transcendence, as well as the 
language of (transcendence in) immanence, is not suitable for translating the works of 
Daoism. Absence and Nothing are not to be seen as a place of unchanging principles. As 
we have seen for example with Schwartz, there is a tendency to subsume Daoism under 
the idea of negative theology, which would mean that all we can say about the 
hyperessential dao is what it is not. The point I wish to make is that there is no 
transcendence necessary; dao can be seen as wholly self-transformation of the ten 
thousand processes. 
The mere volume of books with the title “The Tao of …” should already be 
enough of a warning against two possible approaches. The first would be a search for the 
ultimate meaning of the Daodejing or the Zhuangzi. Since obviously these anthologies 
are open to many diverse interpretations, and because their historical origins are so 
diffuse, it would be both futile and denying of their diversity to look for one and only one 
true meaning. However, the second approach, which claims that therefore the books are 
open to whatever we want them to mean, is equally at fault, and I think that many 
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comparative philosophers have taken the opportunity provided by the vagueness and 
inherent openness of the texts to conflate them with their own interests. 
In general then we can say that most interpretations of the Daoist classics have 
proceeded, or continue to proceed to read into these works the quest of a foundational 
principle, a permanent moment of rest beyond the turmoil of ever changing things, and 
that the Daoist sages are those who have for all time found this metaphysical ground of 
all things, being ‘The Way,’ and try (in vain though, since language cannot convey this 
ultimate ground) to find ways of expressing this to their readers. Against this dominant 
interpretation of Daoism, a different reading is possible.  
3.3 THE POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENCE.  
“Within the rhythms of life, the swinging gateway opens and novelty emerges 
spontaneously to revitalize the world, tempering whatever has moved to an 
extreme, and reclaiming whatever has strayed from the path. Whatever is most 
enduring is ultimately overtaken in the ceaseless transformation of things.”45  
Reading Daoism as one coherent school of thought in itself is a prejudice which tries to 
undo the diversity of the classics which have been subsumed under this name.46 This 
tendency might be compared superficially with the tendency to subsume under the 
umbrella of post-modernism everything which challenges and questions the ideas that are 
usually associated with ‘modernity.’ And both in China and in the West, these challenges 
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have usually been understood as derailing, nihilistic and relativistic.  
So while we have to acknowledge the fact that there is some commonality in what 
we usually call Daoism, we must also be aware of the differences between the classical 
Daoist works. There are important differences between the Laozi or Daodejing and the 
Zhuangzi, and to read the Zhuangzi only as the inner chapters suggest is also to try to 
undo the importance of the commentarial tradition in favour of a single original. We 
know that almost none of the Chinese classics are such original, one-author works as we 
are more familiar with in the history of the West, but that their form developed through 
commentaries and editing from various sources over a considerable length of time. This 
is not to say that with the commentarial tradition evolving, we are necessarily getting 
closer to the ‘real’ meaning of the Chinese classics. It is merely to point out that the 
identity of the Chinese classics is fluid to say the least. We must see this fluidity as 
something inherent in these works and thus as something which influences how we read 
them. 
I would like to point then to the possibility of a differential reading, one that 
incorporates the post-modern critique of metaphysics and thus tries to read Daoism in a 
non-metaphysical way. Graham notices that while many translators and interpreters have 
tried to read some metaphysical reality behind the appearances of the every day world 
into the ineffability of dao, the fact is rather that “[D]aoists are not thinking of the Way as 
ultimate Truth or Reality. They merely have the good sense to remind us of the 
limitations of the language which they use to guide us towards that altered perspective on 
the world and that knack of living.”47 In order to understand the different thinking of the 
Daoist classics, it is most important first to explain how classical Chinese language and 
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thinking have influenced each other and how interpretations of classical Chinese have 
influenced interpretations of the supposed way of thinking behind the Chinese classics in 
general and the Daoist classics in particular.  
3.3.1 INTERPRETATIONS OF CLASSICAL CHINESE LANGUAGE. 
It is not my intention to provide here a theory of the classical Chinese language, but more 
to provide an overview of some theories of classical Chinese language, and with that an 
overview only of what I take to be the most interesting and conflicting points of view that 
bear immediate importance on this dissertation. From this largely incomplete overview I 
hope only to distract a feasible idea of the impact of the perceived function, structure, 
grammar and semantics of classical Chinese on the thinking or philosophy of classical 
China, and especially the impact on the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. This idea will aid 
me in what follows as I present a certain reading of Daoism to stand next to the 
traditional readings and interpretations.  
Benjamin Whorf, in his influential work Language, Thought and Reality, argues 
that language is constitutive of reality in the sense that it is understood that language 
presents the world in a certain way and is not a neutral medium, and it is my opinion that 
a similar view is held by the earliest thinkers in China, who consequently looked upon 
language in a different way than their Western contemporaries did, or later Western 
philosophers for that matter. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests the following:  
“The possibilities open to thinking are the possibilities of recognizing 
relationships and the discovery of techniques of operating with relationships on 
the mental or intellectual plane, such as will in turn lead to ever wider and more 
penetratingly significant systems of relationships. These possibilities are 
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inescapably bound up with systems of linguistic expression.”48  
In other words, language is not just the medium through which otherwise non-linguistic 
ideas are reproduced or represented, but language itself shapes and is thus constitutive of 
these ideas, and these ideas are relational because language is relational. Whereas in the 
West this has been a relatively recent discovery and one that is still contested, the 
thinkers in classical China were aware of this important factor of language from an early 
period onwards, and used language accordingly. From the ‘rectification of names’ to the 
‘ineffable dao’ to the ‘white horses and non-horses,’ examples abound to show that 
philosophers in China took this phenomenon of language seriously. But the Sapir-Whorf 
thesis does not necessarily lead to an extreme linguistic relativism. Graham has argued 
that although certain arguments or concepts can not be translated from classical Chinese 
to Western languages or vice versa, the fact that we seem to inhabit profoundly different 
conceptual schemes does still not necessitate extreme relativism. We can cross over to 
different conceptual schemes and still maintain that they are different from our own 
schemes, so we can learn from the differences in our respective ways of reasoning.49  
Although there are different theories about the existence of grammar, or about the 
function and structure of language in general and the largely pictographic and 
ideographic character of classical Chinese in particular, all these theories agree on the 
fact that the language was an important influence on thinking and its development in 
classical China. And most agree that because of the different structure of classical 
Chinese in comparison to Indo-European languages thinking was largely developed in 
directions different from the Western metaphysical approach.  
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Some of these theories work from the view that has become standard or orthodox 
in the West and thus try to accommodate classical Chinese language into this framework. 
Others challenge this standard and its applicability to classical Chinese and argue that we 
cannot impose Indo-European standards on classical Chinese. The latter ones are 
obviously closer to the views of Heidegger and Derrida.  
Many authors have focused on the supposed vagueness of classical Chinese, but 
more recent scholarship has established that there is much more structure than was 
previously supposed. Graham for example admits to the “syntactic mobility”50 of 
classical Chinese characters, but argues that as scholarship is evolving, this mobility or 
vagueness is becoming more and more restricted. Yet Graham retains the idea that 
classical Chinese is special because of this inherent openness.51 Again, some authors have 
seen this as a disadvantage in relation to Indo-European languages, while others have 
argued for a more positive approach, meaning that this openness and vagueness is a 
productive rather than a negative feature, a claim which I will explain later.  
Hansen argues against the orthodox bias that phonetic writing, or rather the 
writing based on phonemes, is ‘better than’ non-phonetic writing. First of all, this bias 
perpetuates the idea of Western superiority, and then it usually further debases classical 
Chinese in trying to make it conform to the Western standard. Hansen suggests we just 
deny the bias and see language in its totality (that is as both speech and writing) as:  
“an abstract symbolic system. Sounds are one familiar example of linguistic 
symbols, not their essence. Pictures, gestures, electromagnetic modulations, 
graphs, map conventions, eyebrow movements, ideographs, logical notation and 
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so forth are other possible symbol systems that can token words of a language.”52  
Hansen introduces the type-token distinction, which suggests that a language, consisting 
of words, has different word-types in it, which are abstract theoretical objects. These 
types can be represented by different tokens, sound-tokens or written tokens being 
examples. With this distinction Hansen points to the fact that it is not necessary for a 
written language to be derived from the spoken variant. He suggests that classical 
Chinese writing is an instance of a symbol system which arose not from speech, but from 
“a ritual practice connected to divination.”53 With this interpretation Hansen undermines 
the universal claim that all writing must be a transcription of spoken language.  
Having argued against the traditional interpretations of classical Chinese language 
and philosophy, Hansen introduces his own ideas of the language and how it affected 
thinking. He also notices that Chinese ideas about language never fail to “note explicitly 
the conventional nature of language and the crucial role of acceptability of use. Chinese 
theorists emphasize the relation of language and society, perhaps even more than they 
emphasize the relation of language and the world.”54 Language depends on social 
convention, not on a metaphysical theory of meaning that would place ideas in a special, 
Platonic realm, as it usually does in the West.  
Hansen thinks it is better to treat classical Chinese characters as consisting of, or 
rather functioning as, mass nouns.55 This would make us better understand the difference 
between the ontology in the West and what he calls the mereology of the classical 
Chinese worldview. The former is concerned with individuality as a permanent structure 
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of things, their so-called essence, while the latter is “an ontology of non-contiguous stuffs 
with a part-whole structure.”56  
Ames, together with others like Rosemont and Hall, has also argued for a 
separation of the writing and speech of classical Chinese. Rosemont and Ames argue that 
“classical Chinese is not now and may never have been understood aloud as a 
primarily spoken language; therefore spoken and literary Chinese are now and 
may always have been two distinct linguistic media, and if so, the latter should 
clearly not be seen as simply a transcription of speech.”57 
Classical Chinese thus differs significantly from the linguistic ideal of Indo-European 
languages, in that it can not be understood (solely) by seeing it as a transcription of the 
spoken language, whereby the pure presence denoted by the spoken word is transported 
(in a deficient way) into the written word. According to Ames and Hall this means that 
classical “Chinese language is not logocentric. Words do not name essences. Rather, they 
indicate always-transitory processes and events. It is important, therefore, to stress the 
gerundative character of the language.”58 Because of this character, and because of the 
inherent vagueness of classical Chinese which Ames and Hall attest to and see as a 
positive feature rather than as something negative, they suggest to try to understand the 
language “paronomastically—that is, in terms of the semantic and phonic web of allusive 
relationships that obtain among [clusters of philosophical expressions, SVB].”59 The 
vagueness of the language carries a certain unpredictability with it. Notions have more 
than one meaning, often opposite or at least very divergent meanings at that. For 
example, one passage in the second chapter of the Zhuangzi is translated by Watson as 
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“The torch of chaos and doubt—this is what the sage steers by.”60 The same passage is 
translated by Graham as: “the glitter of glib implausibilities is despised by the sage.”61 
This is an example of the vagueness of classical Chinese, and shows how scholars 
competent in classical Chinese, can by a different translation make the same sage do 
something completely opposite.  
Yet, as said, Hall and Ames suggest that this inherent vagueness in the language 
should not be seen as a hindrance to understanding, but as a source of richness that 
enhances the relational context in which real understanding comes about. Understanding 
a term is not taking it from its context and providing it with a fixed definition, as one 
would in a world shaped largely by essentialist thinking, it is putting something in its 
context and acknowledging that it can only be understood from there, as one would in a 
world that is more process-oriented. This calls for a further explanation of the term 
paronomasia, which Ames presents as a guide to understanding the language and thus the 
thinking of classical China. In a forthcoming work Ames tries to show the importance of 
relationality for the classical Chinese worldview, and he extends this importance in the 
direction of understanding the classics and the classical Chinese language they were 
composed in. According to Ames, the meaning of characters is found only by “invoking a 
combination of the semantic and phonetic associations they bring to mind.”62 The stress 
on relationality excludes the normal Western assumptions about how to define terms. In 
the traditional Western metaphysical sense, terms are defined per genus et differentiam, 
that is by putting them simultaneously in a class with similar characteristics and by 
drawing boundaries that delineate and differentiate one term from another. In this sense a 
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definition is an abstraction, through classification and differentiation, from the context in 
which the term is found, in order to find the essence or true meaning of a term which 
would always be the same, even in and despite of very different contextual 
circumstances. In the Platonic tradition it is this essence which is then defined as the real 
meaning of a term, whereas the individual instances of things and terms are mere 
derivations. This is basically the Platonic position that distinguishes between a world of 
forms and one of matter, with the former having a definitely higher status. The basic 
source of meaning then comes to be seen as a transcendental principle, the ‘One Reality’ 
from which the many instances or particular things are derived. 
Compared to this, the classical Chinese worldview does not acknowledge such a 
top-down order, but works from the premise of starting from the perspective of the 
particular and defining it in terms of its surroundings. This also means that things are not 
static, they are not defined once and for all. Because of situational developments and the 
ongoing transformation of things, they are more parts of processes than strict identities. 
We can also read this in the Zhuangzi, where Zhuangzi, upon realising he is himself 
entangled in a web of creatures preying upon each other, says that “[i]t is inherent in 
things that they are ties to each other, that one kind calls up another.”63 Zhuangzi 
(although uneasily)64 assents to the fact that he is a situational being. Graham’s 
translation here might at first seem odd, as he translates not that things have ties with 
other things, but that things are these ties. This translation however makes it even clearer 
that relationality is prior to identity and individuality. A subject is not first a subject 
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which then has relations with other subjects or objects, it is the relations which first make 
the subject what it is.  
From this particularly Chinese worldview of relationality, Ames seeks to find the 
implications of understanding the language of the Chinese classics in this way. For 
example, dao can not be named. But this is not because, as so many (Western and 
Chinese) interpreters have assumed, it is a transcendental principle above the rest of the 
world, but because the complete process of transformation is, as its nature implies, not 
something we can pin down or relate to anything else or behind it. As Ames puts it:  
“With no assumed “One-behind-the-many” as the ultimate source of meaning, 
there is no single-ordered world, no “uni-verse,” only the ongoing evolving 
harmony expressed as the quality of life achieved by the insistent, co-creating 
particulars.”65 
Daoist thinking implies an understanding that this relationality is ever changing, an ever 
ongoing process of transformation, and this implies that any ‘rectification of names’ or 
use of language is therefore provisional and in need of constant renewal. Not only dao is 
beyond naming, but all naming is only a provisional, temporary fixation of what is 
essentially always in flux.  
What reading texts in a paronomastic way means can also be clarified when we 
look at the often found parallelism in the prose and verse of the Chinese classics. Not 
only are words paired with similar words (phonetic or semantic), but sentences with the 
same structure and close to each other are paired as well. This parallelism and the 
switching between prose and verse which often occurs function similarly as a means to 
further understanding and clarity: the poetry is connected to meaning. Parallel sentences 
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have definite connections. Meaning is generated as a result of all these connections. 
One major implication of Ames’ ideas is that the strict distinction between 
metaphorical and literal meaning that is so often held in high esteem in the West, does 
not apply to the worldview of the Chinese classics. There is no literal meaning of a term, 
all terms, concepts, notions etc., rely on other terms, concepts and notions to be 
explained. 
The question of reference then becomes complicated. In the traditional Western 
sense nouns refer to objects etc., and in general we can say that language is seen as a 
representation of reality, it refers to something outside itself.66 Hall and Ames, building 
on the ‘mass-noun’ hypothesis of Hansen, deny this and argue that “no ontological 
referencing serves to discipline the acts of naming. That is, there is no object language in 
the strict sense. Language is, in this sense, nonreferential.”67 Another way of saying the 
same thing, Hall and Ames say that “names ‘reference’ functions or roles which are 
themselves other names.”68 The metaphorical explanation of paronomasia is in the end 
the only one by which we get insight into the provisional meaning of terms. The reason 
why there is no strict distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning lies in the 
non-dualistic worldview of the Chinese classics. Since there is no enduring reality behind 
the transient appearances, all is relative to all else, and that means that the meaning of 
words is relative to the language around them. The way to define something is not by 
appeal to some transcendent principle of permanence, as we will see later, but by locating 
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it within its immediate surroundings, and that includes words with similar phonetic 
elements and close in metaphoric meaning. 
Meaning thus only arises out of the web of signification that language is. In this 
way, language is also not seen primarily as a description of reality, but as a presentation 
of reality in a certain way. In Chinese philosophy, the focus is on the prescriptive instead 
of the descriptive. In fact, the strict distinction made between descriptive and prescriptive 
language might itself be artificial and a feature of the imposition of Western ideas on 
Chinese classics. In the traditional worldview of which classical Chinese language is an 
exponent, ming (to name) is associated with ming (to command). Dao as a term is 
associated with the term for ‘leading, guiding’ and can also mean ‘speaking.’ It thus has 
an obvious prescriptive component. Hansen has pointed out that the ‘usual sense’ of dao 
was understood to be something like “guiding discourse,” which also suggests a 
prescriptive element. Hansen, as we have seen, argues extensively for an understanding 
of classical Chinese that would not subsume it under the supposedly universal standards 
of Western, Indo-European languages. He likens classical Chinese to a computer 
programme, where the programme functions as a guide to action. This means that the 
descriptive function of language, or the mere communication of information about 
objects, is only one function of language in the whole system, and not the most important 
one. As a whole, and more importantly, language is prescriptive according to 
conventional standards, but these standards are not permanent, hence the discussion about 
which dao to follow is indeed the discussion about how to see language.  
“The distinctive claim of the Taoist is that […] our conventional ways of doing 
things with prescriptive language are always changing—there is no constant, 
absolute, guide to behaviour in all circumstances.[…] And, as the Lao-tzu points 
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out, the reason no such discourse is constant is that language (names) is 
inconstant—artificial, conventional, changeable. No Tao is constant because no 
name is constant.”69  
Daoists understood the relativity of a guide that has no permanent standard to refer to. 
Hansen’s reinterpretation of the first lines of the first chapter of the Daodejing shows us 
that ‘names,’ or rather language, does not point to anything metaphysical and 
unchanging. It is a conventional tool that is dependent on situation. As Ames and Hall put 
it:  
“Daoist naming […] is presentational rather than just representational, normative 
rather than just descriptive, perlocutionary rather than just locutionary, a doing 
and a knowing rather than just a saying. […] Such knowing is dependent upon an 
awareness of the indeterminate aspects of things. The ongoing shaping of 
experience requires a degree of imagination and creative projection that does not 
reference the world as it is, but anticipates what it might become. […] And 
having access to the “name” of something is not only a claim to knowing it in a 
cognitive sense, but more importantly, to knowing how to deal with it. […] 
Hence such knowing is a feeling and a doing: it is value-added. It is naming 
without the kind of fixed reference that allows one to “master” something, a 
naming that does not arrest or control.”70 
In the Zhuangzi, chapter 27, there is mention of three kinds of words used in the 
Zhuangzi, or of three ways of using language which are important to understand this 
provisionality. Graham has explained how the first two kinds seem to follow normal 
conventions. The first one, ‘saying from a lodging place,’ which means arguing from a 
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particular standpoint, is discredited throughout the Zhuangzi because for every ‘this,’ 
every standpoint, there is a ‘that,’ or another standpoint. The second one, ‘weighted 
saying,’ is based on authority of experience. It thus suffers from the same shortcomings, 
although less. But the third one is the most important, ‘spillover saying,’ which Graham 
characterises as “the speech proper to the intelligent spontaneity of Taoist behaviour in 
general, a fluid language which keeps its equilibrium through changing meanings and 
viewpoints.”71 So it is not so much that there is nothing to be said, it is more that we must 
always realise that what is said is provisional, prone to shifts in meaning, and open to 
different interpretations from different standpoints. Words can be used in a variety of 
ways, none of which is permanent and none of which will overcome this impermanence. 
It is often argued that Daoists in general and Zhuangzi in particular propose to do away 
with language because of this impermanence, but I think this is a misunderstanding. Let 
us look at one of the passages often invoked in this argument: 
“The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can 
forget about the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you’ve 
gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once 
you’ve gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. Where can I find a man 
who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him?”72 
It is important to understand this passage not as saying that we can do without language 
once we have the meaning of life, but as saying we must always return to language, even 
when we think we no longer need it. You can only forget the fish trap for a short moment, 
while you have fish. Once the fish runs out, is exhausted, you need the fish trap again, 
and you might have to do some repairs as well. On the level of language this means that 
                                                
71
 Graham 1981, 107. 
72 Zhuangzi, Watson 2003, 141. 
 164
the metaphysical idea that there is some ultimate and unchanging reality conveyed by 
words but essentially in a different realm, is undone by pointing to the provisionality of 
words, not with respect to this ultimate truth, but with respect to the description of the 
world. You need first to forget about words as having a fixed reference, not to leave them 
behind permanently. After forgetting them, the realisation that you will still need them 
sets in, and then you need to reinvent or reintroduce, or reinscribe them. Dealing with this 
fluidity of language is like the goblet of the ‘goblet words,’ which is another translation 
of the ‘spillover saying’ that Graham mentions, in that the goblet does not get rid of itself, 
but of what it has too much of, as it rights itself after emptying itself. Zhuangzi does not 
suggest overcoming language in some mystical state, he argues for the equality and 
provisionality of all language and thus of all views, which means that any mystical state 
is not better or worse than another state, but also suffers from the same provisionality. As 
the second chapter of the Zhuangzi shows, there is not one language which can proclaim 
to be representative of the ‘piping of heaven,’ nor can any man claim to have a special 
access to this ‘piping of heaven.’ In a typical move Zhuangzi first seems to assent to the 
idea that the ‘piping of heaven’ is more valuable or more real than the ‘piping of man,’ 
but he then goes on to show that there really is no way of distinguishing between these 
two, which on the level of language means that all language is permissible and not 
permissible in the same way. 
A similar idea is also found in the Daodejing, where it is not argued that we 
should stop using language, but that we should know where its limits are. Chapter 78 for 
example, does not say that all language is bad per se, but that “appropriate language 
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seems contradictory.”73 That means that appropriate language is not to be understood in 
the same category as normal language. Appropriate language is language aware of its 
own provisionality. I would thus also argue against the interpretation of the Daodejing 
that suggests that we should get rid of language altogether. Both the Zhuangzi and the 
Daodejing are written as realisations of the need for language, although not as in the 
common language, but in a different way. They do not argue for a total dismissal of 
language. Chapter 23 of the Daodejing has it that “It is natural to speak only rarely,”74 
and not that it is natural to not speak at all. And further on in chapter 32 it is said that:  
“When we start to regulate the world we introduce names.  
But once names have been assigned,  
We must also know when to stop.  
Knowing when to stop is how to avoid danger.”75 
Even the sages have to speak, there is no sense in avoiding it, but there is great sense in 
knowing how to speak, when to speak and when not to, and when to stop depending on 
fixed meanings. The caution taken when speaking or using language in general is a 
common feature of much of classical Chinese philosophy. Graham has said that “in 
Chinese philosophy argumentation is conceived solely in terms of whether the name fits 
the object.”76 The specifically Daoist contribution seems to be an increased awareness of 
the provisionality of this ‘fitting.’ So what Graham has called the most distinguishable 
trait of the Daoist, that “knack of living”77, has a lot to do with language. The examples 
of cook Ding and other skilful craftsmen can be seen as illustrations or metaphors of the 
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Daoist Sage, who has this knack in everything he does, and most certainly in his use of 
language. He is one who has by default to be extremely aware of the possibilities and 
impossibilities of language, and that is why he is said to be extremely cautious and 
sparing in his use of language. And it is also how he can attune his language to the 
changing circumstances, thus playing along with the process of transformation and not 
hindering it with false fixations. To the sage, this has become a so-called second nature. 
Like cook Ding, whom we can only assume to have achieved his ‘knack’ by a lot of 
practice, the Daoist sage must remain on constant guard against the reassertion of 
propositional and representational language and thinking. It is only by such constant 
awareness that the sage develops this second nature. To become ziran, one must practice 
wei wuwei. And one must practice it constantly. Even cook Ding, when he comes to a 
difficult part, pauses and has to tell himself “to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes 
on what I’m doing, work very slowly…”78 If we unwittingly stick to one interpretation, 
we become dogmatic. But we can not assume that once we have left this dogmatism 
behind, we can then rest on our laurels. In asserting things, we must see that what we 
assert is never the ‘truth’ as such, it is always an interpretation and a point of view which 
can not be neutral or objective in the Western ideal sense of these words. “The Way has 
never known boundaries; speech has no constancy.”79 Once this is realised, we can no 
longer assume to be beyond the boundaries, and then we can and must use language 
‘under erasure.’  
As a corollary to my interpretation of language in Daoism, we can look at recent 
writings about language in Chan/Zen Buddhism, not just because Chan Buddhism is in a 
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way the descendant of Daoist thinking, but also because interpretations, especially 
Western ones, of Chan Buddhism have suggested that the experience of enlightenment 
sought in Chan Buddhism also transcends language, in a similar way as Daoism would do 
by seeing dao as an ineffable reality. However, recently there has been criticism towards 
this standard view of Chan Buddhism by scholars such as Youru Wang and Dale S. 
Wright.80 Both Wang and Wright argue that Chan experience is not about transcending 
language, but about opening it up, about showing the traditional limitations that were 
imposed on it by understanding language in a metaphysical way. In arguing for this 
opening up and for the idea that the sought-for Chan experience of satori is not a pure 
experience that transcends language, but one that is located within the particular language 
community of Chan Buddhists, in locating experience inside a language web or in seeing 
language as essential to meaningful experience, I concur with their findings and wish to 
repeat that what I think Daoism tries to do is similar, in that through language it disrupts 
the standard view and use of language, without thereby denying its necessity. In Wright’s 
words, the ‘awakening’ in Chan/Zen Buddhism is “an awakening to rather than from 
language.”81 And of course I argue that this is also what Heidegger and Derrida do. 
With regard to the social and prescriptive function of language, the Daoist sage 
must thus stand somewhere ‘in the middle,’ or as we shall see later, in the gateway that 
opens to both sides of the yin-yang dichotomies, of the shi-fei assertions, or of the you-wu 
distinctions. Thus chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi says of the sage that he: 
“illuminates all in the light of tian. He too recognizes a ‘this,’ but a ‘this’ which 
is also a ‘that,’ a ‘that’ which is also a ‘this.’ His ‘that’ has both a right and a 
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wrong in it; his ‘this’ too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he 
still have a ‘this’ and a ‘that’? Or does he in fact no longer have a ‘this’ and 
‘that’? A state in which ‘this’ and ‘that’ no longer find their opposites is called 
the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted in the socket, it can respond 
endlessly.”82 
This provisionality seems to me to be one of the key ideas behind the Daoist approach to 
language. This goes against the common idea that Daoists, and especially Zhuangzi, are 
arguing for an escape from the world into some eternal realm of freedom. In my opinion, 
and I have shown how their ideas and use of language supports this opinion, they are 
arguing, in their own way, against these superficial escapist theories in favour of a 
reinterpretation of our way of being in the world that would be less interfering. 
To conclude this part, it seems that most theories of classical Chinese language 
focus on a couple of basic ideas. Social convention, entailing prescription and 
relationality rather than description of an underlying unchanging reality, is the major 
function of language. The fact that there seems to be a different ontology backing the 
classical Chinese language means we cannot assume too much similarity with thinking in 
Western languages. My point would be to claim that the often mentioned denial of the 
value of language should be understood differently. Language per se is not to be 
discarded, but used with ultimate caution and awareness of its provisionality, because it 
could otherwise lead to dangerous dogmatisms and an unrealistic narrowness of focus. 
This excursion into certain interpretations of classical Chinese language will be taken to 
function as a background for the next section, which to some extent rests on the 
particularities of classical Chinese to explain a certain philosophical attitude that I ascribe 
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to Daoism.  
3.3.2 INCONSTANCY OF DAO: NO TRANSCENDENCE PLEASE. 
The focus of this whole chapter has really been a matter of ‘a certain way of reading’ that 
is increasingly under fire. It is not that other ways of reading the Daoist classics are 
neutral or objective, but the one that has been dominant in the discourse of comparative 
philosophy needs reconsideration and this reconsideration is found in some 
contemporary, but also in some earlier sinologists and philosophers. We have seen that 
even minor prejudices and habits of our own languages can easily distort the ideas of 
other cultures. Even using the definite article ‘the’ instead of the indefinite ‘a’ or opting 
for the singular instead of the plural in translations makes a difference. If we look at the 
first chapter of the Daodejing, translating the character chang from the first line as 
‘eternal’83 is different from translating it as ‘constant.’ ‘Eternal’ could easily suggest a 
platonic realm of reality behind the appearance of the worldly things and thus reinforces 
the idea of a duality and hierarchy between reality and appearance, whereas ‘constant’ 
suffers less from such an interpretation. Relative constancy can still be accommodated 
within a thinking based on process and transformation. 
Hall and Ames have argued against translations of Chinese classics which take 
Western notions and their apparently literal application towards Chinese characters for 
granted. They argue that because the Chinese tradition has no concept of strict 
transcendence, translations must anticipate their audience to the extent that “in the 
Chinese worldview, the act of translation is not complete until readers have read the text. 
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This simply means that the coherence of the Chinese order must take full account of 
context.”84 This puts a duty on translators not to impose their own standards of thinking 
on the works in translation, and to anticipate the fact that for readers raised and schooled 
in the Western metaphysical traditions, translating a term such as tian with ‘Heaven’ will 
engender definite connotations which should be avoided as they do not do justice to the 
worldview of the Chinese classics.  
If we are to provide a different reading of Daoist thinking that is not 
metaphysical, we must stay aware of the danger of reappropriating dao, understood as the 
ongoing process of impermanence and change of everything in the world, back into the 
metaphysical tradition, in which case we would be seeing it as ‘the principle of 
impermanence which stays permanent as a guiding principle itself.’ The proposals of Hall 
and Ames on the idea of the absence of transcendence in Chinese thought in general, and 
Daoism in particular, are very promising, and something more should be said about them. 
Hall and Ames understand and define transcendence in the following way: “A is 
transcendent with respect to B if the existence, meaning, or import of B cannot be fully 
accounted for without recourse to A, but the reverse is not true.”85 This notion of 
transcendence is then taken to task with regard to the notions of tian and dao, where Hall 
and Ames find that since tian and dao are both ziran (self-so), they require no further 
postulation of transcendence. In other words, there is no God, Heaven or eternal Way out 
there for us to follow, tian and dao are nothing more than the ongoing processes of the 
world in its countless transformations, nothing more than the wanwu or myriad events, 
things and processes that together constitute the world. Reading Daoism in this way 
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might seem to be imposing some pragmatist or post-modern ideas on it, yet throughout 
history there have been some Chinese commentators who shared this view, for example 
Guo Xiang, Chen Jingyuan, Du Guanting and also Li Daochun.86 So while we may say 
that the position we are looking for has not been dominant throughout history, whether in 
the Western interpretations or in the Chinese commentaries, it would be a mistake to 
assume that this particular understanding of Daoism did not exist in both the early and 
more recent history of Chinese thinking. 
Further, this absence of transcendence is not a case for negative theology, which 
is to say that Chinese thought is not to be regarded in terms of the usual opposite of 
transcendence and immanence. Hall and Ames have argued in Thinking Through 
Confucius and again in Thinking From The Han that it is the language of both 
transcendence and immanence that confuses Western notions for Chinese sensibilities.87 
The contrast between transcendence and immanence has its root, as they argue, in the 
theological tradition, and thus both terms are part of a framework that has arisen in the 
Western religious worldview. This means that whenever scholars deny the existence of 
transcendence, plausible in itself, but then go on to explain Chinese thinking in terms of 
immanence, they are perpetuating the framework itself that is to blame for the whole 
Western infusion of ideas. Since negative theology works within the same conceptual 
structure it is thus inappropriate for understanding the different ideas of classical China.  
However, Hall and Ames also object to the idea of a secular transcendence, one 
whereby dao would be translated and seen as some sort of essential ‘Reason’ or 
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‘Absoluteness.’88 Both forms of transcendence, the positing of a transcendent principle 
outside the world as well as the essentialist version, are absent. One can read this absence 
of transcendence in a similar way in the commentary of the neo-Daoist thinker Guo 
Xiang on the Zhuangzi, quoted by Graham: 
“I should like to ask whether the maker of things is something (yu) or nothing 
(wu). If he is nothing, how is he able to make things? If he is something, he is 
unequal to making things in their multitudinous shapes. Therefore it is quite 
pointless to discuss the making of things with someone until he understands that 
the multitudinous shapes become things of themselves.”89 
The importance of Guo Xiang for a reading of Daoism that is not metaphysical is not to 
be underestimated. Although his only surviving work is a commentary on the Zhuangzi, 
Guo Xiang’s work shows that there was an understanding of Daoism which in most 
definite terms did not subscribe to this metaphysical reading. Guo Xiang’s commentary is 
full of both implicit and explicit denials of the idea that tian, dao, ziran or other concepts 
would have anything to do with transcendence, or with anything remotely resembling a 
God, or otherwise with any idea of transcendent quality or metaphysical reality, and as 
such Guo Xiang forms a strong antidote to metaphysical inclinations of certain 
interpreters. Elsewhere in the same commentary he states his case in the following way:  
“Who, then, produces things? They spontaneously produce themselves…. That 
everything spontaneously becomes what it is, is called natural. Everything is as it 
is by nature, not made to be so. Therefore, when Chuang Tzu spoke of heaven 
(t’ien), he meant the natural, not the blue sky…. T’ien is the general name of all 
things. There is nothing that can be specifically called t’ien. Who can be the Lord 
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that commands things? Everything produces itself and is not created by others. 
This is the way of nature.”90  
This is exactly why the language and ideas of negative theology will not do, as negative 
theology still assumes something outside of all immanence and thus an ineffable and 
hyperessential reality, indescribable but in negative terms. 
Scholars have naturally focused on the first chapter of the Daodejing to provide 
readings of a negative theological nature. Does it not say that the dao which is real is 
ineffable and cannot be described by any of the impermanent things of this world? But as 
for example Brook Ziporyn says, the first lines could easily also be translated as: 
“Guiding ways can be taken as guides, but they are then [no longer] constant [or reliable] 
guides.”91 And even if we insist on reading these lines in some more traditional 
translation, it still does not mean that transcendence is necessarily meant. If we look at a 
standard translation like “The Way that can be spoken of is not the constant Way, names 
that can be named are not constant names,” we must not fail to notice that these lines do 
not say that there is something like a constant way or constant words. In fact, the second 
line is usually taken to mean that names are never constant, yet the first line, which has 
the same structure, is usually interpreted as hinting at a constant way that is just ineffable. 
There is an inconsistency in these traditional translations that inherently favours 
metaphysical readings. Now if we deny the idea of transcendence the first line can be 
taken to mean that dao is just the process of change, the ongoing process of all things 
happening, and as such, as the whole process (it) does not change, because ‘it’ ‘is’ 
change, open-ended. It can then also mean that when we speak of dao, we are already 
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creating a rupture in the processuality of the process, or in other words we are seeking to 
take one part of the process and see that particular part as the totality or as something 
beyond the totality. As chapter 42 of the Daodejing reminds us, one and many, or 
continuity and difference, have their same source in dao understood as process. Or as 
Zhuangzi said: “We have already become one, so how can I say anything? But I have just 
said that we are one, so how can I not be saying something? The one and what I said 
about it make two, and two and the original one make three.”92 The ineffability of dao 
need not mean anything else than the fact that the totality cannot be represented by any 
one of its parts. Or in other words, the recognition of a provisional pattern or continuity 
within change does not have to lead to positing such a pattern as a guiding principle 
outside of change. Even speaking of parts and totality would already introduce some sort 
of closure that is resisted by the processual understanding of dao, which, as said, is 
structurally open-ended. 
Denying transcendence for Hall and Ames however does not mean that they deny 
a religiousness or spirituality to the people of the classical Chinese culture. It is more a 
question of a mystical attitude, if we are fully clear about understanding mysticism in a 
non-transcendent way, thus as a way of thinking that is profoundly this-worldly. It might 
be that because of the historical background of the concept of mysticism we should 
discard the notion altogether, since it has usually been associated with other-worldly 
experiences, or expressions of unity with some metaphysical reality. Yet it need not be 
understood that way. We could understand mysticism or at least the Daoist mystical 
approach as propounding a unity, or continuity, or relativity in the form of relationality, 
found solely in this world, with no need for anything external. 
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A similar approach is taken by François Jullien, who argues also that although 
there is a way in which we can understand Daoism as mystical, it is definitely not the 
same mysticism as for example the Neo-Platonists. Although sometimes Jullien seems to 
employ the language of metaphysics, and although his reading of Daoism comes about 
through an Auseinandersetzung with the Neo-Platonists, he is careful to set them apart. 
For example, speaking about the ‘invisible’ dao, Jullien argues that “the invisible is 
indeed beyond the visible but as an extension of it; […] it transcends the sensible through 
its infinite capacity for transformation […], but it does not hypostatize. This invisible is 
rather the diffuse basis of the visible from which the latter ceaselessly actualizes itself. In 
short, this invisible lacks metaphysical consistency.”93 From this we can see that although 
Jullien uses the metaphysical language of transcendence, he does not endorse the 
metaphysical way of thinking. It might then be better to refrain from using the 
metaphysical language, as Ames and Hall urge us to do, yet the point is the same: we 
might be able to speak of mysticism with regards to Daoism, but it is not the same 
mysticism as in the Western tradition.94 
Despite these attacks on the idea of transcendence in Daoism, many scholars 
today still think it feasible to speak of dao explicitly as a transcendent reality. Although 
my own position is that the non-metaphysical reading is closer to the Daoist sensibilities 
as we can know them, to be consistent in my belief that the Daoist classics are inherently 
open to multiple interpretations I must admit the possibility of these metaphysical 
interpretations. Yet my criticism of seeing dao as a metaphysical reality lies with the 
exclusive claim to rightness that these interpretations often put forward. The entire 
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volume 29 of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (2002) is devoted to the topic “Tao and 
God.” In the preface Chung-Ying Cheng says that “Dao and God are two names that 
represent two forms of ultimate reality”,95 implying a profound similarity between these 
two notions. In the same volume, Robert Cummings Neville argues for a metaphysical 
interpretation of Daoism that would put it closer to negative theology, basing his 
arguments on the unnameable ‘Dao’ of the first chapter of the Daodejing. In his 
vocabulary, metaphysics is about the “development of hypotheses about the broadest 
characteristics of reality and their conditions,” where the “subject matter of metaphysics 
[is] anything real.”96 The perpetuation of transcendence thinking lies in the fact that in 
Neville’s approach, the “broadest characteristics” of ‘the Dao’ include the familiar 
splitting of dao in “the eternal unnameable and the temporal, mothering, nameable 
Dao,”97 an arbitrary splitting that only functions to facilitate the idea that the first dao is 
an ultimate reality.  
Another scholar who defends the transcendence approach is Eske Møllgaard, who 
in a very recent article has defended the view that Zhuangzi distinctly holds to 
transcendence views. Møllgaard’s idea of transcendence however is not the usual one 
Hall and Ames argue against, but more an immanent transcendence. Comparable to 
Heidegger’s Sein, Møllgaard argues that the “essential form of transcendence in Zhuangzi 
is the pure appearance of things, which transcends things without being some-thing 
beyond the realm of things.”98 This means that appearance, or the ‘being-so’ of things can 
not be reduced to those things themselves as purely individual things. This is Platonic in 
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the sense that there is an insistence that the idea or the ‘pure appearance’ of the thing has 
to be informed by some principle. The way Møllgaard states his idea of transcendence 
seems relatively ‘innocent,’ yet he goes on to insist that Zhuangzi also has a notion of 
transcendence that is more strict, even going so far as to take the metaphorical statements 
of Zhuangzi about a creator literally and calling the ‘pure appearance’ of the world “an 
act of pure grace.”99 He thereby conflates the softer version of transcendence with the 
stricter. As Hall and Ames have argued, this insertion of metaphysical vocabulary is 
unnecessary and only leads to confusion. Møllgaard for example argues that when 
Zhuangzi speaks of dao as the ‘realm before there are things,’ he is speaking of a 
metaphysical realm beyond and other than the myriad things, an idea many interpreters 
also read into for example chapter 25 of the Daodejing. But as we shall see shortly, we 
can also see the realm of ‘things’ as the realm of human distinction-making, and then we 
can see the realm of dao as the natural self-so (ziran) world before man turned to the 
arbitrary subject-object distinctions. In my view Møllgaard’s reading of the Zhuangzi is 
unjustifiably selective. When he argues that Zhuangzi sees human life as “misery”100 and 
that therefore man needs to hear and attune himself solely to the ‘pipings of heaven,’ he 
seems to be forgetting that, as we have seen already, Zhuangzi introduces this distinction 
between heaven and man in his second chapter only to question this kind of dubious 
distinction-making, something Møllgaard obviously does not question and this displays 
his (Western) tendency to view Daoism as ‘otherworldly.’ Yet a different way of living, 
something which Zhuangzi definitely promotes, does not need to lead to a notion of 
transcendence, and when Møllgaard notices a “tendency for transcendence as the pure 
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emergence and being-so of the thing to slip into transcendence as an agency and cause 
beyond the thing,”101 he seems more than willing to promote this tendency.102 The pure 
appearance of things is not something that can happen without the things, or rather 
processes, and seeing things as processes solves much of Møllgaard’s dilemma. He still 
works with the idea of a strict identity of things, and in order for him to explain how 
these things develop, he needs the ‘pure appearance’ to guarantee their unity over time. 
There is however no necessity to see ‘pure appearance,’ if we insist on this term, in 
transcendent ways. 
We have already seen that identity or unity as Western concepts can not (and 
should not) be transposed as easily into classical Chinese philosophy as some would like. 
The same also holds for other terms. Neither term of the Western metaphysical pair of 
Being and Nothing has any strict equivalents in classical Chinese thinking. Nor is the 
idea of Being as opposed to Nothing prominent, and thus the relation between Being and 
Nothing in the West is also different from that of the supposed equivalents, you and wu, 
or shi (this) and fei (that). Graham, as we have seen briefly before, has argued extensively 
that to conflate these terms with the Western ontological notions Being and Nothing is to 
make mistakes at two levels.103 First of all, the terms to be translated from the classical 
Chinese, although they have certain overlaps with Being and Nothing, do not precisely fit 
these Western notions, and neither is there a copulative verb ‘to be,’ on which much of 
Western philosophy as metaphysics or ontology depends, to be found in classical 
Chinese. You does not mean Being as an ontological category, it means more ‘to have’ or 
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‘to be present,’ and thus should not be conflated with defining existence pure and simple. 
The same goes for wu. It means ‘not have’ or ‘not present,’ again not signalling a pure 
denial of ontological existence, but rather a pragmatic approach to things and events. We 
can see that different categories are at work. So if the Daodejing says that ‘being comes 
from non-being,’ this can be read as meaning that something was non-existent before it 
became existent, and in due time it will return to its state of non-existence again. All 
things, then, when present, come from and return to being not-present. There is no need 
to read in this wu anything transcendent with ontological implications. 
The second reason why the Chinese terms used in Daoism differ from the 
Western structures is in their mutual relations. Whereas in the latter tradition there has 
been a focus on Being, which implied a hierarchy that says Being is better or more 
valuable than non-being, in the former we do not find such a hierarchy. The yin-yang 
cosmology of the Daoist worldview sees both you and wu as mutually defining structures 
that are interdependent and can never be disconnected. The same goes for shi and fei. 
Ideally, in the Daoist way of thinking, to see things as ‘this’ means also to realise that 
from a different standpoint, they are ‘that.’ So both ‘this’ and ‘that’ are always relative to 
each other, everything is always both ‘this’ and ‘that.’ 
Of course, as I have mentioned briefly earlier in this chapter, it is insufficient to 
merely state different views from different scholars of Chinese thinking about 
transcendence and metaphysics and choose the one we like best. That would amount to 
underwriting the sometimes highly selective reading of certain scholars. We must 
therefore look for more textual evidence in both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi that 
notions of transcendence, metaphysical reality and negative theology do not fit 
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philosophical Daoism, or at the very least are not required for an understanding of these 
classics. 
Chapter 2 of the Daodejing has the following line: “Determinacy (you) and 
indeterminacy (wu) give rise to each other.”104 This shows that there is a mutual 
dependency between the two terms that does not readily admit of favouring one over the 
other, however much that may be our Western inclination. Chapter 11 is also about the 
relation between something you and nothing wu: 
“The thirty spokes converge at one hub, 
But the utility of the cart is a function of the nothingness (wu) inside the hub. 
We throw clay to shape a pot, 
But the utility of the clay pot is a function of the nothingness inside it. 
We bore out doors and windows to make a dwelling, 
But the utility of the dwelling is a function of the nothingness inside it. 
Thus, it might be something (you) that provides the value,  
But it is nothing that provides the utility.”105 
This chapter has often been read as suggesting that ‘Being’ is inferior to ‘Nothing,’ since 
nothing (wu) provides the ‘utility’ of the being in question. Yet something (you) also 
provides the value, without the something there would be no utility of the nothing. It is 
only in the working together of you and wu that utility arises. Another chapter worth 
looking at is chapter 40:  
“”Returning” is how way-making (dao) moves,  
And “weakening” is how it functions.  
The events of the world arise from the determinate (you), 
                                                
104 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 80, italics in original. Other translations have something along the lines 
of “Being and Non-Being produce each other,” for example Chan 1963 and Duyvendak 1954. 
105 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 91, italics in original. 
 181
And the determinate arises from the indeterminate (wu).”106 
Again it might be suggested that wu is what produces you, and that therefore wu is 
logically or metaphysically prior to you. Yet looking at the whole chapter, we see that it 
says that dao works by returning. This returning is however not a one-way stream, which 
we can read in chapter 34, where it is said that “Way-making (dao) is an easy-flowing 
stream, [w]hich can run in any direction.”107 This suggests that both wu returns to you 
and you returns to wu within the yin-yang cosmological worldview that is present in the 
Daodejing. The process is reversible, something which can also be read in chapter 42. 
Dao, taken as impermanence of conventionality, of language, of things, does not admit of 
a permanent hierarchy between things. There are different events, different daos, not just 
one guiding principle. As Hall and Ames have put it, “dao constitutes the noncoherent 
sum of all names and forms,” and dao is “the process of the world itself.”108 If this is so, 
there is no justification in taking wu more serious than you, or in taking them to differ on 
any ontological level, since they are both part of, and together constantly forming the 
whole. 
Yet with all this impermanence and provisionality the question of reference arises, 
and we must ask: ‘is there anything to which the word dao refers?’ The answer to this 
question can only be: ‘nothing but different daos and the constant, open-ended play of 
these provisional structures of signification.’ Hansen explains how “[t]he belief in a 
single, absolute tao/way…”109 has blurred alternative readings. In his own reading of the 
Zhuangzi he says this: 
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“Chuang-tzu neither presupposes nor does his doctrine entail that a single 
ineffable Tao exists, nor that there is such a thing as knowledge of a single, 
ultimate Tao, nor that we ought to follow such a Tao, and so on. In short, 
Chuang-tzu’s theory is not about The Tao. Another way to put this point is this: 
“The Tao” or “The Way,” as used by most English speakers who choose to speak 
of such things, is not the correct translation of the Chinese character tao/way as 
found in this text.”110  
The question of reference is not so much denied, but rather blurred, as dao refers to 
numerous daos, not just one. We can also read this in Graham’s assertion that “even the 
Way is interdependent with man.”111 This means that different people can also differ in 
their interpretation of ‘the way,’ or as Zhuangzi said: “The Way comes about as we walk 
it.”112 Reference is thus also relational or situational, it is not something permanent. As 
has been noted, meaning in the classical Chinese worldview comes about by placing 
things in their context, and not by abstracting them from it. Ames and Hall translate dao 
as ‘way-making,’ and this also shows their focus on the structural impermanence of dao. 
Any dao is a new particular field opened and there is thus no one permanent field which 
we have to discover. Since this is so, all language and thus all reference is situational. Or 
as Zhuangzi says in the story of the happy fish: “I knew it from up above the Hao 
[river].”113 The language of focus and field, which Ames and Hall employ, or of 
particularity and its constituted order can be helpful to explain this. Since every particular 
has an equal ontological status, views about almost anything can and will differ. This is 
also why Ames and Hall have opted to translate dao as ‘way-making,’ in order to point to 
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a number of features of Daoist thinking that other translations have overlooked. First of 
all, as we have seen, this translation has the merit of understanding dao as something 
which does not have a separate status from active living, in this case of humans (but who 
says that animals or other things do not have their ‘way-making’?). Humans make the 
way, it is not something laid out before them. Second, this feature means that ways are 
ever changing, evolving in different directions according to changing times and other 
unknown or uncontrollable forces. This does not mean there is no order, but that any 
order is relative. I will quote Hall and Ames extensively:  
“While the articulation and stabilizing regularity of any specific event anticipates 
the way in which it will continue to unfold, the chaotic aspect within the event 
itself defeats any notion of necessity or absolute predictability. The combination 
of pattern and uncertainty challenges the possibility of universal claims and 
renders precarious any globalizing generalizations. All we can depend upon is the 
relative stability of site-specific and particular expressions of order, with constant 
attention to stochastic variables at every level that well might amplify into large-
scale changes. Order is thus both local and focal.”114 
Related to this, ‘way-making’ also brings out the verbal or gerundative qualities of dao, 
thus strongly favouring a process ontology, which has more resonance in the Daoist 
worldview, over a substance ontology. 
We must again proceed to provide some textual evidence for this reading by 
reinterpreting (with Ames and Hall, Hansen, Duyvendak and others) parts of the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. I will focus on what are usually seen as pivotal chapters, but 
will also look at chapters that are traditionally overlooked. In the case of the Daodejing, I 
                                                
114
 Hall & Ames 1998, 250, italics in original. 
 184
would like to reinterpret the first chapter according to Duyvendak’s interpretation which 
conceives of dao as the process of change. As he says, dao “is not a First Cause, it is not 
a Logos. It is nothing but the process of change and growth.”115 Herrlee Creel finds the 
difference in translation (especially of the character chang) with standard readings of no 
importance,116 but I disagree and think it is important as it makes for a different reading. 
It is very different whether you say in the standard version: “the dao which can be spoken 
of is not the constant dao” or whether you take serious Duyvendak’s translation, which 
has: “the Way that may truly be regarded as the Way is other than a permanent Way.”117 
It is the ‘other than permanent’ aspect of this translation which brings to it a non-
metaphysical ring. The theme of constancy and especially the way in which it is 
interpreted can reveal a metaphysical inclination towards seeing dao as an unchanging 
guiding principle behind the myriad things, whereas seeing dao as the process of change 
proposes to undo that metaphysical idea. Hansen similarly insists that this problem of 
change is not metaphysical in nature:  
“No philosophical problem arises from the mere fact that change takes place in a 
part-whole ontology. Stuff changes. But that observation, by itself, raises no 
philosophical difficulty. The perennial Western problem lies in explaining how 
the object can remain the very same object while its constituent stuff flows in and 
out. Daoist worries about constancy and inconstancy, however, did not arise out 
of that familiar Western conceptual framework. […] They worry about linguistic 
constancy, not object constancy.”118 
This suggests that the idea of constancy as an essence or unchanging reality behind 
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appearance, a metaphysical realm, is not an issue in Daoist thinking.   
Duyvendak’s translation has the further merit of making good sense of the 
parallel structure of the first twelve characters of chapter 1 of the Daodejing, and I have 
already alluded to the fact that the form of the classics is important in understanding 
meaning, in that the poetry and verse have definite functions. If names are not constant, 
and the whole Daoist tradition suggests that we should indeed see language as 
provisional, then what is the point of speaking of the ‘Real’ name? There is no such 
thing. And if we follow the parallel structure, then the same thing would go for dao. 
Since daos are not constant, there is no reason why there should be an overarching 
constant dao other than the whole process of wanwu. Or as Zhuangzi says:  
“The Way is without beginning or end, but things have their life and death—you 
cannot rely upon their fulfilment. One moment empty, the next moment full—
you cannot depend on their form. The years cannot be held off; time cannot be 
stopped. Decay, growth, fullness, and emptiness end and then begin again. It is 
thus that we must describe the plan of the Great Meaning and discuss the 
principles of the ten thousand things. The life of things is a gallop, a headlong 
dash—with every moment they alter, with every moment they shift. What should 
you do and what should you not do? Everything will change of itself, that is 
certain!”119  
There is nothing other than transformation and humans are no exception to this 
transformation, humans are neither somewhere outside of this process, nor is there an 
overarching principle behind it all. The regularity in the process is not something other 
than the process. To end this section, a few more passages where Zhuangzi puts this idea 
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forward:  
“Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, 
wilfulness, candor, insolence—music from empty holes, mushrooms springing 
up in darkness, day and night replacing each other before us, and no one knows 
where they sprout from. Let it be! Let it be!”120 
“Then the four seasons will rise one after the other, the ten thousand things will 
take their turn at living. Now flourishing, now decaying […] At the end, no tail; 
at the beginning, no head; now dead, now alive […] its constancy is unending, 
yet there is nothing that can be counted on.”121 
The Alpha-to-Omega teleology typical of Western thinking, and conducive to an 
invention of a ‘First Cause’ or ‘origin’ as a metaphysical principle ‘that can be counted 
on,’ is absent in Laozi and Zhuangzi, because dao as the process itself does not aim at 
anything, it is nothing more than constant change. How to deal with that change is being 
shifting yourself, and that is where the gate-way character comes in.  
3.3.3 INSIDE & OUTSIDE: THE GATEWAY (MEN). 
The inconstancy of the world and of language are things that any Daoist sage should 
acknowledge and try to attune to. In this part I would like to pay special attention to the 
situational character of Daoism, and how Daoists should live the relationality which Hall 
and Ames speak of. In its language, in its non-metaphysical approach, Daoism considers 
the interrelatedness of all things, and thus also of humans with those things. Humans are 
part of the whole process of dao, so they are neither pure Being nor pure Non-being, 
neither this nor that, neither purely natural, nor purely conventional. Be the male, but 
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preserve the female. Or in another way, they are both of these yin-yang opposites. Being 
neither this nor that, humans should see dao is always the in-between that itself is not, 
nothing else than the inter-play of things and processes. Humans stand in awe and 
deference of this process and naturally seek some harmony. Some kind of balance 
between opposing dichotomies is sought after, yet the Daoist is well aware of the shifting 
state of this balance, since the balance itself is equally prone to the fate which always 
tends to upset this balance in favour of one or the other of the extremes.  
In my opinion the point of the first chapter of the Zhuangzi is to show that there is 
difference in understanding, that conventional understanding will not get beyond itself, 
and that there is a need to overcome this restricted way of thinking. The bird Peng and the 
fish Kun have many more capabilities than their counterparts, the smaller animals. Yet 
Peng and Kun too are in some way restricted, as is Liezi’s flying exercise. And their 
hugeness effectively prevents them from being able to do what the small animals do. 
Therefore I think the first chapter of the Zhuangzi is meant to show a preference for the 
overall view, or for the bigger picture, but this bigger picture is not something beyond all 
different perspectives, but rather a wider or broader view which acknowledges different 
views, which entails equally an awareness of the situatedness of all thinking, as the 
Autumn Floods chapter and numerous other instances suggest: 
“A beam or a pillar can be used to batter down a city wall, but it is no good for 
stopping up a little hole—this refers to a difference in function. Thoroughbreds 
like Qiji and Hualiu could gallop a thousand li in one day, but when it came to 
catching rats they were no match for the wildcat or the weasel—this refers to a 
difference in skill. The horned owl catches fleas at night and can spot the tip of a 
hair, but when daylight comes, no matter how wide it opens its eyes, it cannot see 
 188
a mound or a hill—this refers to a difference in nature. Now do you say that you 
are going to make Right your master and do away with Wrong, or make Order 
your master and do away with Disorder? If you do, then you have not understood 
the principle of heaven and earth or the nature of the ten thousand things. This is 
like saying that you are going to make Heaven your master and do away with 
Earth, or make Yin your master and do away with Yang. Obviously it is 
impossible.”122 
Although the preference thus seems to be one side of the dichotomy or opposition, it is 
both sides which are needed and the equilibrium and harmony between the different 
functions, skills and natures that is sought. Although Jullien seems to favour the view that 
this is not about harmony, but about “an aspiration toward going beyond the limits,”123 
which would warrant placing him back into the metaphysical tradition, he acknowledges 
both the ‘harmony’ view I have in mind and the ‘going beyond’ view he seems to 
espouse: “From one angle or another, the goal is to open up points of view to rejoin 
vision; to return from exclusive perspectives to globality — that of the Tao — in which 
all are equally possible.”124 In both cases, no metaphysical principle is invoked or 
needed.125 One side is merely privileged since the other side needs to be reigned in. Is it a 
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coincidence that the legendary Laozi was stopped by the “gatekeeper”126 and that this 
gatekeeper persuaded him to write down his teachings before he definitely moved to the 
other side of the gate? And that the gatekeeper said to him: “As you are about to leave the 
world behind, could you write a book for my sake?”127 I take this to mean that the Daoist 
gatekeeper wanted to know how to stay at his post, the gate, from where he could respond 
to the diverse challenges that would inevitably come to him, yet without turning this into 
a fixed dogmatic position.  
The whole Daodejing is concerned with polar opposites of the yin-yang character, 
but the point is not so much to favour one of the opposites over the other. Western 
interpreters have often understood the Daodejing in this hierarchical manner, and have 
mostly argued that the Daoists favour the other side of the dichotomy more than or over 
the side which the West has always favoured, perhaps as these interpreters were 
searching for an alternative, but could not break themselves loose from thinking in 
hierarchies. Although some of the language suggests this, as there is much more focus on 
the yin character traits that one should develop, in the end it is the equilibrium or 
tranquillity jing that is sought after, it is to be skilful in staying at the threshold. As 
chapter 42 of the Daodejing says: “Everything carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its 
arms [a]nd blends these vital energies (qi) together to make them harmonious (he).”128 
The harmony of this place for which the gateway stands as a metaphor, should however 
not be understood as a permanently fixed place, it shifts according to situation and brings 
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out the harmony which is itself a blending of differences “so that they come together with 
mutual benefit and enhancement without losing their separate and particular 
identities.”129 The harmony thus does not seek to deny or resolve the differences, but to 
bring them out.  
According to Ames and Hall, “[t]he swinging gateway […] is where and when 
dao spontaneously “opens out” to provide creativity a space through which to make its 
‘entrance,’ qualifying the processive nature of dao with the immediacy and specificity of 
the creative act.”130 To be constantly experiencing afresh means to be constantly alert to 
dogmatic fixations that would close off avenues to the future, and thus it means to stay at 
the threshold of possibility. The creativity Ames and Hall mention would be that 
openness and responsiveness to whatever would come to be experienced, the inclination 
to maximise the possibilities of what is offered without imposing on what offers itself. 
The gateway is thus not to be understood as a threshold between this world and another 
one of transcendent quality, nor to be seen as some escapist hiding place in pure 
tranquillity, detached from the world. Like the yuan source, which is more like a yuan 
spring, a fluid and earthly source, than a fixed principle, the gateway is that shifting place 
between reversing opposites. That this place is itself equally prone to changes and shifts 
in perspective can be read from the following quote from the Yuandao:  
“In the innumerable different directions there are countless changes,  
Untrammeled I am in no fixed position.  
I alone am in great spirits, and leaving things behind,  
Travel along the same path as dao.”131  
                                                
129
 Ames & Rosemont 1998, 56. 
130
 Ames & Hall 2003, 59, italics in original. 
131 Yuandao, Lau & Ames 1998, 117, italics in original. 
 191
Not to be in a fixed position is to follow along with the myriad processes as they unfold, 
neither escaping or keeping away, nor attaching to the specific instances. The Daoist 
sage, in another metaphor, keeps to the root and acknowledges his place: “The myriad 
things have their progenitor, yet he alone knows to abide by the root; The events of the 
world have a source out of which they come, yet he alone knows to abide by the 
gateway.”132 One other thing that might be argued in favour of my reading is the relation 
between presence and non-presence. As I have argued, presence comes about through 
non-presence and vice-versa. That moment between existing and not yet existing can also 
be conceived as going through a gateway, and if we understand this moment in a non-
metaphysical way, that gateway is again the final thing we can say about things: 
“The convergence of the myriad things 
Goes through a single aperture; 
The roots of the various happenings 
All issue forth from a single gateway.”133  
Things come into existence from the gateway. The interesting thing I find most in favour 
of a non-metaphysical interpretation is that there never seems to be mention of anything 
beyond this gateway, it is the gateway itself that is the final port of call. We can also read 
this in the first chapter of the Daodejing. The standard or metaphysical interpretation of 
Daoism would have it that the gateway would be that place between the ‘real’ dao and 
the artificial language used to describe it. Yet I have tried to show that both language and 
dao are constitutive of that gateway in a different way. The gateway is the meeting place 
of man and dao exactly through language. At least this is how I would interpret the last 
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lines of chapter 1 of the Daodejing: “These two—the nameless and what is named—
emerge from the same source yet are referred to differently. Together they are called 
obscure. The obscurest of the obscure, [t]hey are the swinging gateway of the manifold 
mysteries.”134 The nameless and the named, although the most obscure, are the 
innerworldly gateway. Notice that these lines do not say that they come from somewhere 
else through the gateway, but that they are the gateway. 
Yet there is a slight problem in putting so much emphasis on this gateway 
character. First of all, it is obviously just one of many metaphors used in describing dao 
and/or the Daoist sage. Yet I have tried to argue that it is an important one. The other 
problem arises when we have to explain the lines in chapter 52 of the Daodejing, which 
are repeated in chapter 56: “Block up the openings, [a]nd shut the gateways, [a]nd to the 
end of your days your energies will not be used up.”135 These lines seem to offer a 
somewhat negative understanding of the gateway. Yet we can explain this in the 
following way: to shut the gateway is to make sure one is not disturbed or influenced by 
external factors and by arbitrary fixations. As Ames and Hall explain, it is to “conserve 
one’s vital energies and to avoid depletion that is caused by externally induced 
agitation”136 which does not mean a retreat to ‘the inner circle’ but an awareness of the 
possible consequences of attaching to various external values and things. Standing in the 
gateway as I have tried to explain it is also exactly this awareness and the ability to 
respond to what comes your way in ever differing appropriateness. 
Now for the Daoist sage, the way to get to this ever shifting place is by asking 
(wen) and hearing (wen), and I want to focus on these characters and especially on the 
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‘space-between’ (jian) character as characters that are paronomastically close to the 
gateway character. Chapter 5 of the Daodejing talks about the ‘space-between’ heaven 
and earth as man’s abode. The ‘space-between’ character is closely related to the gateway 
character and should therefore be seen as that shifting place that is itself nothing, but 
from which all diversity issues. Chapter 10 has the lines: “With nature’s [tian] gates 
swinging open and closed, Are you able to remain the female?”137 This is usually 
understood as suggesting that one should keep to the yin side of the dichotomy, yet it can 
also be understood as suggesting that one should not venture beyond tian as the realm of 
heaven and earth towards some otherworldly entity or principle, something which can 
also be read in chapter 73: “Tian’s net is cast wide, [a]nd although coarse in its mesh, 
nothing slips through it.”138 The mother and the female can thus also be read as being 
metaphors for a this-worldly approach that I have been arguing for as characteristic of 
Daoism. This approach and the idea of the in-between shall feature prominently in the 
comparison with Heidegger and Derrida. 
The character for hearing (wen) is normally used in the Daodejing just for the 
faculty of hearing, yet in some instances it is better understood as learning or knowing, 
specifically against the knowing (zhi) that is common knowledge. This seems to be the 
case in chapters 41 and 48, where learning (about) dao is specifically connected to 
hearing. Another character close to the gateway is wen, asking. Although not prominent 
in the Daodejing, it does appear in the appendix that Ames and Hall added in their 
translation, which was part of the 1993 Guodian archaeological find. All these characters, 
hearing, space-between, asking, are paronomastically related to the gateway, which 
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means that we can further our understanding of this position by seeing it as something in 
which openness and willingness to hear, learn and ask ever anew are important features. 
Chapter 58 has another related character translated often as ‘muddled.’ This again 
exploits the inherent vagueness of such a position as a positive thing, in the same way as 
the gateway, and dao, are said to be obscure and mysterious. Wing-tsit Chan translates 
this character as “non-discriminative and dull.”139 
Chapter 25 of the Daodejing talks about dao as if it was prior to the world. Yet we 
have to understand this differently, in the sense that dao itself is not the metaphysical 
entity that seems to be suggested here, because it is not the endpoint since dao itself is 
modelled on what is ziran, so of itself. I think therefore that this chapter speaks about dao 
before man introduced the distinction between heaven and earth and placed himself in the 
middle. So dao is not earlier than what is natural or self-so of the world, it is only earlier 
than artificial distinctions. In my opinion this is also why some metaphysical language 
seems to get used under erasure in Daoism. I am thinking of the frequent occurrence of 
constructions in which, in translation,140 the verb ‘seeming’ plays an important role. In 
chapter 4 of the Daodejing it is said of dao that ‘it’ ‘seems’ the predecessor of wanwu, 
and that ‘it’ ‘seems’ only to persist. Chapter 6, speaking of the gateway and root 
character of dao, also says ‘it’ just ‘seems’ to be there. And as chapter 14 tells us, the 
reason for this seeming is that dao as the whole process is beyond determination, and 
being indeterminate ‘it’ cannot be determined by anything determinate. Things are not 
what they seem to be, and this is especially so for dao or tian and similar concepts, which 
can too easily be misunderstood as standing for determinate entities or principles. But 
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what Daoism tells us is that since language only works through such determinations, we 
must use it carefully and not lose sight of its metaphorical nature.141  
In the Zhuangzi the gateway (men) character mostly occurs in its ordinary use of 
door, or gateway, although there are a number of instances where the more philosophical 
use I am focusing on can be found. Tianmen, the gate of heaven, is mentioned in chapters 
14 and 23. In chapter 14 it is said: “Only he who complies with the Great Change and 
allows no blockage” is able to follow dao. “If the mind cannot accept this fact, then the 
doors (men) of Heaven will never open.”142 In chapter 23 we can read that dao has “no 
source, […] no place where it resides, […] no beginning or end,”143 and as such it is 
called “the Heavenly Gate.”144 The message is similar to that of the Daodejing: the 
artificiality of making fixed distinctions between this and that, right and wrong is 
attacked, and in its place comes an understanding of the world that focuses on 
acknowledging the open-ended process nature of dao. To have this understanding is to 
reach the ‘gate of heaven.’ The sage should therefore seek a position which allows him to 
see both ‘this’ and ‘that.’ This state “is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is 
fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly.”145 So Zhuangzi is also speaking of the 
gateway, or at least of the hinge, itself not anything, but still imperative as a 
responsiveness to the process of change. In chapter 33 it is even said the sage will “make 
Heaven his source, Virtue his root, and the Way his gate (men), revealing himself through 
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change and transformation.”146 With the indecision and undecidability between ‘this’ and 
‘that’ Zhuangzi argues for a similar ‘in-between’ stance that sees the processes of the 
world as ever changing. Thus, things are never strict identities, they are always in motion 
and thus always becoming something other than what they are. In that sense the processes 
form an ever shifting gateway between the opposite forces of yin and yang. This is what 
is meant by seeing things not as ‘being,’ but more as ‘becoming.’ Since this is ziran, the 
sage should thus identify with this becoming or transformation, so as to overcome the 
narrow perspective of identity as unchanging. Things as processes have no strict 
boundaries, there is a necessary vagueness or penumbra that Zhuangzi explores 
extensively,147 and which precludes the permanence of our artificial naming of them, and 
thus precludes our seeing them as fixed entities. In Zhuangzi’s terms, the processes of the 
world are always somewhere between the potter’s wheel and the grindstone of nature, 
between emerging and vanishing. The sage’s job is to see both this emerging and 
vanishing as equally necessary. A similar idea is expressed in the Yuandao chapter of the 
Huainanzi: 
“Thus, where the attention of the spirit is directed toward the small, it is oblivious 
to the big; Where it is directed toward the internal, it is oblivious to what’s going 
on externally; Where it is directed toward what is above, it is oblivious to what is 
below; Where it is directed toward the left, it is oblivious to the right. It is only 
when there is no place that the spirit does not fill that there is nowhere toward 
which the focus is not directed.”148  
The trick is thus not to escape the realm of the human into something other, it is not to go 
                                                
146 Zhuangzi, Watson 1968, 362, Romanisation added. 
147
 For a discussion of vagueness and penumbra in the Zhuangzi, see Coutinho 2004. 
148 Yuandao, Lau & Ames 1998, 133, translation slightly modified. 
 197
to the other side of the gate and try to stay in the ‘heavens,’ but it is to have that knack to 
respond to differing situations, which demands both internal and external attention. In 
chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi there is mention of dao, and it is called “Peace-in-Strife.”149 
The idea of this is to be able to follow the ever changing equilibrium between yin and 
yang forces, something which can also be read in chapter 11, where the “dark and 
mysterious gate” 150 is exactly the passage from yang to yin (and of course this passage is 
reversible). This idea of responsiveness which the sage embodies is being sometimes a 
companion of Heaven, sometimes a companion of man, but more likely a bit of both, 
according to the shifting circumstances. This is why Zhuangzi advocates following the 
“torch of chaos and doubt.”151 And it is also why Zhuangzi has Kuan-yin, the keeper of 
the gate, saying:  
“Within yourself, no fixed positions:  
Things as they take shape disclose themselves.  
Moving, be like water,  
Still, be like a mirror,  
Respond like an echo.”152 
Again, by arguing for the importance of an inner-worldly understanding of this gateway 
character, I am in fact arguing that non-metaphysical readings of Daoism are coherent 
and supported by textual evidence.  
3.4 CONCLUDING DAOISM. 
To conclude this chapter I would like to suggest the following: by offering at least the 
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possibility of a different reading of the Daoist classics and way of thinking, I hope to 
have shown that traditional metaphysical interpretations are in many ways biased. The 
language, worldview and philosophical background that have often been employed in 
translating and explaining the Chinese classics to a Western audience are not necessarily 
those of the Chinese themselves. In fact, we have found that their ideas of the world and 
their place in it are profoundly different, a thing which we can only fully appreciate if we 
are both aware of, and willing to a large extent to let go of, our own prejudices.  
As the Daoists argued against what they considered the artificial Confucian 
strictness of public life, in similar ways did Heidegger and Derrida struggle against the 
prevailing opinions in the societies of their respective times. Heidegger and Derrida 
specifically argued against the metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy. The Daoists 
had no such need, since they were not taking aim at a metaphysical tradition to start with.  
So although in different circumstances, these struggles in all cases resulted in a non-
metaphysical interpretation of the world and man’s place in it.  
In chapter 4 my focus will be on the interaction of Derrida, Heidegger and 
Daoism, to get a better understanding of their respective approaches and see the 
similarities that arise from understanding Daoism in a non-metaphysical way. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THINKING, PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE: COMPARING HEIDEGGER, 
DERRIDA AND CLASSICAL DAOISM.  
“Then everything would hinge on reaching a corresponding saying of language. 
Only a dialogue could be such a saying correspondence. But, patently, a dialogue 
with its own particular character. […] And it would remain of minor importance 
whether the dialogue is before us in writing, or whether it was spoken at some 
time and has now faded. […] Because the one thing that matters is whether this 
dialogue, be it written or spoken or neither, remains constantly coming.”1  
“What then, is this encounter with the absolutely-other? Neither representation, 
nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the same.”2  
“Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with 
him.”3  
In this chapter I will focus on how the previous interpretations of Heidegger, Derrida and 
Daoism can yield an interesting comparison which might aid the underlying ideas of 
comparative philosophy. I anticipate that the ideas behind comparative philosophy will be 
subjected to some rethinking, but that this rethinking should be understood as a 
strengthening of these ideas through a better understanding both of their functioning and 
of the dangers implicit in comparative philosophy. The areas of comparison between 
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Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism that are the most promising are those that bear upon the 
ideas of what philosophy and thinking are or should be, and those connected to ideas of 
language. These two areas will first be explored and will then be used as a ground for 
further comparisons opened up by the readings of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism that I 
have proposed, eventually looking at the possible ethical and political implications of 
these ways of thinking.  
In the previous chapters I have argued how a different understanding of language 
is needed to fully explore the possible relations between Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism. 
One of the points I will make in this chapter is that none of the protagonists of this 
dissertation deny the value of language; instead they are acutely aware of the importance 
of language in shaping thought. Yet they do wish to point to the limitations of ‘everyday’ 
language and its reference structure, and with that they point to the possibilities that arise 
from a thorough thinking through of, and thereby a different view and use of, language.  
This comparison will necessarily return to the notion of Auseinandersetzung. 
Derrida would likely say that the Heideggerian notion of Auseinandersetzung is 
tantamount to working within the metaphysical structures of identities as the notion 
seems to imply two different cultural identities. Yet in the first chapter I have shown how 
through a clearer understanding of what Heidegger meant by Auseinandersetzung we can 
deny or amend this incomplete reading of Auseinandersetzung. An Auseinandersetzung 
does not presuppose two different identities; it is more that the identities are side-effects 
of the more primordial or more originary4 Auseinandersetzung or Polemos. In the same 
                                                
4 As the reader may have noticed, I prefer to translate the Heideggerian “Ursprünglich” by ‘originary’ 
rather than ‘primordial,’ but will keep to translations as they have appeared, adding the German when 
necessary. 
 201
way différance is the more original play of the world, of which particular differences are 
the consequences and not the causes. 
I hope to show that Heidegger is more viably compared with the Daodejing and 
that Derrida’s thoughts are more in line with those of the Zhuangzi. This is an important 
point, because although not necessarily historically the same in both situations, it would 
seem that Derrida and the Zhuangzi are in some philosophical way the descendants of 
Heidegger and the Daodejing respectively, so we could expect some particular 
similarities. By seeing the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi in this way I am not trying to 
impose the very complex connection between Heidegger and Derrida on Chinese history. 
But I do think that in an important way the Zhuangzi is expanding and progressing on 
ideas found in the Daodejing, and that to see this development in a comparison with the 
development from Heidegger to Derrida can lead to a better understanding of both.  
Although I have presented both Heidegger and Laozi as proposing a non-
metaphysical thinking, we have to realise there is the distinct possibility to read in both 
Heidegger and Laozi some remnants of metaphysical thinking, or in other words, there 
are certain passages open to a metaphysical interpretation, which later scholars have 
followed up, at the expense of non-metaphysical readings. As we saw earlier, Derrida, 
although highly appreciative of Heidegger’s thinking, nevertheless sees him as to a 
certain extent stuck in metaphysics, and Laozi has often been interpreted as expounding a 
metaphysical view of dao. And even in the Zhuangzi there is talk of a ‘creator.’ But if my 
understanding of Heidegger, Derrida, Laozi and Zhuangzi is correct, these metaphysical 
interpretations lose much of their plausibility. 
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In order to see and fully appreciate these problems in comparing Heidegger, 
Derrida and Daoism, we must then first take a closer look at some comparisons that have 
already been offered between Heidegger and/or Derrida on the one hand, and Chinese 
philosophy in general and Daoism in particular on the other hand.   
4.1 METAPHYSICS, DIFFERENCE AND COMPARISONS.  
“Derrida’s deconstructive grammatology […] seeks an absolute interiorization of 
writing as an autonomous act.”5  
Does it really? Actually it does not. Of the many comparisons that have been made 
between Daoism and Heidegger and/or Derrida,6 most of these have tried to establish, in 
the case of Heidegger, that dao is similar to Being (Sein) or Way (Weg), or, in the case of 
Derrida, that dao is similar to differance or trace. While this is naturally to be expected, 
the fact has been that in the process of doing so, in many cases metaphysical ideas of 
presence and origin have been reinstated, in direct contradiction to the Heideggerian and 
Derridean non-dualist, non-metaphysical ways of thinking in the West. In other instances, 
comparisons have sought to infer relations beyond the actual similarities in ways that are 
not always valid, that have overlooked important differences. In other words, it is my 
opinion that some of these comparisons have in important ways distorted the views of 
Heidegger, Derrida and of Daoism by either reappropriating them to the metaphysical 
tradition, or by inferring more affinity than is called for. This section will look at specific 
                                                
5 Jung 1984, 220. 
6 For examples of these comparisons, and in general of comparative studies of Heidegger or Derrida with 
Chinese philosophy, I refer the reader to the bibliography. 
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instances where this has happened in comparisons of Heidegger and/or Derrida with 
Daoism.   
4.1.1 DIFFERENCE AND COMPARISON. 
In comparative philosophy we must foremost not lose sight of the important differences 
in cultural approaches to thinking, and here that means we must actively be aware of the 
differences that pertain between the three participants in this particular intercultural 
dialogue. Differences in background assumptions need to be explored, differences in 
form, style and goals, as well as historical differences. For example, the anxiety (Angst) 
that Heidegger sees as a fundamental characteristic of Dasein in his earlier work, seems 
to be a very Western, twentieth century phenomenon that has to do with the sense of loss 
of foundation. The apprehension that Chinese thinkers might have concerning living out 
their years or concerning their political surroundings is nowhere the same. Another 
difference that is obvious is the individualist approach of Heidegger, because although 
Dasein is always Mitsein (being together), there is nevertheless a profound 
individualisation taking place in much of Heidegger’s early work, where Dasein is only 
authentically itself as possibility in its understanding as an individualised entity.  
Another difference is found in focus. Where Daoists seem to put emphasis on the 
continuum rather than the differences between the parts of the continuum, Heidegger and 
Derrida focus their efforts on the deconstruction of this sort of continuum as it has been 
perceived by metaphysics, in the sense of a unity and identity that is independent of 
actual differences. Both difference and continuity are implied though, both by Heidegger 
and Derrida as well as the Daoists. It is merely a matter of both the historical and 
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philosophical background in each different case dictating the focal approach. One reason 
for this could be that Heidegger and Derrida were actively engaged in a struggle with 
metaphysics, whereas for the Chinese thinkers such a struggle did not exist in the same 
way. 
In itself the idea that highly complicated and controversial notions such as 
Heidegger’s Sein, Derrida’s différance and the Daoist notion of dao could mean the same 
is naïve to say the least. Yet while most thinkers who have compared Heidegger and 
Derrida with Daoism do not really make this mistake, they still argue for a seeming 
overlap between some of these notions, which needs to be taken with extreme caution, 
especially since the translations of these terms into English (or into any other one natural 
language) already make it easier to ‘find’ similarities. This danger of re-appropriating 
different ways of thinking through translation must constantly keep us on guard. But if 
the similarities are merely found in the supposed vagueness and ensuing difficulty for 
common or rational understanding to come to grips with what these terms have to say to 
us, such comparisons merely have provisional value. And more likely, in the process of a 
comparison via rational structures that is intent on finding the meaning of these terms, it 
is much easier for metaphysical notions such as transcendence to reappear. The ideas of 
Sein, différance and dao respectively, and other related notions as Weg, trace, 
supplement, wuwei, ziran with them, are then in danger of being reified in the direction of 
a substance ontology, against the often explicit intentions of the authors behind these 
notions to the contrary. The idea of a comparison itself could easily suggest such 
reification, if we believe that although outwardly different, on a deeper level, behind the 
appearances, there must be similarities. So even though this dissertation is itself a 
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comparison of similarities between Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism, we need to be on 
constant guard against implying more connections or similarities than are warranted, and 
be aware of how we see any similarities. 
We saw that by translating you and wu respectively as ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing,’ 
understanding could inadvertently be guided to see these terms from within the 
metaphysical structure of the West, and therefore Heidegger’s writings on ‘Being’ and 
‘Nothing’ seem to offer an easy comparison. Yet at first this is only superficially so, since 
Heidegger started from the metaphysical tradition of the West, arguing against its 
insistence on a highest being and its philosophy of presence. We have already seen and 
shall again see later that the relation of you and wu in Chinese philosophy comes from a 
very different background, one that did not start out from this metaphysical framework. 
That means that comparisons are not always that easy and similarities might have to do 
more with translations and the wish to find such similarities than with the actual 
intellectual culture and worldview of both parties.  
4.1.2 METAPHYSICS AND COMPARISON. 
One of the earliest comparisons of Heidegger and the Daodejing is a reading and 
translation of the latter by Chang Chung-yuan. While in his introduction Chang tries hard 
to avoid metaphysical ideas, he nevertheless seems content to imply a strong sense of 
mysticism in both Daoism and Heidegger, evident in the following quote: 
“Tao is the highest attainment of primordial intuition. Tao is preontological 
experience, which is gained through the interfusion and identification of the 
subjectivity of man and the objectivity of things. This preontological, inner 
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experience is the spontaneous reflection of one’s being, which simultaneously 
transcends both time and space.”7 
Now while this may to a certain extent be said of Daoism (although my reading of 
Daoism in the previous chapter questions this whole attitude of seeing it as mysticism, at 
least as far as transcendence is inserted), Heidegger has always argued vehemently 
against mysticism, which he saw mostly as an attempt to escape from the finite world into 
some realm of eternity. Mysticism, which for Heidegger was “the mere counterimage of 
metaphysics,” exactly because it remains in this inversion, is for those who are “still 
trapped in utter servitude to a metaphysics they think they have long since suppressed, 
[and] seek escape routes to some arcane realm, some world beyond the sensuous.”8 As 
such, Heidegger is totally against such a mysticism functioning in philosophy. Although 
Heidegger was highly interested in medieval mysticism (especially Eckhart), he 
nevertheless saw this mysticism as belonging to religion, and as such it belongs to the 
realm of faith, and not to that of philosophy. And although he did borrow freely from the 
language that is often employed in mysticism, Heidegger on the other hand wished to 
ground every philosophy and way of thinking and living on or in a thorough 
understanding of finite existence. In this way Heidegger’s work is really not about 
generating “preontological experiences” which would transcend space and time, but 
about the way in which to see experiences in a different light, from a different thinking 
perspective within space and time. Chang here seems too eager to explain the ideas of 
Daoism along the lines of Western style mysticism, whereby subject and object become 
(momentarily) interfused in the “preontological experience” which is then supposed to 
                                                
7
 Chang 1975, xv, italics in original. 
8
 Heidegger 1961, vol. 2, 28; Nietzsche 1979-1987, vol. III, 182. 
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transcend space and time. If the conclusions of my third chapter are correct, these 
comparisons miss the point that Daoism is trying to bring across. If there is a form of 
mysticism in Daoism, it is about interfusing with space and time exactly as a spatial and 
temporal being, not about transcending these categories. In such a way it might be 
compared to Heidegger,9 but that is not what Chang does. Besides that, the notion of 
interfusing subject and object is itself misleading, since Heidegger’s project was to find 
ways of thinking that were before or beyond (in the sense of more originary than) this 
distinction, where Chang seems to take the distinction itself as given primary to any 
subsequent interfusion. 
Chang also frequently refers to Chan Buddhism for a clarification of his 
translation and interpretation. This in itself is not an illegitimate enterprise since Chan 
Buddhism is for a large part a direct descendant of earlier Daoism, and I have done the 
same in chapter 3 and will again on occasion refer to Chan Buddhism to strengthen or 
clarify my own case. But one must take caution to see this as just clarification. Seeing in 
Chan Buddhism the ultimate meaning of the Daoist classics, which is something Chang 
seems to be aiming at exactly with his notions of ‘primordial intuition,’ ‘enlightenment’ 
and especially when he translates xuande of the final sentence of chapter 10 of the 
Daodejing as “mystic attainment,”10 is not justified. 
There are other comparisons of Heidegger and Daoism in which, at least partially, 
this metaphysical scheme is perpetuated. Graham Parkes, whom I usually agree with to a 
large extent, in one of his earlier papers on Daoism and the early Heidegger, seems eager 
                                                
9 I will do so later in this chapter with the notion of “Zeit-Spiel-Raum” or “Zeit-Raum.” 
10 Daodejing, Chang 1975, 33. Ames & Hall 2003 translate :”profound efficacy,” and Lau 2001 has: 
“mysterious virtue.”  
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to translate or interpret wu as “absolute Nothing,”11 thereby reinforcing a metaphysical 
reading of Heidegger’s early work that seeks to interpret Heidegger’s Nichts as the 
absolute and not relative opposite of Being. Two things need to be said about this. First of 
all, in his later work, Heidegger denounced these kinds of readings,  and he himself 
recognised that the way of Sein und Zeit was flawed, and consequently did not speak of 
Being as ‘absolute Nothing’ anymore, but as Ereignis. This in itself should give us pause 
when we compare Heidegger’s earlier work alone, as by itself. Second, Parkes makes the 
point that in both Daoism and Heidegger, “the realization of a particular emptiness, lack 
or non-being within the world conduces to a realization of the Nothing that is the ultimate 
ground of everything.”12 In my view it is exactly this metaphysical extensionism in the 
trend of Plato and Descartes that fallaciously transfers findings in one realm to another, 
that Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism have been seeking to avoid. In the case of Daoism, 
Parkes mentions chapter 11 of the Daodejing, where the nothingness or emptiness 
functions as the provider of the use of things. But surely this, as I have tried to explain in 
chapter 3, is about relationality and not about absolute Nothing. You and wu belong 
together, always work together, as presence and absence. As Ames and Hall have 
explained, we need not see them as ontological categories.13 Similarly we need not 
understand Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode, Being-unto-death, as being about this absolute 
idea of Nothing, as Parkes assumes. Dasein’s relation to death, its own death, is not that 
of a being towards absolute Nothing, but of a being towards its own possible and 
inevitable demise, and that means essentially that the non-being is as relative to the being 
as the being is relative to the non-being.  
                                                
11 Parkes 1984, 354. 
12 Parkes 1984, 357. 
13 Ames & Hall 2003, 91. 
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Parkes further notices the similarity between the Daoist yin-yang dichotomy or 
dynamic on the one hand, and the ‘strife’ (Streit, polemos) of Heidegger on the other.14 
While I agree with this similarity, there is no need to further postulate something beyond 
the ‘strife’ or beyond the dynamic of yin and yang, and Parkes seems to do so with this 
notion of absolute Nothing. 
On a different level, the Kyoto school of thought as an expression of one of the 
later developments of classical Daoism, Chan/Zen Buddhism, also takes Heidegger back 
to metaphysics. Nishida and Nishitani, with their idea of ‘Absolute Nothingness’ as the 
opposite of Western thinking, seem to get stuck in this inversion and fail to go beyond it 
when they insist on their other-worldly understanding of Zen Buddhism. Trying to 
incorporate Heidegger into the mainstream Western tradition,15 the Kyoto school thinkers 
failed to notice how notions such as the ontological difference, Being and Dasein 
function as this-worldly concepts by their implicit design, and they thus saw Heidegger as 
not going far enough because he did not establish the link back to the essential religious 
experience, where Nishida and Nishitani insist on the religious nature of their thinking. In 
my view, the argument against mysticism that Heidegger makes applies to their thought. 
Nishitani, for example says that the “self has its homeground at a point disengaged from 
the world and things.”16 Although my point here is not necessarily an argument against 
Zen Buddhism and its perceived religious nature, it does point to the fact that Heidegger 
was often wrongly interpreted as promoting an absolutist view of Being and Nothing. 
                                                
14 Parkes 1984, 361. 
15 Although there are no real connections between Nishida and Heidegger, the former was familiar with 
Sartre and presumably, as is evident for example in Yuasa’s contribution to Heidegger and Asian Thought 
(ed. Parkes, 1987), the Kyoto School in general interpreted Heidegger similarly in an existentialist way, 
mainly because they were only aware of Heidegger’s early thought, which they saw as too subjectivistic. 
(see also Mizoguchi’s paper in the same volume) 
16 Nishitani 1982, 152. 
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Interestingly, in his contribution to Heidegger and Asian Thought,17 Nishitani seeks a 
similar closeness between Zen Buddhism, Christianity and Heidegger, in which he 
counters the idea of transcendence but advocates an absolute standpoint. Nishitani seeks 
to appropriate Heidegger’s play on the notions of Heimat, heimisch, unheimisch and 
Unheimlichkeit to the Buddhist idea of universal suffering and subsequent detachment 
from the transitory world,18 where I have argued and will argue again in this chapter that 
Heidegger’s work is about dealing with the transitory world, but not from a detached 
point of view, but from a committed, inserted and situational point of view. 
Similarly, there have been many examples of comparisons of Derrida to Chinese 
philosophy, and most notably these seek to compare Derrida’s differance to dao. I shall 
deal with these comparisons below. Most of the thinkers who try to deal with Derrida’s 
possible relations to Chinese thinking and language however seem very one-sided. They 
tend to overemphasise writing as opposed to speech, or overemphasise the negative in 
Derrida in general. One of the first points where many go wrong is in the failure to notice 
that while dao is arguably one of the most central notions of Chinese philosophy in 
general and Daoism in particular, differance is just one of the words Derrida uses to try 
and describe what he thinks, and that this particular word, as opposed to dao, is itself to 
be abandoned.  To make a strong comparison between dao and differance that purely 
focuses on the importance and centrality of these terms is itself a neglecting of the 
provisionality that is espoused especially by Derrida and if my interpretation is right, also 
in Daoism. 
                                                
17 Nishitani 1987, 145-154. 
18 Nishitani 1987, 148/49. 
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One of the readings of Derrida’s encounter with the Chinese language (which, as I 
have shown in chapter three, was far from comprehensive) is by Hwa Yol Jung.19 My 
main objection to this paper is that Jung espouses a very superficial understanding of 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology that fails to realise that Derrida’s ‘writing’ is not the 
opposite of speech, nor the mere inversion of the hierarchy between speech as closer to 
meaning than writing, this hierarchy itself being one of the essential features of Western 
logocentric metaphysics.20 With ‘writing,’ Derrida has argued for an understanding of 
language, including both speech and writing, as equally arbitrary and provisional sign 
structures. Oddly, Jung makes some claims similar to Derrida, but in an attack on Derrida 
that perceives him as stuck in the inversion of the hierarchy. First Jung agrees with 
Samuel Beckett saying that “in language as gestures the spoken and the written are 
identical.”21 But later on in the same paper Jung propounds a version of the Chinese 
language that puts it squarely in the logocentric or at least phonocentric tradition 
favouring speech over writing, going so far as to say that “(w)riting is an artefact, 
whereas speaking is not,” and following this up with the claim that “speaking is an 
unmediated medium for human communication.”22 The point is not so much that Jung 
tries to relocate classical Chinese into the logocentric standard, but that he misses 
Derrida’s point totally in saying that Derrida thought that Chinese ideography is “the pure 
                                                
19 Jung 1984. 
20 While Jung’s reading may be excusable if purely based on a rather superficial reading of Of 
Grammatology alone (although even then it is not warranted), between the appearance of Of Grammatology 
in English and Jung’s article lies a time span of 8 years in which Derrida repeatedly denied and sought to 
clarify his position regarding ‘writing’ and to defend himself against claims like those of Jung. Some 
instances include interviews first published in 1982 (“The Almost Nothing of the Unpresentable.”, now in 
Points… Derrida 1995), the “Outwork” of Dissemination (Derrida 1981a, especially 3-6), and Writing and 
Difference (Derrida 1978, for example page 22). 
21 Beckett paraphrased in Jung 1984, 217. 
22 Jung 1984, 226. 
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and simple act of writing purged of the phonetic.”23 Anyone with a more than a 
superficial understanding of Derrida knows that Derrida thinks there is nothing pure and 
simple, and certainly not ‘writing.’ And even in Of Grammatology Derrida has pointed to 
the fact that classical Chinese had phonetic elements in it.24 Derrida’s point of the so-
called inversion or reversal of the opposites is to overcome the artificial hierarchy itself. 
Edward T. Ch’ien, in a paper seeking to explain dao in terms of an ultimate 
reality, sees similarities with Derrida.25 However, Ch’ien does not do justice to Derrida 
when he says that Derrida’s idea of a non-centre is merely to be understood in the field of 
language. Although obviously Derrida’s main efforts have been concerned with language 
as a play of differences with no centre and no ultimate meaning other than within this 
play, this by no account means that that is where Derrida stops. His work has much wider 
implications, in that the conclusions he draws about language point us to a way of 
thinking that underlies our most fundamental metaphysical convictions. Ch’ien argues 
that Daoism is about the ontology of dao as the ultimate reality, but if we take seriously 
the similarities Ch’ien finds with Derrida, and admit that Derrida’s work is about 
questioning this whole ontology, as it is an attack on this logocentric metaphysics, then 
seeing dao as an ultimate reality becomes problematic. Since Ch’ien does not want to 
draw this conclusion, he seems happy to confine Derrida to a philosophy of language, but 
as we have seen, the idea that “there is nothing outside the text” does not support such a 
confinement, but rather challenges it. 
                                                
23 Jung 1984, 227. 
24 See Derrida 1976, 90. 
25 Ch’ien 1984, especially 382/83. 
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In his paper in Critical Inquiry, Zhang Longxi26 agrees with the standard reading 
of Daoism which explains it as metaphysical, and thus similar to the Western tradition. 
Zhang’s paper is another example that does not so much seek to find similarities between 
Daoism and Derrida, but seeks to reintegrate Daoism into the mainstream standard by 
denying that Derrida’s claims have any application to Chinese thinking and language. 
Zhang does so by insisting that the mistrust of language, and especially writing, as a 
conveyor of true meaning, and by extension the logocentric approach to thinking, is 
common to both Western and Eastern traditions, thereby perpetuating the metaphysical 
claim that there must be something ‘beyond’ language. As he says: “Logocentrism, 
therefore, does not inhabit just the Western ways of thinking; it constitutes the very way 
of thinking itself.”27 Zhang then, rightly, uses Derrida to argue for the fact that non-
phonetic language suffers the same inadequacy as phonetic language, but with exactly the 
reverse conclusion that Derrida comes up with. Where for Derrida, according to Zhang, 
and rightfully so in my opinion, this ‘inadequacy’ leads to the understanding of language 
as “a trace without origin,”28 Zhang argues that “a Chinese intertext is always a trace 
leading back to the origin, to the fountainhead of tradition, the great thinkers of Taoism 
and Confucianism.”29 Writing for Derrida means the impossibility of any origin. In 
Zhang’s opinion, Chinese writings have the power to “transform[.] the author into 
authoritative text.”30 If I understand correctly, Zhang then means that thinking is 
metaphysical, and that Chinese language is somehow capable of transforming an author 
whose existence is doubtful into an authority that is present, whereby language revenges 
                                                
26 Zhang 1985. 
27
 Zhang 1985, 395. 
28
 Zhang 1985, 397. 
29
 Zhang 1985, 397. 
30
 Zhang 1985, 397. 
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itself against the claim of being a mere supplement. In my view Zhang then merely uses 
the ideas behind deconstruction as a tool to reinstate metaphysical beliefs about 
something beyond language, but unfortunately only accessible through language. 
David A. Dilworth reaffirms my earlier suggestion with regards to Heidegger, that 
the Kyoto school is intent on profiling itself as the opposite of Western logocentrism, and 
that it seeks to include Heidegger and Derrida in the Western tradition.31 Dilworth’s 
reading of Derrida fails to understand that employing the semantic form of the 
metaphysical tradition does not necessitate being firmly within that tradition. Dilworth 
says that Derrida privileges “the concept of differance as the final a priori structure of 
writing.”32 To say this is to mistake the ‘concept’ of differance for a metaphysical form of 
identity, a logocentrism. The point of Derrida’s critique is really that his thinking is no 
longer reducible to such a fixed standard, but that this at the same time does not mean 
Derrida admits of no standards. The polarisation Dilworth speaks of as ensuing from the 
post-modernists insistence on difference is another instance of a superficial reading of 
Derrida.33 Derrida sees opposites at work everywhere, but as we have seen that does not 
mean that these opposites can never meet. Indeed, the whole point is that they must of 
necessity meet, all the time, since the supplement, or the trace of otherness always upsets 
identities and therefore also upsets strict dichotomies or oppositions. Dilworth is right in 
assuming that the Kyoto school profiles itself as the opposite of Western thinking, but he 
is wrong in suggesting that Derrida espouses the same opposition. This inversion, as we 
have seen and will see again later, is just a necessary phase, which, if succumbed to, 
retains one firmly in the metaphysical tradition. 
                                                
31
 Dilworth 1990. 
32 Dilworth 1990, 9, italics in original. 
33 Dilworth 1990, 12. 
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This section has argued that a lot of misunderstandings and/or misapplications of 
Heidegger and Derrida have occurred in comparing them to Daoism or other East Asian 
schools of thought. Through such comparisons the dominant metaphysical tradition is 
usually reinforced. It is imperative to find ways of comparison which challenge such one-
sided approaches. Even if there is a danger of my own interpretation being one-sided in 
the reverse direction, we shall see how this inversion should be seen in the end.  
4.2 THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY.  
“Thinking is not a means to gain knowledge. Thinking cuts furrows into the soil 
of Being.”34  
Derrida has always maintained that his thinking is both inside and outside of philosophy. 
His questions are therefore no longer (solely) a part of the philosophical discourse in a 
strict sense. Both Heidegger and Derrida question philosophy on its grounds, its 
presuppositions, its most basic assumptions. However, this being partly outside of 
philosophy is of interest to comparative thinking in two ways. First of all, it is 
increasingly understood that the ways of thinking of Daoism do not benefit from being 
squeezed into the harness of philosophy as it is commonly known in the West. In other 
words, Western style metaphysics or onto-theology and Daoism are not that compatible, 
but both Heidegger and Derrida have made it easier for us to argue that while not 
philosophical in the traditional, metaphysical and logical sense, this Daoist tradition has a 
lot of ‘thinking’ to offer. Secondly, we can use the different ideas found in Daoism to 
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 Heidegger 1997b; 1971, 70. 
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challenge and question the ‘normality’ of Western philosophy by arguing that different 
views of the world will lead us to different conclusions which are not necessarily better 
or worse in any sense. Thus Daoism is very much a part of the “community of 
thinking.”35 Philosophy as metaphysics is also part of this community, but the point is to 
see that neither metaphysics nor other ways of thinking should be perceived as better or 
as more authentic. We must no longer see them in a hierarchical way but rather as 
complementary. Both have their respective places, and we can understand this from the 
interpretation of Daoism that I have given in the previous chapter, whereby not one side 
of an opposition is given preference, but both sides are needed for a full understanding of 
the whole field in which the opposition takes place.  
Heidegger has also argued that his Wiederholung or Überwindung, or 
deconstruction of metaphysics should not be seen as a demolishing of metaphysical 
thought to be replaced with something else (presumably its opposite), but as a thinking 
that leaves behind the narrow confines of metaphysical thought, without thereby denying 
metaphysics its place. In fact, neither Heidegger nor Derrida see themselves as 
completely free from metaphysics. Rather, their works revolve around metaphysics and 
are located on its margins, its boundaries. Yet as deconstructive they aim at the heart of 
metaphysics, not to overcome it, but to get to its fundamental presuppositions and show 
how these constitute only one part of what is called thinking. 
This section will then argue for seeing the position of comparative thinking in a 
similar vein, as being both inside and outside of philosophy. The definition of philosophy 
and thereby the in- or exclusion of other types of thinking in the greater discourse of 
philosophy, that is to say the limits of philosophy and its delimitation, has always been a 
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 Derrida 2002b, 13. 
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special problem for comparative philosophers, who have struggled to include many 
different ways of thinking while feeling obliged to keep to at least some of the rational 
structures of philosophy. Yet my whole point would be that to conceive of culturally 
different and thus often substantially different ways of thinking as situated both inside 
and outside of philosophy is especially suited to the whole programme of comparative 
philosophy, as it is not a matter of thinking in a dualistic inside or outside, philosophy or 
thinking, but a non-dualist thinking that tries to overcome these sorts of distinctions, or in 
other words, tries to think in-between different cultures. That in-between I have tried to 
locate in chapter one in Heidegger as the Auseinandersetzung and the Lichtung and 
Ereignis, in chapter two in Derrida as the trace, differance, spacing and play, and in 
chapter three in Daoism as dao, the gateway (men), the hinge, and the interplay of yin and 
yang. These notions thus stand in need of comparison, which is the aim of this chapter. 
Regarding the inside and the outside, the point of Derrida, Heidegger and Daoism 
seems exactly to not succumb to the temptation of going to either side, but remaining on 
or in the hinge, the gateway, the margin or dehiscence, and thus not above the play of 
differences, not denying this play in a dialectic third position, but in a way both inside 
and outside, in the ‘between,’ or the openness. Comparative philosophy can never be 
from some neutral perspective, some place above or detached from what it seeks to 
compare. But as in-between it is also always shifting, depending on what is compared. 
Comparative philosophy can then never have a final or purely theoretical form, 
applicable to different instances, but is itself a changing process that lacks strict identity. 
In Derridean fashion we could say that any identity that comparative thinking has is 
purely a function of the differences that make it up. 
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In Heidegger’s later work the notion of Ereignis (appropriation, event, happening) 
becomes increasingly important. This idea, which will receive more attention later, could 
compare well with the idea of dao in the sense that Ames and Hall give it, as ‘way-
making,’ precisely because both the notion of Ereignis and dao as ‘way-making’ make it 
clear that the focus is on the relationship(s) of human beings with their world. Er-eignen 
as ‘appropriating’ should however definitely not be read under the metaphysical 
assumption of a subject appropriating an object to itself, making it its own, or of 
possessing an object, but more in the sense of relating from a particular focus (de) toward 
the environment, the world. This particular focus, as we have seen in the Zhuangzi, is 
unavoidable and need not necessarily mean something negative. In the same way as Hall 
and Ames have argued for the preference of situation over strict agency and against the 
subject-object distinction, Heidegger argues for the event of Ereignis as the place/time 
where Being happens, and this Ereignis happens to Dasein as much as it is of its own 
making. In his earlier work, especially Being and Time, the focus is more on the Dasein 
and its Jemeinigkeit, about how Dasein actively relates to its world. Yet even there the 
distinctive mode of Being that puts Dasein in its place as Sein-zum-Tode, Angst, is not 
something Dasein chooses, but is something that as an event happens to it beyond its 
control. In Heidegger’s later work the attention shifts and then the event, the Ereignis, 
comes increasingly to be seen as the more originary, yet not of course without any 
Dasein. Ereignis is somewhere in-between. 
When thinking along the lines of Derrida’s all-pervading contextuality we will 
come to a similar conclusion, one that privileges situation, relation and context over 
identity. On this note it would be impossible to exclude the commentarial and religious 
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traditions of Daoism. There is never a clear-cut line. This is where the notion of in-
between becomes important and this notion will be further explored in this chapter. My 
approach will be to first compare Heidegger and Daoism, and then later Derrida and 
Daoism. After that I will use these comparisons for the more important section on 
language.  
4.2.1  HEIDEGGER AND DAOISM. 
In this section we must start by placing Heidegger’s particular interest for Daoism in 
perspective by pointing to his equal interest in ancient Greek thinkers and German poets, 
and in some medieval mystics. The point to see is that these interests show that 
Heidegger is a very profound thinker in his own right, and that he uses these other ways 
of thinking mostly for his own project. As we have seen, Heidegger uses poets, but is not 
a poet, he uses the ancient Greeks, but is not one of them. This was shown clearly in the 
quotation in chapter one where Heidegger said that we have to become “more Greek” 
than the ancient Greeks themselves.36 In the same way, Heidegger uses Daoism, but is 
not a Daoist. We have to think through these other ways of thinking. Yet there are many 
similarities with Daoism which are fruitful for a better understanding of both Heidegger 
and Daoism, and Heidegger’s interests in and rethinking of the ancient Greeks and the 
German poets can be used for furthering our understanding of how Heidegger sees the 
connection between himself and Daoism.   
In returning to the ancient Greeks Heidegger has tried to provide us with 
unorthodox readings of their way of thinking. These readings are unorthodox exactly 
because they try to undermine the ‘traditional’ metaphysical readings that have been 
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offered to us throughout the Platonic history of Western philosophy. We could therefore 
look and see whether Heidegger’s vocabulary is also applicable to a non-metaphysical 
reading of Daoism. We must be aware however that any applicability of Heidegger’s 
language does not mean to say that the thinking of the ancient Greeks is to a large extent 
the same as that of the Daoist classics. It does mean that a language and vocabulary of 
non-transcendence, of non-metaphysical import could be more suitable to express the 
sensibilities of Daoist thinking.  
Heraclitus propounded the idea that ‘Physis loves to hide,’ and we can reinterpret 
this in Heidegger’s terminology to mean that every unconcealment comes with 
concealment, there is always mystery involved. Profound thinking is not the rational 
solution of mystery, but the thoughtful acknowledgment of the fact that thinking is 
necessarily concerned with both concealing and unconcealing. Heidegger also saw this in 
Daoism: 
“Perhaps there lies concealed in the word ‘Way,’ tao, the mystery of all 
mysteries of thoughtful saying, as long as we let this name return to its 
unspokenness and are able to accomplish this letting.”37 
In the same way we must see Heidegger’s ‘new’ or different reading of the poets. Far 
from traditional, it is yet a very thoughtful reading that keeps in mind the profound 
difference between Heidegger himself and the poets. And again, it is a reading which 
seeks to undo the metaphysical ways of conceiving of poetry. Heidegger was also aware 
of the poetic strength of the Daoist classics. He had two lines of chapter 15 of the 
Daodejing inscribed in calligraphy in his studio, a present from Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, with 
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whom he partially translated the Daodejing. On one occasion Heidegger wrote these two 
lines back to Hsiao in a letter. These lines are the following: 
“Muddy water, when stilled, slowly becomes clear; 
Something settled, when agitated, slowly comes to life.”38 
Heidegger translates, or rather interprets these lines into his own idiom and way of 
thinking:  
“Who can be still and out of stillness and through it move something on to the 
Way so that it comes to shine forth?  
[Who is able through making still to bring something into Being?”39 
The point of these lines, which I think are important, is that they do not show preference 
for stillness as such, but acknowledge the process of reversing that was mentioned earlier. 
Things in motion return to stillness, things in tranquillity return to life, motion. Although 
Heidegger’s translation shows this less clear than the more standard ones, Hsiao explains 
that indeed “Heidegger thought this [the lines in question, SVB] through farther, in 
saying that clarifying finally brings something to light, and subtle motion in the tranquil 
and still can bring something into being.”40 So again it is not about valuing stillness as 
such, but about the interplay of stillness and motion. Through this, and through 
Heidegger’s thoughts on the Greeks and the German poets, we return to the idea of 
Auseinandersetzung, which aims at setting two things in relation. It is the space between. 
The Auseinandersetzung similarly is nothing itself. It is what takes place in-between. This 
in-between is a constant focus of Heidegger’s work, as evident from the following: 
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“The intimacy of world and thing is present in the separation of the between; it is 
present in the dif-ference. The word dif-ference is now removed from its usual 
and customary usage. What it now names is not a generic concept for various 
kinds of differences. It exists only as this single difference. It is unique. Of itself, 
it holds apart the middle in and through which world and things are at one with 
each other. The intimacy of the dif-ference is the unifying element of the 
diaphora, the carrying out that carries through. The dif-ference carries out world 
in its worlding, carries out things in their thinging. Thus carrying them out, it 
carries them toward one another. The dif-ference does not mediate after the fact 
by connecting world and things through a middle added on to them. Being the 
middle, it first determines world and things in their presence, i.e., in their being 
toward one another, whose unity it carries out.”41  
It is difference that is most important, and from this difference we start looking for what 
is common. Yet the opposites are always already connected in an essential way. The 
‘intimacy’ or unity of the differences does not exist anywhere else but in the interplay of 
the differences. For example, in Heidegger’s earlier work, the notions of authenticity and 
inauthenticity play an important role. In the Verfallen of das Man, in our modern 
societies, we have lost touch with what we really, existentially, authentically, are. But 
Heidegger takes caution not to see the relation of authenticity to inauthenticity in a moral 
sense. Inauthenticity is a necessary part of what we are. Only when understood in that 
sense, as two sides of a coin, could one say that Heidegger argues for a return to 
authenticity, our nature as Dasein. In much the same way the Daodejing argues that we 
need to undo the artificial social structures that keep us from becoming ourselves. In 
Philip J. Ivanhoe’s words: “the natural state to which the Daoists appeal is not the status 
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quo but the dao, which lies beneath successive layers of socialization. For those in the 
fallen state of society, the dao is not easy to discern or to follow. The challenge is to 
become aware of what we—in some deep sense—are and then work and live in light of 
this awareness.”42 
We can see this double layer of two opposing sides working together in much of 
Heidegger’s work, and we see it in Daoism. Comparing the notions of Physis and tian, 
we begin to understand nature as self-emerging and self-hiding. Concealing is essential to 
unconcealing. Every possible unconcealing is based on concealing, we never have access 
to the things in themselves, except through our human perspectives and signification 
structures. The Aletheia of Being is based as much on unconcealing as on concealing. 
First of all, every unconcealing that Being grants conceals Being as itself. Second, one 
way of unconcealing tends to conceal other ways, in the same way as the metaphysical 
tradition of unconcealing concealed other possible ways of thinking. As Heidegger asks 
himself rhetorically, does not concealing belong essentially to unconcealing “because 
self-concealing, concealment, lethe belongs to a-letheia, not just as an addition, not as 
shadow to light, but rather as the heart of aletheia? And does not even a keeping and 
preserving rule in this self-concealing of the opening of presence from which 
unconcealment can be granted to begin with, and thus what is present can appear in its 
presence? If this were so, then the opening (Lichtung) would not be the mere opening of 
presence, but the opening of presence concealing itself, the opening of a self-concealing 
sheltering (sich verbergenden Bergens).”43  
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This is why Heidegger was much more fond of the star metaphor instead of the 
traditional sun/light metaphor, since the former reveals much more clearly that light, as 
clearing, as unconcealing, always is surrounded by and only possible through darkness, 
as concealing. Presence, as unconcealment, is never pure; there are always traces of 
otherness or concealment in it. I will come back to this notion of trace in Heidegger’s 
work later. Tian, or dao, thought of as the process of nature, works similarly. Tian and 
dao are obscure, dark, granting but never showing themselves.44 Tian is like dao as 
Heidegger’s Zeit-Spiel-Raum or Zeit-Raum (time-space). It is not a fixed source, the idea 
is more that of yuandao, not as the source of dao, but as the fluid spring of dao. There is 
no endpoint, and in that sense it might be comparable to Heidegger’s notion of ‘abyss.’ It 
is the framework in which everything happens, yet which itself is nothing. Heidegger 
explains the Zeit-Raum as the abyss (Ab-grund)45 that is the grounding emptiness, 
precisely as the absence of a fixed ground, thought in a metaphysical and substantial way. 
There is a sense in which yuan can be read in accordance with this notion of abyss, since, 
as Lau and Ames have explained, the source (yuan) of which the Yuandao speaks should 
not be understood as pointing to a metaphysical principle, but to a fluid this-worldly 
source, as a life-force like water from a spring.46 
As I have already indicated, in Heidegger’s later work the idea of Ereignis (event 
of appropriation) becomes more and more important. Ereignis is a notion closely related 
to the ‘clearing of unconcealing and concealing,’ and this notion should be explained 
before it can be compared to any notions in Daoism. First fully explored by Heidegger in 
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Beiträge zur Philosophie,47 the notion of Ereignis is meant to think beyond the subject-
object dichotomy, in the sense that the subject is always already included in the event. 
The subject belongs to the more originary event and can only be derivatively understood 
from Ereignis. Dasein abandons itself to the event, which means it seeks to understand 
itself as part of some ongoing process and from that process, which in turn means that we 
understand our Dasein not as something apart from this process. This is what Heidegger 
calls Ereignis. When Heidegger moved from thinking Being itself from Dasein to 
thinking Being and time together as Ereignis, or appropriation, he makes it very clear at 
least that this is not to be thought in any metaphysical way: “Appropriation is not the 
encompassing general concept under which Being and time could be subsumed.”48 
Ereignis, as Hans Ruin describes it, is “the free and incalculable and abyssal opening in 
and through which beings obtain their place and significance.”49 Ereignis then has to do 
with the always-already-there of the shifting relationality between otherness and self (or 
rather Dasein).  
Another way to understand this is by employing the notions Ames and Hall 
propose, focus and field. Only within the field of process does there arise anything like a 
specific focus. The reading of dao that I have given in chapter three concurs with this 
approach. Both Ereignis and dao are to be seen as processes, both singular processes of 
‘things’ and referring to the whole process nature of the world to which man belongs. 
Thus thinking becomes an experience both of and from this processuality, and Heidegger, 
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Derrida and Laozi and Zhuangzi all in their own way try to convey as well as guide us 
into this experience, of which more later. This experience is necessarily one of turning, 
turning from artificial structures to a more originary event of appropriation.50 As 
Heidegger says: “Be-ing essentially happens as Ereignis. That is not a proposition but the 
non-conceptual, silent telling of the essential happening that opens itself only to the full, 
historical enactment of inceptive (anfängliches) thinking.”51 Ereignis is the more 
originary (in the sense of Ursprünglich and Anfänglich) event and it is how the world 
comes to us, how it shows itself, how we are in the world, and the same could be said of 
dao.  
Important for our comparison of Heidegger and Daoism is that he also 
understands Ereignis fundamentally as in-between. As he says: “Yet this »in-between« is 
not a »transcendence« in relation to man, but on the contrary it is that openness to which 
man as founder and keeper belongs, since as Dasein he is en-owned (er-eignet) by Being 
itself, which is as nothing else than Ereignis.”52 In other words, Being is nothing else than 
what happens in Ereignis, and this is definitely not to be understood as transcendence, but 
as ‘opening in-between.’ In similar vein Heidegger also says: “Ereignis is the self-
ascertaining (ermittelnde) and self-effecting (vermittelnde) middle (Mitte), in which all 
presencing (Wesung) of the truth of Being has to be thought back beforehand.”53 This 
‘middle’ as the in-between is not a dialectic third, but the endurance of difference, since 
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“truth happens as clearing concealing.”54 I have tried to present through the gateway 
(men) character a similar idea in Daoism which acknowledges the nothingness of the in-
between, while not succumbing to a metaphysical reading. As the process of differing, 
dao is the play of differences through this in-between. 
Another notion comparable to dao in the same way would seem to be logos. The 
important point is how to perceive of this comparison. As we have seen, sticking to the 
traditional metaphysical explanation of both logos and dao, we might indeed perceive 
similarities. Thomas In-Sing Leung for example, seeking to understand dao as the 
underlying ultimate process or ultimate truth, and logos as the ultimate order of things, 
accordingly finds many connections.55 But if we start reading in a non-metaphysical way, 
and do so for both dao following Ames and Hall and others on the Chinese philosophy 
side, and for logos following Heidegger (and Derrida) on the other side, we begin to see 
the comparison in a different light. Heidegger understands logos as polemos, as was 
argued in chapter one. This means that difference and the interplay of differences is 
constitutive for any constancy, which would be relative to it. Con-frontation or 
Auseinandersetzung is the more originary ‘begetter’ of things. We can find a similar 
understanding in the Zhuangzi as well. In chapter 6 another one of the provisional names 
for dao is offered as “Peace-in-Strife.”56 Graham translates these characters as “[a]t home 
where it intrudes” and the following sentence as “[w]hat is ‘at home where it intrudes’ is 
that which comes about only where it intrudes into the place of something else.”57 Wing-
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tsit Chan translates: “tranquillity in disturbance.”58 The general idea behind all these 
translations I take to be that only within and through the process of change can there be 
found a relative stability, so that this stability is only as a function of the more originary 
play of differences. 
Other comparisons of logos and dao can be found using Heidegger’s thinking. 
Already in Being and Time, Heidegger explained logos as “discourse,” and the 
fundamental meaning of discourse as “letting something be seen.”59 Seeing how a 
‘letting-be-seen’ always, as unconcealment, contains concealing, we can understand 
logos as the discourse which lets things be seen as unconcealing/concealing. As such, 
dao, which is similarly translatable as ‘discourse,’ and is also a letting things be seen as 
they are in their relationality to what they are not. In a different, but related way, 
Heidegger explains the related concept of physis as Fuge, Fügung in the sense of 
Harmonia.60 Heidegger’s translation of Fragment 8 of Heraclitus is the following: “Das 
Gegen-fahren ein Zusammenbringen und aus dem Auseinanderbringen die eine 
erstrahlende Fügung.”61 Translation of this Heideggerian jargon is difficult: “The 
reciprocal play a bringing together, and from the distinction the one shining jointure” 
would be my loose translation. Heidegger understands Gegen-fahren as the play of 
differences, which is at the same time a bringing together of differences as well as a 
distinguishing of differences, understood from the idea of ‘jointure,’ which is nothing 
else than the space between things filled up by their necessary interaction, in other words, 
Auseinandersetzung. Difference and jointure belong together, thought in a non-
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hierarchical way. This way of thinking is also found in Daoism. The title of the second 
chapter of the Zhuangzi explains how sorting out (lun) can be seen as both differentiating 
and equalising, which we can then read in comparison to Auseinandersetzung or Das 
Selbe (the ‘same’). The idea of the force of Auseinandersetzung brings me to Heidegger’s 
logos as polemos, something which must be addressed in the light of any translation of 
dao as logos. The point I have made is that this translation will only hold if logos is seen 
in a Heideggerian way, which does not admit of turning it into a guiding principle outside 
of the differential structures of the world, outside the great clod. Chapter 25 of the 
Daodejing seeks to portray dao as the unchanging whole of change.62 Within this whole, 
things are always reversing, returning, growing and degenerating, and that is the sense in 
which logos necessarily entails polemos, especially if we relate logos to the notions of 
concealing and unconcealing As such, dao is similar in that it is also the workings of 
these yin-yang forces. As Heidegger puts it in the Contributions to Philosophy: “Strife 
(Streit) is essential being (Wesung) of the »in-between.« (Zwischen)”63 This in-between 
will return later. Never showing itself, dao works within the logic of difference, 
transformation and aletheia. 
Heidegger’s later work has many instances comparable to a possible description 
of dao as the temporal flowing together of all things For example, in Zur Sache des 
Denkens he says the following: 
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“Being is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it is determined by time as 
presence. Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it remains constant 
in its passing away without being something temporal like the beings in time.”64 
Thinking along these lines could lead to some sort of relativism, yet this relativism is 
harmless in that it merely acknowledges time and temporality, and thus processuality and 
finiteness, as fundamental structures of everything in the world. As Heidegger says: 
“every thing which actually is, every being comes and goes at the right time and remains 
for a time during the time allotted to it.”65  
With the idea of Ereignis, the notion of Erfahrung or experience as thinking 
becomes important. Note again that we are not thinking here about the so-called mystical 
experiences, which have been unmasked as residues of metaphysical thinking by 
Heidegger. Experience here is the experience of thinking, which is to say that Heidegger 
wants us to see the process of thinking understood as an experience, this-worldly. “To 
experience means eundo assequi, to obtain something along the way, to attain something 
by going on a way. … To experience is to go along a way.”66 This experience however is 
of necessity “an experience with language.”67 So it is not unmediated as a so-called 
mystical experience would like to have it. Dao is also understood as this ‘going along a 
way,’ and with it an experiencing through language in the sense that when giving 
meaning to the experience we are of necessity within language. For any experience to get 
any meaning it needs immediate insertion in the iterability structure of language.  
Translating dao as ‘way’ has definite connotations with a stretch that connects 
two fixed points. Heidegger’s thoughts about Weg have tried to undo this understanding 
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of ‘way.’ Heidegger gave his Gesamtausgabe the subtitle: “Wege, nicht Werke.” Ways, 
not works. This can be compared to Zhuangzi chapter 1, of which the title is “Free and 
Easy Wandering.”68 The meaning of this title and chapter (and indeed one of the central 
concerns of the Zhuangzi), I take to be this idea that the way is not fixed, it has no 
definite goal, but is structurally open-ended itself. We are always, and will always 
remain, underway, on the way. And this ‘way’ is not one fixed road, but multiple in itself 
and open, or as Heidegger explained referring to Sein und Zeit, this way is “a way, not 
‘the’ way, which never exists in philosophy.”69  
Being on a way as such it is inevitable that we are always leaving traces. Thinking 
cuts furrows, leaves traces. Thinking is acting. To end this section I want to refer back to 
these notions of trace, cutting furrows, tracing, Spur. I have tried to argue that notions 
such as ‘trace,’ ‘furrow,’ and ‘Spur’ have connections with the notion dao, which are 
conducive to a reading of dao that sees ‘it’ as less determined, open-ended, and refers 
more to the human aspect without succumbing to subjectivism. It is man that makes the 
way, but it is easier to see and less anthropocentric to say that it is man that leaves traces 
as being part of the environment. In trying to be as non-anthropocentric as is humanly 
possible, the point made by the Daoists would be that the traces one leaves should not be 
interfering with other traces, they should be ziran and wuwei. This acknowledges man’s 
place in the universe, yet on first sight does not seem to grant man special status. Yet man 
is special in that humans are the only ones who have seemingly strayed from their dao, 
and who are thus capable of thinking and relating to dao in a special way. Heidegger 
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similarly gives man a special status, but not so much as subjects against objects, and on 
this I will have to quote Heidegger at length:  
“We always say too little of “being itself” when, in saying “being,” we omit its 
essential presencing (An-wesen) in the direction of the human essence 
(Menschenwesen) and thereby fail to see that this essence itself is part of “being.” 
We also always say too little of the human being when, in saying “being” (not 
being human) we posit the human being as independent and then first bring what 
we have thus posited into a relation to “being.” Yet we also always say too much 
when we mean being as the all-encompassing, and in so doing represent the 
human being only as one particular entity among others (such as plant and 
animal), and place them in relation to one another. For there already lies within 
the human essence the relation to that which – through a relation, a relating in the 
sense of needful usage (Brauchen) – is determined as “being” and so through this 
relation is removed from its supposed “self-independence.” (“an und für sich”) 
[…] In truth we cannot then even continue to say that “being” and “the human 
being” “are” the Same (das Selbe) in the sense that they belong together; for 
when we say it in this way, we continue to let both subsist independently.”70  
Being does not happen without human beings, and in the same way there is no experience 
of dao as the whole of processes, without humans. Heidegger tells us that “Being 
requires/uses (braucht) man, so that it can unfold (wese), and man belongs to Being, on 
which he can fulfil his utmost destination as Da-sein.”71 The interplay of Being and 
Dasein is what makes both possible, or as Heidegger phrases it, “[t]his counterpoise 
(Gegenschwung) of requiring (Brauchens) and belonging (Zugehörens) makes up Being 
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as Ereignis.”72 In Daoism, only (some) humans can experience dao as dao. To quote 
Zhuangzi on the subject: “The Way (dao) comes about as we walk it.”73 There is thus no 
pre-fixed road or way which we only need to find, the way is made by what we think and 
do. This suggests a similar idea of interplay, which can also be seen in the dao character 
itself, as it is made up of head and foot. There is (or at least there should be) a continuity 
between dao and de as man’s specific dao. In the Daodejing chapter 23 it is said: “Way-
making (dao) is moreover enhanced by those who express character (de), just as it is 
diminished by those who themselves have lost it.”74 Both chapters 16 and 25 of the 
Daodejing express similar ideas in their establishment of an essential connection between 
the king, tian and dao. The description by Ames and Hall of way-making and its essential 
human component is enlightening here. By translating dao as ‘way-making’ they put 
more emphasis on the human experience of daoing, the human experience of process. 
This is why Ames and Hall relate dao to terms as “fluidity and reflexivity,” and why they 
call the dao character “gerundative, processional, and dynamic.”75 This is not solely to 
point to the process character of dao, but also to denote the human factor in the 
experience of this process. 
Humans then, have a specific dao, or at least a specific relation to dao, and they 
would do good to attune this relation to more natural daos, in other words, not to see dao 
as fixed, but to accommodate their dao to change and process. We must then compare the 
interpretation of Daoist way-making by Ames and Hall to Heidegger. First of all, 
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75 Ames & Hall 2003, 59 and 57. 
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Heidegger’s understanding of Weg is just as far from a fixed path and just as close to 
human experience as is dao in our interpretation.  
“To clear a way […] is in the Alemannic-Schwabian dialect still called wëgen 
even today. This verb, used transitively, means: to form a way and, forming it, to 
keep it ready. Way-making [Be-wëgen (Be-wëgung)] understood in this sense no 
longer means to move something up or down a path that is already there. It 
means to bring the way […] forth first of all, and thus to be the way. 
Appropriation [Ereignis] appropriates man to its own usage [Brauch]. Showing 
[Zeigen] as appropriating thus transpires and Appropriation is the way-making 
[Be-wëgung] for Saying [Sage] to come to language. This way-making puts 
language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the 
sounded word).”76 
Heidegger speaks of “a more originary call,”77 indeed on more than one occasion, of the 
belonging together of man and Being, which seeks to undo the artificial rule of 
technology and metaphysics, the artificial subject-object distinctions. Similarly Laozi 
speaks of undoing the artificial Confucian impositions and attuning oneself to dao as the 
more natural, originary way of life.78 As with Heidegger’s Geviert, humans (mortals) can 
only be seen as acting and becoming themselves in a constellation, and not outside of 
their surroundings, and more importantly, of which more later, not outside of language. 
The divinities of Heidegger’s Geviert need not be understood as outside of this world, as 
has been mentioned in chapter one. Heidegger rather understands divinity as an essential 
part of the world, which means that he is trying to say that our everyday understanding of 
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square brackets added. 
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 Heidegger 1996, 411; 1998, 311. 
78 Daodejing, especially chapters 18, 19 and 38. 
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the world is superficial, whereas all things have more meaning than we can imagine with 
our scientifically oriented way of knowing. The divinities thus point to the 
mysteriousness of the world also found in Daoism. Anyway we look at it, humans are a 
special part of the constellation that is called Geviert. This is also why Heidegger is 
closer to the Daodejing than to the Zhuangzi, as the Zhuangzi is much more explicit in 
challenging the special position of mankind. Yet in my view even in the Zhuangzi man is 
special in that man is the only one able to mediate between tian and earth. Man, or at 
least the sage, has the ability to step outside of the purely natural world and take on a 
wider perspective in accordance with tian. But that said, Heidegger is definitely closer to 
Laozi here. Although there are analogies of man, mostly in the form of sages, with the 
non-human world in the Daodejing, there is to my knowledge no paradigmatic shift of 
perspective from human to non-human as there is in the Zhuangzi.  
Another feature of the closeness of Heidegger to Laozi is in their style. Both tend 
to write in an obscure fashion, which is one of the reasons why mysticism has been 
invoked in both. Especially Heidegger’s later work is shrouded in obscurity, difficult 
terminology and suggestiveness. Yet it is important to see that Heidegger wrote in such a 
way on purpose, since as we have seen, this is part of the impact of arguing for the 
interdependence and relationality of unconcealing and concealing. In the case of Laozi, 
the obscurity in the writing is similarly a calling to attention of the retreat of things 
profound into darkness, an acknowledgement again of the untraceable trace-character of 
the world. We will see later how Derrida and Zhuangzi, although their writings are 
equally obscure, are also linked in a different way, in their more playful style of writing. 
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Yet if thinking is acting, then how do Heidegger and the Daoists see this acting? 
Here we have to make a comparison between Heidegger’s Gelassenheit and the Daoist 
notions of wuwei and ziran, but we can also think of Entschlossenheit and 
Erschlossenheit, openness and preparedness. If we compare Gelassenheit to notions as 
wuwei and ziran, we should note that none of these suggest a negative or passive attitude 
towards things, and also not towards language. Gelassenheit is an attitude which listens 
to the call of Being, to Saying. And that attitude seems to entail an abandoning of the self 
to the primacy of the event, the Ereignis. Similarly, wuwei as non-assertive action does 
not mean one can not speak, but that one will naturally be extremely careful with one’s 
words, so as not to upset the ziran workings of the world by artificial constructions. This 
however only happens after having unlearned the artificial, propositional use of language. 
Chapter 48 of the Daodejing conveys this idea that “in learning of way-making (dao), 
there is daily decrease: One loses and again loses [t]o the point that one does things non-
coercively (wuwei).”79  
Etymologically the wu character could be compared to Heidegger’s notion 
Lichtung. Lichtung, or clearing, which as we have seen is how Heidegger describes the 
unconcealing concealing play of differences, is an open space in the woods.80 The wu 
character is similarly based on men cutting trees, clearing the woods, and both thus can 
be understood as pointing to a void within a larger whole. Again we see that this void (or 
nothing) is not something opposed to being or beings, but is with being just another 
integral part of the whole process. 
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80 See Heidegger 2000, 71-72, 1972, 65. 
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Heidegger’s understanding of ‘trace’ is important in this context, as both nothing 
and being are not to be understood as pure identities, but there are always traces of the 
one in the other. They only function together. This will also help to explain how 
Heidegger is closer to Laozi than to Zhuangzi. In both Heidegger and the Daodejing there 
is still the possibility of a reading that assumes that there is something behind the trace, 
and while that need not be some transcendent entity, it does point, in both Heidegger81 
and Laozi82, to some originary source even if that source is this-worldly and obscure. As 
we will see later both Derrida and Zhuangzi will question this whole notion of a source 
behind the traces.  
Yet I do not want to suggest translating dao as ‘trace.’ Etymologically this might 
be possible, if stretching, but does it fit in the text? If we think about the notions of head 
and foot, tracking, leading forth, the experience of going through something, a middle 
way, of thinking cutting furrows in the soil of Being, then there might be some interest in 
comparing dao with trace. The etymology of dao can certainly be read as having to do 
with going forth and thus leaving traces, but Heidegger might not be the thinker to 
continue this line of thought with. Derrida on the other hand has taken up this notion of 
trace, and in my view succeeds in making it clear that in his case, trace does not imply 
some transcendent or transcendental ‘trace-creator.’  
4.2.2 DERRIDA AND DAOISM. 
                                                
81 See for example Pöggeler on trace in Heidegger, in Parkes 1987, 70, or Heidegger’s frequent mentions of 
things like ‘the secret of Being’ and ‘the originary call.’ 
82 In the Daodejing there are hints that could be understood as pointing to a source of which we can only 
perceive the traces, in a negative theology fashion. Although these hints can also, as I have shown, be read 
in another way, it is possible to give the metaphysical reading, seemingly in the Daodejing and in 
Heidegger as well. 
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Derrida denies that there is a Heideggerian, more originary call from somewhere. In other 
words, there are no fundamental words and no profound connection between humanity 
and being, ideas which he dismisses as remnants of metaphysical thinking. As such he is 
closer to Zhuangzi, who also challenges these notions.  
I will begin the comparison of Derrida and Daoism with the notion of ‘trace.’ 
Derrida uses many terms related to this ‘trace’ thinking, which have definite connections 
to dao, as in way-making. ‘Breaching’ (Bahnung (German) or Frayage (French)) plays 
an important role in Derrida. ‘Spacing’ and ‘supplement’ are other terms used in this 
connection. In the second chapter I have explained that ‘trace’ as Derrida understands it 
is the play of otherness, of differences, that which no longer belongs to presence, and has 
no real origin or source. Derrida refers to this play of differance as temporisation,83 which 
also points to the deferring part of differance, or what we could call, temporal tracing. 
Presence is always deferred; it is always only a trace of presence, a wandering without 
goal, the presence of which does not exist. Traces are all we have. 
In trying to see dao in this way, it would then become impossible even to refer to 
dao as a principle, since that notion already implies that there is something guiding 
something else, before something else, a presence before the trace. Chapter 62 of the 
Daodejing says that “Way-making (dao) is the flowing together of all things (wanwu).”84 
This passage implies a process thinking which is commensurable with Derrida’s trace 
thinking, since there is nothing behind the flowing together of things, meaning first of all 
that there is no guiding principle behind it, and second that all things flow together in the 
sense that they have traces in each other. Again, this reading proposes a denial of the 
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presence of pure identities. Other chapters of the Daodejing can be read in the same way. 
Chapter 4, 6 and 14 all talk about dao as ever evading, as only seemingly there, which 
means there is no getting beyond the hinting traces. And in chapter 21 it is said:  
“As for the process of way-making,  
It is ever so indefinite and vague.  
Though vague and indefinite,  
There are images within it.  
Though indefinite and vague,  
There are events within it.”85  
This I take to mean a very similar thing as what Derrida suggests that within the system, 
only differences function and thus only traces with otherness are to be found. The system 
itself is nothing else than this play of differences, but within that system of course there 
are references. These references however never attain the fullness that is suggested by the 
metaphysical tradition. Two arguments in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi say something 
similar. When everything has a “this” and a “that,” full identities are denied and the way 
is opened for seeing things as traces in traces. And a bit further Zhuangzi says: 
“There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a 
not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. 
There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet 
beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is being and 
nonbeing. But between this being and nonbeing, I don’t really know which is 
being and which is nonbeing.”86 
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Otherness is always inserted. Yin is always yin becoming yang, and vice versa. There is 
always a regression, which means we can not see things otherwise than as infinite traces 
only identifiable by ever expanding context. Graham puts it in a nice way, although I do 
not agree with his use of capital letters: “Perhaps Lao-tzu’s Way is how the Trace will 
look to us when we are no longer haunted by the ghost of that transcendent Reality the 
death of which Derrida proclaims.”87 
We have seen that although Derrida sometimes seems to insist on certain Western 
features of philosophy, like the question, the critique of culture and a certain rationality, 
this does not mean he subscribes to the ideas of Western philosophy. To remember this, I 
will refer to chapter 2 of this dissertation where I have explained the connection between 
Derrida and negative theology, which showed that although Derrida is obviously aware 
of the necessity of using metaphysical language, and of keeping certain ideas ‘under 
erasure,’ this does not mean that either Derrida or Daoism need succumb to this 
metaphysical inclination. What we can argue with Derrida is that the metaphysics of 
being as presence has obscured different possible readings, both within the West and of 
readings of those texts of the East we are discussing here. Differance then is not an 
overarching principle, (it) is relationality, the never ending play of differing and 
deferring, in which each identity is only an abstraction of the more fundamental 
relationality, the inter-play. There is a bottomlessness to this endless processuality, 
endless referencing, endless tracing, and this is something which is also acknowledged by 
Heidegger’s notions Abgrund and Zeit-Spiel-Raum, and which we can see in the ever so 
“indefiniteness” and “vagueness” of the process of dao.  
                                                
87 Graham 1989, 228, italics in original. 
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Speaking of differance, Derrida says that “temporization is also temporalization 
and spacing, the becoming-time of space and becoming-space of time.”88 ‘Spacing’ has 
the same connotation. Differance then, as this inter-play, is located “between speech and 
writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other, 
occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are two.”89 Similarly, “Différance is 
the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of 
which elements are related to each other.”90 And we need to remember what Derrida 
really means when he said there was nothing beyond the text, which is that this text 
means context, and this context means the whole play of differences that make up the 
world at any time.  
Toby Arvard Foshay, among others, points to the fact that many comparisons take 
no account of the fact that Derrida does not deny that there is a referential structure 
between language and its outside, but that deconstruction is first and foremost targeted at 
the relation between signifier and signified, and not between sign and referent.91 Yet this 
does not mean that deconstruction has no implications beyond this signifier/signified 
relation: By aiming at this relation, “deconstruction tries to show that the question of 
reference is much more complex and problematic than traditional theories supposed. […] 
But to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or 
complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is 
nothing beyond language.”92 There is a whole world out there, it is just that Derrida 
denies that we can ever have unmediated access to it, and that the mediated access we do 
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have is always provisional. This leads us to the question about the permanence or 
impermanence of dao. A merely relative stability means there is no possibility of 
generalising beyond the situational events, in Daoism the process of change takes 
precedent over any local ordering. There are structures that endure for a certain time, 
there is some permanence to things, but there is also and more importantly the 
impermanence of daos. This is especially so for the relation of man to things. As Graham 
notices: “It is all right to make fluid distinctions varying with circumstances, it is when 
we make rigid distinctions misleading us into judging that something is permanently what 
it is temporarily convenient to name it that thinking goes wrong.”93 Both Derrida and the 
Daoists thus argue for the provisionality of our thought and our language, but not against 
thinking and language per se. 
By now it should be clear that any comparison which looks for similarities 
between Derrida and Daoism should not focus on those metaphysical interpretations 
which have tried to see dao as a foundational principle in the same vein as God or some 
sort of platonic idea. So if we are to compare this non-concept of differance to dao, we 
should find a way to read this kind of denial of transcendental principles in(-to) the 
Daoist classics. Here it might be useful to look at Ames’ interpretation of Pang Pu.  
“Pang Pu in explaining the “birthing, life, and growth (sheng)” of the cosmos 
makes a crucial distinction between “paisheng” in the sense of one thing giving 
birth to an independent existent, like a hen producing an egg, and “huasheng ” as 
one thing transforming into something else, like summer becoming autumn. […] 
In this process of creatio in situ, there is no product independent of the producer. 
Discourse is simply the outside of an inside. Cosmologically there is no 
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progenitor independent of the progeny, but rather a proliferating and living on of 
the progenitor in the progeny. Analogously, in community, there is no speaker 
independent of the speech, but rather a living on of the speaker in the speech.”94 
In principle, the possibility of a transcendent creator or creative principle is denied in the 
classical Chinese worldview. In its place, or rather as some other way of seeing things, 
we look for generation of meaning from the inside. The birthing metaphors abundant in 
Daoism are one way of seeing the emergence of meaning. These metaphors also imply 
that there are always traces of otherness in the self, each and every mother is also a 
daughter, the process is continuous. As such, the blank and the in-between, the swinging 
gateway that in themselves are nothing, but which make possible any signification can be 
read in resonance with Daodejing, chapter 11, where it is suggested that emptiness is 
exactly what provides the possibility of signification, yet without ‘itself’ being anything 
outside the process. But again, as we see, there is an interpretation needed here of the 
Daodejing which is not at all standard or obvious, because it has affinities with Derrida’s 
non-metaphysical thinking. Also, chapter 1 of Daodejing does not only talk about dao as 
ineffable, but of the need to stay with the mystery of the interplay between the nameless 
and what is named:  
“Together they are called obscure. 
The obscurest of the obscure, 
They are the swinging gateway of the manifold mysteries.”95 
It is precisely this gateway, this hinge that I have already taken as an important idea in the 
previous chapter, and that I want to take again as my point of departure in the 
comparison. I have already argued that man in general, and even the sages, should be 
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someone in-between Heaven and man. A person in “whom neither Heaven nor man is 
victor over the other, this is what is meant by the True Man.”96 I have also argued that the 
works of the Daoist classics are aimed at preparing people for a responsiveness to the 
world around them that recognises both the dangers and importance of language as 
necessities. In all these senses there is an important place for the non-place of the in-
between or interval. As Derrida states regarding time, one of the ongoing focal points of 
the discussion, and I will have to quote at length:  
“It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if 
each so-called “present” element, each element appearing on the scene of 
presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself 
the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of 
its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called 
the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the 
present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it is absolutely not, 
not even a past or a future as a modified present. An interval must separate the 
present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval 
that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of 
itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on 
the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and 
singularly substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself 
dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of 
time or the becoming-time of space (temporization).”97 
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In my view this interval, the between that is itself nothing, not just as difference, but also 
as time-related difference, as spacing, or as trace, is an important aspect of Daoist 
thinking. Apart from frayage (breaching), Derrida also mentions the French word brisure 
in connection to trace. Brisure means both ‘joint’ and ‘break,’ and thus is both what 
brings things together and what sets them apart. Brisure can thus mean both what is split, 
fractured, broken and yet it also means ‘hinge,’ ‘joint,’ as in the hinge that connects two 
parts.98 All these words, differance, hinge, brisure, spacing, trace, point to the same thing: 
That interminable process of the play of differences, and that is also what Daoism points 
to. As Zhuangzi puts it: “[A]ll the ten thousand things are what they are, and thus they 
enfold each other.”99 This is also the way I read the cook Ding passage of chapter 3 of the 
Zhuangzi. Cook Ding says that his skill is really about finding the spaces in-between 
where things are joined: “At that joint there is an interval, and the chopper’s edge has no 
thickness; if you insert what has no thickness where there is an interval, then […] there is 
ample room to move the edge about.”100  
So there are many similarities based on a non-metaphysical reading of Derrida 
and Daoism, and even the style in which they proceed is sometimes similar. This 
(Derridean) style of playing with words is also found with Zhuangzi, and it is one of the 
aspects that make Derrida closer to Zhuangzi than to Laozi. When we look at the form 
and style of the Daoist classics, their inherent fluidity means that they can be seen to 
function as Derridean texts from the start. They were not first original works which later 
suffered from diverse interpretations; they arose exactly as the result of diverse 
interpretations. Readers were implicated in the genealogy of the work from the start, and 
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it is often difficult to see what is commentary and what belongs to the apparent authors 
themselves. And their constant revolving around certain words without ever getting there 
is similar to Derrida’s evading style. But we will see more of this connection when we 
start to focus on what Heidegger, Derrida, Laozi and Zhuangzi seem to consider the most 
important thing in thinking, language.  
4.3 LANGUAGE IN COMPARISON.  
“This breaking up of the word is the true step back on the way of thinking.”101  
As argued before, the idea that language is in some way constitutive for our 
understanding of the world is readily found in Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism. Although 
I will argue that Daoism shares the criticism towards certain forms of language, we 
should not thereby expect that the classical Daoist texts are totally not influenced by 
logo- and/or phonocentrism. In many instances we can find in the Daoist texts the same 
phonocentrism that especially Derrida saw functioning in the Western languages, the idea 
that speaking is somehow closer to meaning than writing. For example, in the Zhuangzi 
chapter 6, the woman ‘crookback’ is asked how she heard the way. Not just the fact that 
this part specifically mentions hearing the way (dao) more than twice, the woman also 
describes it in the following terms: 
“I hear it from Inkstain’s son, who heard it from Bookworm’s grandson, who 
heard it from Wide-eye, who heard it from Eavesdrop, who heard it from Gossip, 
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who heard it from Singsong, who heard it from Obscurity, who heard it from 
Mystery, who heard it from what might have been Beginning.”102 
In this tale we can read a steady digression from exclamation and speaking as being 
closer to the meaning of “what might have been Beginning” to seeing and to writing, 
which are only secondary. It thus gives us the same phonocentric digression from the oral 
to the visual. The translation of this passage by Wing-tsit Chan corroborates this idea as 
he translates the first person in it as the “son of Writing the Assistant (for writing is no 
more than an aid).”103 In general, even though they are written works, there is an 
emphasis on speaking and hearing throughout the Daoist texts, and in the Book of 
Changes, in the Appended Words it is literally said that “writing cannot fully convey the 
speech, and speech cannot fully convey the meaning.”104 Of course we have to remember 
that historically, the simple and quite obvious fact that oral language preceded written 
language in most developments of language around the world is not what Derrida means 
by this phonocentric bias. The phonocentric fallacy consists in thinking that because of 
this development oral language is somehow closer to meaning than written language. In 
seeing this however, we must also see that the Daodejing argues against the possibility 
that ‘hearing’ is better than ‘seeing’ in getting nearer dao.105 And the Zhuangzi argues 
against the stability of all language, so even though it seems to assert that speaking is 
closer to the true meaning than writing, it is in the end both speaking and writing that 
suffer the same provisionality. In fact, every kind of experience functions only because of 
difference. My claim with regard to the so-called ‘direct’ experiences that Daoists refer to 
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would be that any direct experience is first of all immediately taken up by context, and 
that is the only way for it to gain meaning, as the notion of iterability has shown. Second, 
I will claim that such ‘direct’ experiences are nothing other than experiences of 
relationality, of contextuality. 
Comparing Heidegger and Derrida on language is itself a difficult task, and 
comparing their ideas of language to ideas found in classical Chinese language is even 
more difficult, and can only be done indirectly, for numerous obvious reasons. However, 
if we compare Heidegger’s and Derrida’s use of language with classical Chinese 
language, we must be aware that we are making a couple of interpretations of either. First 
of all, it will be my interpretation of both Heidegger’s and Derrida’s thinking as 
presented. Second, since there seems to be no consensus on a theory of classical Chinese, 
it will be a case of comparing this interpretation with some of the interpretations of 
classical Chinese. These latter interpretations, as the preceding chapter has shown, are far 
from coherent and do present conflicting views. There are however views of classical 
Chinese which are close to Heidegger and Derrida, and since these views are important 
contenders in the ongoing debates on classical Chinese, I will use them to reinforce the 
non-metaphysical reading that I am presenting. I will agree with Hansen that “[t]he 
linguistic school that sinologists take to be orthodox assumes that all written languages 
must be transcriptions of spoken language.”106 This orthodoxy in linguistics led to either 
a bias against classical Chinese as inferior to the alphabetic languages, which were 
supposed to be a truer transcription of the phonetic, the spoken language, or else it led to 
the position mentioned earlier, that is a defence of the idea that classical Chinese is 
equally a transcription of spoken language, and therefore not that different from Indo-
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European languages. This orthodoxy, as we have seen, is challenged with regard to 
Western languages by Heidegger and Derrida, as well as by Ames, Hansen and others 
with regard to classical Chinese.  
Heidegger, although a definite proponent of the voice and the spoken word, does 
not necessarily subscribe to the orthodoxy just by this preference. Both written language 
and spoken language are equally originary:  
“The word of language sounds and resounds in the spoken word, shines and 
clears itself in the written image. Sound and writing are certainly something 
sensible (Sinnliches), but the sensible in which a sense or meaning (Sinn) sounds 
and appears.”107 
The quotation of note 1 of this chapter conveys a similar thought, in that it does not 
matter whether a dialogue is “written or spoken or neither.” Although much emphasis is 
often put on Heidegger’s notions of hearing (hören) and belonging (gehören) and other 
related notions, we should not forget Heidegger’s equal insistence on language as 
showing (zeigen), and his writings on paintings, art, that betray the ‘visual’ aspect of his 
thought.  
What remains for us is to see that the metaphysical meaning or the propositional, 
representational sense of language is but one of many possible ones. Heidegger’s idea is 
that ‘Saying’ (Sage) as his poetic thinking is more capable of thinking beyond the 
confines of metaphysics. This Saying guards the necessary ambiguity of language, its 
differential and metaphorical nature. As such it seems awkward to our metaphysically 
trained minds. This Saying, as Heidegger says,  
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“must always pass through the essential ambiguity (Mehrdeutigkeit) of the word 
and its turn of phrase. The ambiguity of saying by no means consists in a mere 
accumulation of significations that arise arbitrarily. It resides in a play that, the 
richer it unfolds, remains all the more rigorously maintained in a concealed rule. 
Via the latter, the ambiguity plays in the balance of scales whose oscillations we 
rarely experience. This is why saying remains bound to a supreme law. This law 
is the freedom that frees us for the ever playful jointure of never resting 
transformation. The ambiguity of those words that “arise like flowers” 
(Hölderlin, “Bread and Wine”) is the garden of the wilderness in which growth 
and nurturance are attuned to one another out of an incomprehensible 
intimacy.”108  
The vagueness, ambiguity or polysemy inherent in language is also most persistently 
noticed by Laozi and Zhuangzi and their thinking thus takes vagueness serious, and not 
just in language. Steve Coutinho has argued for seeing this vagueness as a productive 
force in Daoist thinking. We see this vagueness employed by Laozi and Zhuangzi in their 
efforts to relate their processual way of thinking.109 Coutinho finds vagueness at work in 
the notions of the penumbral, transformations between opposites, growth and decline, and 
especially important for our inquiry in the language of paradoxes and contradictions. This 
means that both Laozi and Zhuangzi did not subscribe to the orthodoxy in their time 
regarding language, but sought to convey a different understanding of using language. 
That Derrida does not subscribe to the orthodoxy in linguistics that was 
mentioned earlier is I hope by now clear. The multiple terminology of Derrida suggests 
that language is forever provisional. The great import of Daoism with regards to language 
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seems to be that, especially in the Zhuangzi, it is not only understood that language 
guides behaviour, and that it is prescriptive, but that it is so only imperfectly, and that 
language itself can and will come back to haunt its own ideas. This however is not to say 
that language should be abolished, but like Derrida, Laozi and Zhuangzi are aware that 
while dao is ineffable, and words do not really say anything, they are nonetheless needed 
and continue to defy our ambitions (or those of the stricter Confucians seeking a final 
rectification of names) to tie them down. Language, or rather words, are like the statues 
of Daedalus, in that they will not stay put, but will start to run around as soon as created. 
To be skilful in playing with this phenomenon of language, and to continually stay aware 
of it, is the strength of both Derrida and especially Zhuangzi when he explicitly mentions 
and uses ‘spillover words.’ As Graham describes it, Zhuangzi “uses words not like a 
philosopher but like a poet, sensitive to their richness, exploiting their ambiguities, letting 
conflicting meanings explode against each other in apparent contradiction.”110 The idea 
of both Zhuangzi and Derrida seems to be not so much that language is useless and to be 
discarded, but that we should use it to its utmost possibilities and thereby rethink its 
normal usage from a different standpoint. By letting words ‘explode’ against each other, 
by exploiting the fullest range of meanings of any term, by bringing out ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, they show us how language is not up to the promise of pure medium, and 
how we are trapped in a way because we have to use language, meaning we are always in 
a web of signification and can only operate from within this web. If this is understood as 
possibility, then Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism advocate a use of language that seeks to 
explore it to its fullest possibilities, and this with full awareness of its dangers and 
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limitations, rather than discard it. As Graham puts it, speaking of Zhuangzi (but the 
passage could equally well apply to Derrida):  
“In one of his many aspects he is himself a true sophist, fascinated by the 
subversion of received opinions and intoxicated by the plunge which imperils 
rationality in the course of discovering its possibilities. He is also, even in the 
flow of reason itself, a poet who changes course as new insights explode, 
elliptical even when most logical.”111 
Language, or writing in the Derridean sense, is constitutive of our experience in the 
world. We have seen that Derrida’s “nothing outside the text” means that our lives 
revolve around structures of signification. Being in these webs of signification means we 
are thus relational at our core and revolve around ‘language’ or ‘discourse.’ We are dia-
logos. In Chinese thinking Ames has put this point forward in a similar way:  
“we are nothing more or less than the ongoing and sedimenting aggregate of 
these various levels of discourse: what we say and hear, what our countenances 
express and how it affects others, what our formal behaviors communicate and 
what they precipitate, what our body language and gestures indicate and how 
they are interpreted, what our voices and songs convey and how others are 
prompted to respond to them. As such, we are the organisms that in our doings 
and undergoings emerge discursively out of these performances of ourselves in 
community.”112 
What emerges in the Daoist way of thinking is this idea of the ever ongoing formation of 
our experiences by forces in- and outside. What both Daoists and Derrida do is to find 
ways of appreciating this ongoing working of dao or of differance. In this view we must 
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also remember that in the Zhuangzi it is said that things “are ties to each other,” meaning 
that everything is related in differential webs, and that language is also such a web, 
existing only because of and by this relationality. Like Derrida, Zhuangzi, according to 
Watson, “rejects the conventional values of words as well, deliberately employing them 
to mean the opposite of what they ordinarily mean in order to demonstrate their essential 
meaninglessness. When a writer does this, he of course invites misunderstanding, no 
matter how dazzling the literary effects he achieves.”113 But equally like Derrida, the 
provocation employed by Zhuangzi is not about the total meaninglessness of words but 
about the mistake of assigning fixed meanings. Since he is aware of the need of words, 
and equally welcomes misunderstandings as possibilities to upset the orthodoxy of fixed 
meaning, so he looks for a similar soul, who “has forgotten words, so I can have a word 
with him.”114 Such a person is aware of the provisionality of language, has forgotten the 
idea that words have fixed meanings, and is therefore a suitable candidate for dialogue. 
Essentially, both Derrida and Zhuangzi are aware that there is no way they can ever 
permanently escape the workings of language, and thus they want to break up the rigidity 
of the workings of the ways of thinking in which they were brought up.  
Does Zhuangzi really suggest not speaking and returning to a state of ‘nature’? In 
my opinion this view is wrong. What then is the nature of wuwei and ziran? These 
notions should, as I have explained earlier, not be understood as being against language 
per se. Heidegger, Derrida, Laozi and Zhuangzi have all argued against the common 
sense notions of language and its possibilities, against its literal interpretations, yet in my 
view none of them have argued against language per se. It is thus a different idea of 
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language and its possibilities that is put forward, an idea that challenges metaphysical 
notions of presence, of reference and representation. The importance of language lies 
exactly in the fact that it is our vehicle for thinking, but that metaphysical (or Confucian) 
language prohibits certain ways of thinking and tends to make artificial distinctions. It is 
thus not a question of leaving the vehicle behind, but of understanding how it functions, 
what it does and can do, in seeing our relation to language differently. As Heidegger 
says:  
“What if the language of metaphysics and metaphysics itself, whether it is that of 
the living or of the dead god, in fact constituted, as metaphysics, that limit which 
prevents a transition over the line, i.e., the overcoming of nihilism? If this were 
the case, would not crossing the line then necessarily have to become a 
transformation of our saying and demand a transformed relation to the essence of 
language?”115 
Aside from the fact that this statement (rightly, I think) suggests that nihilism is only a 
function and problem of still thinking within the metaphysical structure, it also means 
that we should leave behind language as the discourse of representation, we no longer 
talk about the world in propositional statements, but we should rather return to the 
language of Saying (Sage), which speaks from Being. Derrida might see this as an 
impossible and rather nostalgic approach, but Heidegger is well aware that all language, 
including his own, is subject to the restrictions and dangers inherent in language:  
“the word itself already reveals something (known) and thereby conceals that 
which should be brought into openness in thoughtful Saying. This difficulty can 
not be removed by anything, indeed even the attempt to do so already means the 
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failure to appreciate all Saying of Being. This difficulty must be undertaken and 
understood in its essential belonging (to thinking Being.)”116  
Language might be considered an obstacle, yet it is a necessary obstacle and as such a 
possibility of which we must be aware, and which we must not shun to employ to its 
fullest. Thus I think in direct contradistinction to Hansen, who says that Daoists seek to 
“remove language,”117 that they rather seek an awareness of the artificiality of language 
and of the need to nevertheless turn that artificiality against itself, making it ‘explode’ by 
deconstructing it. Understood in this sense, a different thinking approach to language 
becomes necessary. In Heidegger’s words: “The point is not to listen to a series of 
propositions, but rather to follow the movement of showing.”118 Saying (Sagen) is 
showing (Zeigen). As Ames and Hall have argued, in Daoism this awareness of the fact 
that ming (language) ming (commands) was furthered by the realisation that seeking to 
close off this ‘naming’ in a system of fixed reference is not the way to do justice to the 
ongoing process.119 Or, in the words of Jullien: “The issue, then, is to consider the heart 
of language: to invent a speech that can baffle its condition as language and break its 
mold; a speech that frees itself from the factitious oppositions we usually project onto 
language and thereby lifts us outside the unilaterality of point of view; a speech that is not 
blocked in any direction but articulates the eternal transition of things.”120 Another way 
of saying this is that we should not consider ourselves as subjects who master the world 
by language, in fact we do not even master language itself, we just try to follow what it 
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says and explore its possibilities with an awareness of its provisional, prescriptive and 
performative functions. In Heidegger’s thought, it is language which speaks, not us.121 
That such a reading as I am presenting is not alone, could for example be glanced 
from Youru Wang’s idea of a liminology of language in Chan Buddhism.122 I do not quite 
agree with his coinage of the term liminology, which sounds and is presented as if one 
could turn deconstruction into a theory or a method, which could then be applied, 
something neither Heidegger nor Derrida would agree with.123 However, the important 
point of Wang’s paper on language in Chan Buddhism is that he explains how Chan 
Buddhists do not so much seek an experience that would transcend language, they rather 
seek to de-limit language, in other words, to free language from its artificial boundaries. 
Those boundaries are in our case the metaphysical way of thinking, which has set 
language within the subject-object distinction, seeing it as a tool or medium for our use, 
and thus preventing other ways of thinking about language their place. This I think is 
what gets to the heart of what chapter 1 of the Daodejing is trying to convey in its 
paradoxical way. Do not follow language as representing, as propositional, as if you were 
a subject using language as an object, but listen closely and follow what is being said or 
hinted at. Not only the first, but also the final chapter 81 of the Daodejing suggests this: 
“True words are not beautiful; 
Beautiful words are not true. 
A good man does not argue; 
He who argues is not a good man. 
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A wise man has no extensive knowledge; 
He who has extensive knowledge is not a wise man.”124  
The representational and propositional attitude to language and wisdom is not the attitude 
of the Daoist.  
The same goes for the Zhuangzi, which is full of messages of a similar kind, like 
the passages in chapter 2 which regard the acceptability or non-acceptability of 
propositional language as superficial, wrongheaded, and claim that following dao 
overcomes this duality by not adhering to fixed representational schemes. Following any 
fixed representational or propositional scheme “obscures” or “hides” dao by installing 
artificial ideas of right and wrong.125  
In Chan Buddhism the direct, uncontrolled and paradoxical sayings of the masters 
are used as tools to bring us out of the dogmatic slumber of propositional thinking. The 
paradox is a tool to make us see that metaphysical language with its insistence on strict 
meaning is wrongheaded, and this is to make us see language differently. The Koans of 
Chan Buddhism thus, although in the first place aimed at enlightenment, further function 
to keep us on guard against relying on propositional language and thus on propositional 
thinking. To this extent it is similar to what Heidegger and Derrida try to convey.  
I will argue then that the so-called ‘ineffability’ of dao does not lead us to a 
transcendental signified in whatever form, which would just be unattainable, but that this 
dao nevertheless functions as the negative space between, and as such seems to be the 
lubricant which keeps the whole process running smoothly. Many commentators have 
perceived what they thought to be a great irony, that the Daoists who were proclaiming to 
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get rid of language, who were saying that words cannot convey the meaning, nevertheless 
wrote and did so very eloquently, using the full richness of the language at their disposal. 
If my interpretation is right, then there really is no irony. Daoists wrote since they 
perceived the necessity of language, and they valued language highly, but they did write 
against a certain type and use of language which is exactly the kind of language that 
conceptualises an ultimate reality behind appearances, and they proceeded to argue that 
there was another way we could think of language. As Derrida has put it, any largely 
“nonphonetic writing breaks the noun apart. It describes relations and not 
appellations.”126 This brings me back to the difference between performative versus 
constative language. Hall and Ames say: “The performative function of language 
reflected in the normative implications of shi and fei means that naming (ming) a world, 
we are commanding (ming) this world into being.”127 A danger in understanding 
language this way lies in the fact that through language we seem to master the world. The 
Chan masters in their paradoxical use of language seem to be doing nothing more than 
‘mastering’ or overcoming language, exactly in their so-called free use of it. Yet here we 
could find a difference with Derrida and Heidegger, who say that it is language which 
speaks, remains beyond the grasp of man and exactly therefore frustrates all attempts at 
reappropriation. Youru Wang, precisely in coining the term liminology, seems to agree 
with this extraordinary mastering of language. But in Daoism I think this attitude is not 
found that easily. Zhuangzi argues that the meaning of words is never fixed, so even what 
he says himself slips away.128 And in the Daodejing it is said that both the named and the 
nameless together are ‘obscure,’ and the general mistrust of language is here never 
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superseded, any kind of naming is subject to the same forces. It is not hereby argued that 
language has no function, but that its appropriateness is provisional. It is also therefore 
that the distinction between literal language and metaphorical language is usually not 
acknowledged in Daoism. That would lead us to say that in Daoism metaphorical 
language is valued in itself. Even such a statement falls short of understanding that the 
whole distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘metaphorical’ language itself rests on the 
assumption that the former would somehow convey reality better, whereas the latter 
would be derivative and parasitic on this literal language. But the idea of literal language 
can only exist on the assumption that reality (at least ideally) can be fully determined in a 
univocal way. Even Confucius’ ‘rectification’ of names does not suggest going as far as 
this, especially if we take into account Xunzi’s acknowledgment that “[n]ames have no 
intrinsic appropriateness, [and] […] no intrinsic reality.”129 Naming is based on 
conventions, and although some names can be good, they must not be thought to be 
permanently good. Even though the processuality of dao admits of a certain constancy, 
language must remain alert to follow the changes that occur. What has to be meant by the 
statement that in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi literal and metaphorical language cannot be 
separated is that such an assumption of a fixed reality and fixed references to it are not 
part of the Daoist outlook.130 The distinction itself does not arise in the first place, or in 
the Heideggerian terminology of Michael Heim:  
“where ‘beings’ have not yet been determined on the basis of a highest being, 
there can as yet be no strictly ‘metaphorical’ way of speaking and thinking. It is 
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only with us, [the West, SVB] where the tradition of rationalism is dominant, that 
we may speak of ‘metaphor’ or literally ‘bringing over’ (Greek metapherein) one 
kind of being to illuminate another kind of being.”131  
The metaphor is impossible to circumvent, and that is also what leads Heidegger, Derrida 
and the Daoists to the conclusion that all language is provisional, there is no literal 
language. As Derrida has shown in “White Mythology,”132 the ‘light’ metaphor is one of 
the most pervasive metaphors in Western philosophy. The light metaphor is meant to take 
us to the ‘real’ meaning beyond metaphor, but as Derrida shows, such a move to an 
unmediated presence is impossible. Heidegger also does not subscribe to the light 
metaphor. Lichtung, or clearing, is a space in which light is being let in. So it would seem 
Heidegger does work with this metaphor. Yet we must remember that the star was 
Heidegger’s favourite light metaphor. The star is light, but light in darkness, arising out 
of darkness. And the Lichtung is only such in the surrounding darkness. Thus Heidegger 
stays true to the idea that unconcealing only happens within concealing. 
Similarly, in Daoism, when something is profound, it retreats into darkness. It 
becomes vague, obscure, “and yet there are images within it,”133 and that suggests that 
Daoists were aware of the same interplay of light and darkness. In the Zhuangzi chapter 2 
mentions, after a lot of talk involving ‘clarity’ or ‘illumination,’ that this is really to be 
understood as “Shaded Light” (Pao Kuang).134 Graham translates this as referring to a 
star, thus reaffirming the light-in-darkness idea.135 Coutinho’s insistence on vagueness 
functions in the same vein. The penumbra, the in-between of light and darkness is an 
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important feature of Coutinho’s argument, and is also found in Ziporyn’s study of Guo 
Xiang.136 But we must now move on and see where this in-between could be located.  
4.4 ‘BEYOND’ THE INVERSION OF OPPOSITES.  
“The sorting which evens things out.”137  
The inversion of opposites or the negative approach we have been talking about in 
Heidegger, in Derrida and in Daoism, must be recognised as a stage. Yet this stage is not 
something to be overcome in a dialectic Aufhebung of the Hegelian kind. Heidegger and 
Derrida, as well as Laozi and Zhuangzi, make it very clear that the stage of inversion, 
although a stage, is always a necessary stage. There is no position beyond it where we 
can rest on our laurels; there is always the danger of reappropriation into metaphysical 
structures, in fixed meanings, and in fact we are never totally beyond such structures. As 
Derrida puts it:  
“To counter this simple alternative [the mere inversion of opposites, SVB], to 
counter the simple choice of one of the terms or one of the series against the 
other, we maintain that it is necessary to seek new concepts and new models, an 
economy escaping this system of metaphysical oppositions. […] If we appear to 
oppose one series to the other, it is because from within the classical system we 
wish to make apparent the noncritical privilege naively granted to the other series 
by a certain structuralism. Our discourse irreducibly belongs to the system of 
metaphysical oppositions. The break with this structure of belonging can be 
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announced only through a certain organization, a certain strategic arrangement 
which, within the field of metaphysical opposition, uses the strength of the field 
to turn its own stratagems against it, producing a force of dislocation that spreads 
itself throughout the entire system.”138 
The metaphysical system is dominant, but we must use it against itself, to see that webs 
of signification are always and everywhere differing, growing and decaying, altering. 
Contexts are contexts not as definable perimeters, but are contexts exactly because they 
can never be defined exhaustively. We are never finished and that means a constant 
awareness, a constant repetition of inversion. In my view this is clearest in Derrida and 
Zhuangzi, who argue extensively for constant guarding and endless provisionality.  
As an important point connected to this I would like to say something about the 
notions of nihilism and the related negativity and/or positivity in Heidegger, Derrida and 
Daoism. I now wish to deal with a number of scholars who have compared Heidegger 
and/or Derrida to Daoism, only to see some similarity in the negative aspects, after which 
they go on to claim that Daoism provides more solace, or therapeutic value than 
Heidegger or Derrida do, by offering a way out of the impasse of writing and 
metaphysics. Many interpreters have therefore maybe seen that in Daoism the inversion 
is a stage, they fail however to see a similar thing happening in Heidegger and Derrida. 
Hence the many accusations of nihilism, especially towards Derrida, but to a lesser extent 
also to Heidegger. I wish to argue otherwise that both Heidegger’s and Derrida’s thinking 
show definite signs of overcoming this nihilism in a positive affirmation, and provide 
equal ‘solace’ to the reader trained in Western ways of thinking. Yet this affirmation is 
never a third position over and against the simple opposites.  
                                                
138 Derrida 1978, 22, italics in original. 
 263
One author exemplary of the kind of reading which proposes Daoism as a ‘way 
out’ of the nihilism that Heidegger and Derrida seem unable to avoid, is Mark Berkson.139 
While to a large extent in agreement with Berkson, I must differ on exactly the point 
where he gives Zhuangzi the advantage over Derrida. Seeing Zhuangzi in this way, 
Berkson suggests that the Daoist sage “escapes the perspectivism of human-centered 
points of view trapped within systems by escaping the systems altogether in a Heaven’s-
eye view that illuminates all things to show their relativity and ultimate equality.”140 This 
is exactly the form of mysticism Heidegger showed to be firmly trapped in metaphysical 
thinking. By perceiving language as a trap, one suggests we must look for a way out of 
this undesirable trap, a search which Derrida has unmasked as one of the defining 
features of metaphysics. As Berkson says further on, Derrida “has no positive picture, no 
way to get out of an infinite play of signifiers.”141 That might be true, but it is only true 
because Derrida does not want to get out, since getting out implies a return to the 
metaphysical way of thinking he has been trying to undermine. The point is that many 
like Berkson believe in such a third position outside the realm of metaphysics and its 
nihilistic opposite, without realising that this search for a beyond and outside is itself in 
fact a return to metaphysics, be it as mysticism or otherwise. Heidegger argued against 
such a return. And in my view Derrida definitely has the advantage here over Berkson’s 
Zhuangzi. For first of all, the inversion of hierarchy that might lead (but not necessarily) 
to nihilism is indeed a stage to overcome, something to which Heidegger, Derrida, Laozi, 
Zhuangzi and Berkson would agree. It is a stage, aimed at showing how opposites are 
dependent on each other, how concepts, words and human thinking only function through 
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differences. Yet this overcoming of the hierarchy is neither to establish an inverse 
hierarchy, nor to move completely beyond the opposites into some dialectically 
conceived third realm. It is rather the realisation and recognition of the constant interplay 
of differences as “all there is” and the affirmation of this “all there is.” The realisation of 
a no-beyond means that no absolutes exist, and that goes as well for opposites. No 
absolute opposites exist, since one side always has traces of the other in itself, there is no 
purity. In Berkson’s view, which seems to be an exponent of the standard view, Zhuangzi 
proposes a sageliness that goes beyond language. What I have argued is that Derrida 
realises that such a position is impossible. Positively, the affirmation consists exactly in 
dealing with this impossibility of getting beyond language, in using it with full awareness 
of its dangers and shortcomings, and to not perceive these as dangers and shortcomings, 
but as possibilities which open up the world to us. It is, as I have argued, not an 
experience that goes beyond relationality, but an experience and affirmation of 
relationality. 
The second point I would make against Berkson is that he is exactly espousing the 
standard view that has Zhuangzi fleeing the world, or standing somewhere above it, 
where I have tried to argue that through a different understanding of his views of 
language we can argue that Zhuangzi can be seen differently, as espousing a similar view 
of language, and ultimately of the world, as Derrida, namely that it is processual, 
constantly provisional and that any identity is at least constantly shifting and a product of 
this process rather than a producer. 
There are a number of other scholars who seem to make the same point as 
Berkson, at least with regard to this aspect of comparison. Robert Magliola, J.J. Clarke 
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and Michael Saso all argue along similar lines: Derridean deconstruction, and to a lesser 
extent Heidegger’s thinking as well, leave us no way out of the quandary of nihilism, 
whereas Daoism, or Chan/Zen Buddhism take deconstruction ‘one step further’ to a 
reinstatement of some essentially ‘blissful’ or ‘tranquil’ harmonic position from which to 
see the world. Magliola suggests that the differential form of Chan Buddhism renders the 
ongoing process of paradoxes, ‘trace,’ somehow blissful since the Buddhist can slide “at 
will”142  between the logocentric and the deconstructive. Saso thinks the solution lies in 
transcending the necessary stage of deconstruction in some ‘intuitive’ metaphysical state 
outside space and time.143 And Clarke, although highly perceptive and appreciative of the 
similarities between Daoism and post-modernism, still ends up suggesting that 
deconstruction “tends to portray the (constructed) world as inherently banal and aimless, 
and therefore to exude a kind of scepticism that leads to cynicism and even despair rather 
than to wisdom or spiritual growth.”144 All I am suggesting is that these positions do not 
so much get stuck in the inversion of metaphysics, but fail to perceive that deconstruction 
can not be understood as the negative term of a dialectic process that seeks to overcome 
metaphysics (since that would mean a return to metaphysics) and that therefore 
deconstruction itself can not be overcome through positing some third realm outside 
space and time. The process is not metaphysics deconstruction synthesis in an 
Aufhebung that sees deconstruction as a stage. Derrida’s whole point is that the 
possibility of dialectic thinking and thereby of any Aufhebung itself is profoundly 
challenged by deconstructive ideas. As an example that Zhuangzi thinks in the same way, 
we could look at the following passage where Zhuangzi speaks of the ‘transformation of 
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things.’ After describing how everything constantly changes and is in process, he 
describes the person who understands dao:  
“He who understands the Way […] is certain to know how to deal with 
circumstances. And he who knows how to deal with circumstances will not allow 
things to do him harm. When a man has perfect virtue, fire cannot burn him, 
water cannot drown him, cold and heat cannot afflict him, birds and beasts 
cannot injure him. I do not say that he makes light of these things. I mean that he 
distinguishes between safety and danger, contents himself with fortune or 
misfortune, and is cautious in his comings and goings. Therefore nothing can 
harm him.”145 
The sage is not someone who floats beyond the earth, but one who knows how to deal 
with change. Especially the last part of this passage shows clearly how earthly, or 
worldly, Zhuangzi’s sage is. He is not one who lives in another realm, but one who 
understands the provisionality and transformation of this realm, affirms it and deals with 
it. 
If we see therapeutic value in this way, then obviously it is there in Heidegger and 
Derrida as well, if you know where to look and how to read it. Yet it is a different 
therapeutic value, one that does not deny or go beyond the problems, but lives with them. 
That is where the difference between positivity and affirmation comes in. Derrida 
observes, regarding his own work: “I would say that deconstruction is affirmation rather 
than questioning, in a sense which is not positive: I would distinguish between the 
positive, or positions, and affirmation.”146 Affirmation is different from taking a fixed 
position. In fact, affirmation denies the possibility of ever getting stuck in positions 
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exactly because it affirms the danger of thinking in hierarchies. And I have tried to show 
how in Daoism this also happens. No mysticism in fleeing the world, but ‘mysticism’ that 
acknowledges the world in all its facets. Heidegger and Derrida overemphasise the 
different, the other, not in order to merely inverse the hierarchy set up by metaphysics 
between opposite terms and concepts, but precisely to question that hierarchy itself. 
Daoism does so too, by saying ‘keep to the female’ it is not advocated to overturn the 
masculine, but to come to some sort of ever shifting equilibrium that acknowledges the 
necessity of both opposites.  
But is Daoism about reconciling the opposites or differences or about 
acknowledging them, because acknowledging is what Heidegger and Derrida do, when 
they say we should remain with the hinge, the lever, at the margin. Here we tread on 
precarious ground, because in the case of Daoism, something could be said for both. 
Laozi and some parts of Zhuangzi advocate some kind of third position, at least for the 
sage or ruler, whereas other parts of Laozi, Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang advocate the 
process of differentiation purely as itself. And even in Heidegger, we find hints that all 
his work is mere preparation, waiting for the advent of ‘Being’ in its true sense, although 
nobody knows how that may look. Yet I have tried to show how the part that 
acknowledges the world as it is, is at least equally strong, if not stronger, in most of what 
Heidegger, Derrida and the Daoists think. Thus the this-worldliness of Daoism is 
something I see as the dominant trend.  
Ames’ wider aim has often been to criticise the persistent characterisation of 
Daoism as negative, quietist and similar interpretations. What we must keep realising is 
that Daoism is about both yin and yang, not one more than the other, in spite of the 
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insistence of mostly the Daodejing on the more yin aspects of life. As the Book of 
Changes tells us: “The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way 
(Tao.)”147 In similar vein, Heidegger has explained logos as polemos. Derrida reduces the 
overly optimistic conceptuality of Western logic and language, yet finds himself always 
both inside and outside of metaphysics, or rather maybe in-between metaphysics and its 
other. What they all have in common is the acknowledgment of the play of different 
forces that shape and guide (our understanding of) the world. 
In Daoism one learns by reducing artificially constructed concepts and rules. In 
my view, since Daoists still speak, there is no reduction to meaninglessness, there is 
realisation of provisionality of all meaning. This again relates to the use “under erasure” 
of concepts by Derrida. 
So what I have argued for in this chapter is how there can be two ways of 
reappropriation which Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism seek to avoid. There is first of all 
the mere inversion of opposites, which takes the form of blaming Heidegger and Derrida 
of nihilism, or of saying that Daoism is mystical or a pure return to nature beyond 
language, or a scepticism or relativism that discredits language. But the second form of 
reappropriation lies in the fact that many interpreters of Daoism have taken this inversion 
as a stage to be overcome in a dialectic third position, somewhere and somehow beyond 
the workings of opposites and of language. To this I have tried to counter how Heidegger, 
Derrida and Laozi and Zhuangzi are fully aware of the impossibility of such an 
enterprise. And in this sense, my understanding of deconstruction is that it seeks out 
exactly how the reversal or inversion of hierarchies or opposites remains on the same 
level as the metaphysical approach in the first place, and that at the same time, 
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deconstruction shows how an overcoming of this dualism can no longer be a Hegelian 
sublimation. Overcoming metaphysical hierarchies is acknowledging that both sides of 
any dichotomy are always related and that the play between the two sides is not 
something we can step outside of. Chi-Hui Chien tries to relate this thinking of difference 
in the following way: “The double character of Tao, wu and yu, thus should be 
understood in terms of ‘both one and the other’ and ‘neither one nor the other.’”148 In 
other words, there is no way to get outside the double play of differance or dao 
understood in this way. To sum it up in Derrida’s words, deconstruction traces and sets to 
work “certain marks […] that can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) 
opposition, but which, however, inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and 
disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a 
solution in the form of a speculative dialectics.”149 
In order to ‘achieve’ the ‘disposition’ that Heidegger, Derrida and the Daoists are 
trying to convey, the question remains whether one should not rather try to write in a 
‘Daoist’ way? As a criticism of Western style scholarship, which has obvious 
connections to the logocentric tradition of searching for a final truth, this would make 
sense, but my point is that a similar ‘effect,’ if we can still speak of ‘achieving,’ 
‘dispositions’ and ‘effects,’ would come from writing in Heideggerian or Derridean 
fashion, in that such writing also upsets the standard view of language and thus of 
thinking. In fact, even a more standard version of ‘writing’ like a dissertation, if it insists 
like I do on seeing language and with that thinking in a different way, is able to point or 
at least guide us to such a changed attitude.  
                                                
148 Chien 1990, 45, quotation slightly modified. 
149 Derrida 1981b, 42-43, italics in original. 
 270
4.5 ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.  
“The heavens and the earth are not partial to institutionalized morality.”150  
One of the problems we face if we deny the standard interpretation of Daoism as an 
escape from the world in a return to nature or a dialectic sublimation, is the question of 
the ethical and political imports of the thoughts of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism. One 
of the most obvious problems we run into when trying to continue this non-metaphysical 
comparison on an ethical level is the lack of an absolute standard. Since there is no 
ultimate reality, or transcendental signified, relativism and nihilism seem to ensue. How 
do we compare the Daoist inclinations towards a non-metaphysical basis for ethical 
behaviour, wuwei and ziran, towards the ‘other’ in general, not rule-oriented or based on 
universal, rational or otherwise foundational principles, but critical of artificial 
constructs, with Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, authenticity and Geviert, and with Derrida’s 
notions of responsibility, openness, opening up of power structures which have had and 
continue to have such influence on our societies?  
It is impossible to separate thinking from ethics and politics: Heidegger argued 
that our way of thinking had become ‘technological,’ and Derrida, amongst others, has 
argued for an understanding of the essential ethical and political implications of so-called 
‘fundamental’ research. This means that he argues for an ethical awareness in both 
science and philosophy. No matter how rational, objective, abstract or remote or value-
free some research might look, and that includes philosophy, there are always ways in 
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which this research has ethical implications. We must in some way be responsibly aware 
of these implications. And there is no denying that the Daodejing is at least in part (also) 
a political treatise. 
In reality, these implications can be seen from the fact that Heidegger (and 
Nietzsche) have been annexed by the Nazis, Derrida has been ‘accused’ of being both left 
wing and right wing,151 and Daoism for its part has been connected with anarchist 
inclinations for its insistence on laissez faire government in the Daodejing and freedom 
in the Zhuangzi, but also with the totalitarian system of the legalists.152 One can take a 
negative view and reproach all three for failing to provide an ethical system based on 
their respective philosophies and thus for being open to appropriation by different ethical 
systems. However, this has often been suggested and I find it rather simplistic to think it 
that easy to condemn the three. The relations between the philosophies expounded and 
political or ethical power systems which have taken over and reinterpreted their ideas, are 
far from simple and different in each instance. 
In the case of Daoism, its incorporation into the legalist despotism by Han Feizi 
took a parallel approach to it in acknowledging the forces of nature, but suggesting that 
these could be mastered and used by the government to stabilize society.153 Yet Daoism 
is at the same time often used in anarchistic arguments for abolishing any and every kind 
of government. What are we to make of all these accusations and implications? In each 
case there seems to be an appropriation of the ‘original’ thinkers by others with their own 
agenda. While the history of these appropriations is not to be denied, it might be more 
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1992, 344 and on. 
153 See Graham 1989, 289. 
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fruitful to return to the ‘originals’ and see whether we can find their ethical positions 
directly. But we must first of all remember that to criticise certain current systems and 
theories of morality and politics is not an argument against ethics and politics in itself. 
The fact that Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism deconstruct their respective structural 
systems of thought, and thereby of ethics, is not a warrant for saying that they therefore 
do no believe in any ethics. 
The ethics and politics of performative language could provide a meeting place 
for Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism, as all three are intent on showing how language 
actually does something to the way the world is perceived and therefore also to the way 
the world is run. It is undoubtedly so that the metaphysical outlook of the West has, 
through its functioning in language, created the kind of rationalistic and scientistic view 
of the world that is dominant, and thereby has also disallowed other views of how the 
world functions and how we should find our place in it, by excluding such considerations 
from the framework of meaningful discussion, at least within philosophy. Thinking 
within such a structure but criticising it, means being open to the charge of irrationality, 
or nihilism. Once we understand that Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism try not to get stuck 
in the inversion of this scheme, another way of seeing their contributions opens up. We 
should therefore question the longstanding idea that if we acknowledge that there is no 
constant dao, we must therefore discredit all norms. Or in other words, we must question 
the idea that if one adheres to a certain form of relativism, all is relative. This plainly is a 
very superficial understanding of relativism. To argue that “things are ties to each 
other”154 does not necessitate the conclusion that there are therefore no standards or 
norms at all. As I have shown in the case of Derrida, the fact that something is 
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complicated, questioned and challenged, does not necessarily mean that it is therefore to 
be totally discarded. And the fact that there are patterns of change with some continuity 
within the process of change tells us that meaning can still arise within the webs of 
signification, as relational and situational. The performative function, or rather character, 
of language makes it instantly and of necessity relate to what is outside of it.155 This 
means that philosophy is always about its outside, its other, something which again we 
can see in an ethical way, in the sense that we must take care not to impose, through our 
use of language, artificial structures, and thus hindrances, to the development of things 
from themselves. The views of language that Heidegger, Derrida and Daoists give us are 
then already implicated in otherness, and show a responsiveness to and respect for 
otherness. The performative in language is, in Derrida’s terminology, a ‘yes’ to otherness 
which is located before philosophy, thus in a way outside of it yet constitutive of it. 
On the ethical level, notions of letting things take their natural course are readily 
found both in Heidegger and Daoism. And together with Derrida’s idea of 
responsiveness, all three advocate an attitude of openness to things unfamiliar, a letting 
be of difference. This in response to the perceived artificiality of the ideas current in their 
respective times. Thus the Daoists argue against the artificial Confucian standards, which 
they actually see as an obstacle to the development of natural or unmediated morality. 
Morality in this unmediated sense will develop of itself, it is ziran or spontaneous, 
without the artificial imposition of rules and regulations. Heidegger argues against the 
‘they’ (Man) attitude of social conventions and tries to establish how Gelassenheit could 
help us overcome this artificial approach. Derrida searches for ways to affirm otherness 
and to criticise the dominance of certain power systems. With this he seeks to establish a 
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natural responsiveness to others that is certainly ethical, reminiscent, as we have seen, of 
Levinas. Yet a difficulty arises when we start thinking about how far this openness 
should extend. Should we let things be even if they are harmful to us?156 It is only 
Zhuangzi who seems to have no problem with this, since he advocates an affirmation of 
life in all its aspects.157 But Heidegger, Derrida and Laozi do advocate certain restraints 
of the people. Thus ‘following nature’ inevitably becomes ‘following certain parts of 
nature, but not all of nature.’ The unlearning of conventions, the reducing day by day of 
knowledge that is artificial, should lead one to spontaneous inclinations, but in how far 
these spontaneous inclinations are purely natural is dubious, and even more so the 
question how they can point to an ethical system? Even Derrida had to acknowledge that 
he was arguing for notions such as democracy and human rights ‘under erasure,’ meaning 
they eventually came from the system he tried to undo. The challenge is to see whether 
and how these ideals can also be derived from the thinking of Heidegger, Derrida and the 
Daoists themselves.  
Graham has called the Daoist ideal society a “paternalistic anarchism.”158 This 
means that the people order themselves by themselves through their own ways, 
spontaneously, but the ruler has to oversee this and make sure nothing interferes with this 
spontaneity. That is why it is said in chapter 17 of the Daodejing that the best rulers are 
invisible, nobody knows more than that they are there.159 Wuwei and ziran are effectively 
two sides of the same coin, in the sense that by acting wuwei we are following the ziran 
                                                
156 We must remember J.S. Mill’s principle that the individual is free to do as he or she pleases as long as it 
does not harm others, an injunction of singular importance in present day problematics. 
157 See the discussions on the transformation and death of people in chapters 3, 6 and 18 of the Zhuangzi for 
example. 
158 Graham 1989, 303. 
159 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 101-103. 
 275
course of nature. However, in the Daodejing, and to a lesser extent in the Zhuangzi as 
well, there is the suggestion of a supervisor overseeing this process and keeping it from 
degenerating into artificiality. Exactly how this is to be achieved is unclear though, 
besides referring back to wuwei and ziran. 
Heidegger and Derrida were very much proponents of an ethical way of life, yet it 
is equally hard to establish where Gelassenheit or the decision to responsibility lead in 
actual societies. Derrida’s ethical ideas stem largely from Levinas’ notion of the other. 
Ethics arises as a direct consequence of an opening towards what is ‘other,’ both in 
Heidegger and in Derrida. Since what is ‘other’ is always inserted into the self, and thus 
constitutive for it, it becomes impossible not to acknowledge the other, and that means a 
responsiveness that entails a responsibility. This responsibility is direct, not derived from 
some greater source or origin, but purely as a consequence of the relationality to alterity 
or difference. In early Heideggerian terminology, Dasein is always Mitsein, being-with, 
and its way of being is Sorge, care. The Geviert or fourfold of the later Heidegger 
similarly suggests that we, as mortals, are part of the world and thus have to care for it. In 
Derrida, responsiveness to the other leads to responsibility for the other. The same 
happens in Daoism, in so far as no preference is given to the self, and in so far as Daoism 
suggests we should let all things be what they inherently are. This letting be is then 
actively a responsibility not to interfere with the natural inclinations of other things. This 
is indeed an ethical position, yet the problem remains how this can avoid becoming a 
total ‘anything goes’ in the political sphere. The sages let things be what they are, but 
“[a]lthough they are quite capable of helping all things (wanwu) follow their own course 
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(ziran), they would not think of doing so.”160 From the ethical acknowledgment of 
otherness to political action that helps others is a difficult step, one the Daoist seems not 
to want to take.  
Simon Critchley argues that although there is an ethics in Derrida, and although 
Derrida definitely has a political agenda, to philosophically connect these seems to pose a 
problem.161 The same problem is applicable to Heidegger and to Daoism. Critchley 
argues that what he calls the ‘political’ and ‘politics’ are two different fields. Philosophy 
is about the ‘political,’ it can not do or get implied in real ‘politics.’ Heidegger’s ill-
conceived rectorate in 1933 serves as an example, and so do the many instances of Daoist 
political advisors in the Zhuangzi. Does this mean that philosophy, thinking, can only 
give an ethical foundation, but never move beyond the vagueness of this foundation? It 
would seem so, since this foundation can apparently be used in politics in very diverse 
and even opposite directions. 
In the Daoist case, the political actions seem to range from advice to the ruler in 
the Daodejing to set up a Daoist state, to the legalist despotism of Han Feizi, to the retreat 
approach of the Zhuangzi, advocating detachment from the world of politics and seeing 
self-preservation as a good valued above that of the state. Are such diverse interpretations 
misunderstandings of the real political meaning of Daoism, or is there no such real 
meaning? My line of argument goes in the second direction, the meaning of these texts at 
a level of politics can be open, yet the point of this section is to show that although these 
diverse interpretations are possible, that does not mean that there is no foundation of 
ethics to be found in Daoism. The foundation is there, but of necessity vague and open in 
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that it is only openness to otherness. In deconstructive fashion, it just shows that there is 
always an underlying assumption of otherness inherent in the same, an otherness that 
prohibits pure identity.    
In Daoism, this idea takes a form that is central to the yin-yang cosmology, which 
is that the mutual influences of opposites are unavoidable and that we therefore better be 
in a position to respond to deflections and irregularities. We should not try, as in the 
West, to assert only one point of view as the best, or to do away with ‘evil’ altogether, 
because these views are self-defeating, we must rather acknowledge differences of 
opinion, and work with these as our basic assumptions. We can not try to undo the yang 
side altogether, but must constantly shift within the yin-yang range of options. In Antonio 
S. Cua’s words, “tao as a vision of harmony appears to lie in its emphasis on opposites as 
complements.”162 
Heidegger’s Dasein, as we have seen, is fundamentally Mitsein, Sorge. In his later 
work, Dasein, or the mortals, form an integral part of the Fourfold (Geviert). Dasein 
comes to be understood from the complex of relations to the heavens, the earth, the 
divinities and other mortals. This is comparable to the Daoist individual who only exists 
as the function of a matrix of relationships, thus ever changing without a fixed core.  
Derrida’s work is filled with political undertone, and Derrida is noted for having 
called logocentrism ‘ethnocentric’ in the sense of Eurocentric, and metaphysics as 
perpetuating Western power structures.163 Deconstruction is as much about criticising 
those power structures as it is about the language in which they thrive. Derrida’s more 
political writings include not just arguments against the more straightforwardly political 
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institutions, but also against academic and publishing institutions. His ‘decision’ or ‘yes’ 
could be compared to Zhuangzi saying that we should see everything as both ‘this’ and 
‘not this.’ A realisation and affirmation of relationality again ensues, which in Derrida’s 
case means that subjectivity can only be understood as a function of difference, through 
the workings of differance.  
In trying to apply their thinking to politics, one of the implications of Heidegger, 
Derrida and Daoism could be the stress on the overcoming of dualistic thinking which, 
because the opposites that were thought of were always constructed in a hierarchical 
manner, are now overturned, and although this overturning is, as we have seen, but a 
stage of the process, it should still reveal an approach based more on equality and less on 
hierarchy.   
4.6 CONCLUDING THE COMPARISON.  
I have shown in this chapter how a non-metaphysical reading of Daoism can yield fruitful 
comparisons with Heidegger and Derrida, although obviously important differences 
remain. I have sought to relieve the protagonists of the charge of nihilism, relativism, 
and/or scepticism. My argument has been that the inversion of opposites, or the negative 
approach, is not to be seen as a mere inversion, yet also not to be sublimated in a dialectic 
third position, which is what has happened in a lot of interpretations of Daoism. Through 
a reading of Heidegger and Derrida that discredits these interpretations of Daoism, we 
can start understanding new possibilities of reading them all that involve an 
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acknowledgment of the interplay of differences and the in-between of these differences as 
their relationality. In doing so however, we must remain aware of the dangers the 
proponents themselves point to, especially the danger of language and the ensuing danger 
in trying to extrapolate an ethics and politics from them. There are ethical implications of 
their thinking, and we should actively take responsibility for the interpretations we give 
to these ethical implications. 
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CONCLUSION.  
Many interpretations of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism get stuck in the inversion of 
opposites, since these interpretations do not look beyond their negative approach. This 
also goes for many comparisons of Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism. These comparisons 
get stuck in a sort of negative theology, replacing one fundamental principle with 
another, which is just vaguer and more ineffable. Throughout this dissertation I have tried 
to show how neither Heidegger, nor Derrida, nor Laozi and Zhuangzi propose such a 
negative guiding principle, but instead focus on the inability of everyday language to 
show us beyond this inversion. While not wanting to get stuck in the inversion, we have 
to be careful when claiming to go beyond it. Many comparative philosophers seem to 
argue for some kind of dialectic third position which would somehow sublimate the 
ongoing processes of difference in a static unity. I have argued that neither Heidegger, 
nor Derrida, nor the Daoists advocate such a sublimated position. The point is rather to 
see this third position as an affirmation and realisation of the constant play of differences 
alternatively called Being, differance or dao, which are but a few names that have been 
given provisionally. My presentation of the proponents of this kind of thinking has 
hopefully made it clear how this affirmation need not plunge us into a debilitating 
relativism, but can rather be understood as a productive possibility. By understanding 
from context and relationality, relativism, nihilism and scepticism can be avoided. 
Meaning exists, yet never absolute and never beyond this world. 
Similarly, comparative philosophy as a discipline should look at itself in this way. 
Not content with merely pointing to similarities it has moved on to pointing to 
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differences, and should move on again to pointing beyond the differences, though not in 
some overall fusion of horizons, but in acknowledging differences while not succumbing 
to the charge of absolute relativism that is then levelled against this acknowledging. Like 
Heidegger and Derrida, and like Laozi and Zhuangzi, it should seek to understand the 
differences as productive, and to make these differences work to dismantle the system 
that denies them a valid place. In Clarke’s words: 
“The benefits lie more in the tensions and differences that prevail and which 
continue to place Daoism and contemporary philosophical thinking in a creative 
counterpoint with each other rather than in comforting unison.”1  
Metaphorically speaking, the relations between Heidegger and Laozi on the one 
hand and Derrida and Zhuangzi on the other can be pictured in the following way. Life is 
seen as a tree, and a tree grows from the roots, so we need to return to these roots. But 
where Heidegger sought to find a ground in which the roots were firmly planted through 
language as Saying, Derrida exposes the roots themselves by wiping away the loose soil 
that language is made of. Both the notions of roots and ground then lose their ultimate 
values. Similarly, Laozi advocated a return to a primitive, natural way of life, the roots, 
and sought to establish an ultimate ground for this, dao, even if this ground, like 
Heidegger’s, was not to be understood as a metaphysical, transcendent ground. Zhuangzi 
then shows the ultimate provisionality of such an enterprise in his relativistic or relational 
approach.  
In this dissertation I have tried to show that Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism can 
fruitfully be compared on a different level, or a different field, for they are indeed “the 
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sort that roams beyond the guidelines.”2 Or rather, on the guidelines, in the margins, on 
the periphery of our normal everyday thinking. From these margins, we can derive new 
readings of old terms like Sein, logos, differance, trace and dao, ziran, wuwei, tian by 
different scholars, like Heidegger, Derrida, Guo Xiang, Ames, Hall, Hansen and others, 
and taking these seriously (instead of remaining stuck within the guidelines, that is the 
metaphysical interpretations and the language which perpetuates these interpretations by 
denying the possibility of thinking otherwise), there will open up a new level of 
comparison that is non-metaphysical in inclination. Whether this new reading of Daoism 
is in fact historically and culturally more accurate must be left open. First of all I am not 
in a position to judge here, so that must be left to others more qualified. Second and more 
importantly, my point would be that if it did not fit into our preconceived ideas of the 
cultural and historical sphere of the ancient Chinese, these preconceived interpretations 
might themselves stand in need of rereading in the same way. And similarly it has always 
been my intention to follow Heidegger when he said that we have to think “more Greek” 
than the Greeks themselves. Heidegger was well aware of the fact that we can not bridge 
the gap to any ancient society, and that the real challenge lies in making them speak to us, 
and in thinking through them in such a way that we can think what they maybe left 
unthought or what was passed over in the history of subsequent interpretations.  
In comparing, the position of language has been extremely important. Not only 
have I argued that language, understood in a broad way, is an essential feature of our 
experiences, at least in the sense that experiences only gain meaning through language, 
but as such, I have argued that the proponents of this comparison do not argue for some 
position beyond language. In other words, neither Heidegger, nor Derrida, nor Laozi and 
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Zhuangzi argue for transcending language to some pure, direct and unmediated 
experience of the ‘real’ world. At the very least our humanity mediates experience, and 
our languages provide meaning, however provisional. Heidegger, Derrida and the Daoists 
are extremely aware of the necessity of language, and all in their own way argue for an 
opening up of language to its own possibilities, rather than remaining in its limited 
metaphysical field. Language is not denied, but a certain idea and use of language, the 
metaphysical or propositional and representational use, is denied dominance and 
superiority over other avenues. In its place we must seek to use language to its fullest, 
which will in turn point us to the interplay of differences, or that process we are part of, 
sometimes called, provisionally, dao, differance, or Being. 
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